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 Cost-benefit analysis has long been a popular method of policy analysis.  When 
applied to policies affecting the environment, however, it faced a serious problem.  Many 
policies exert environmental impacts that are external to market transactions, so the 
monetary values of these impacts resist measurement.  Specifically, price and quantity 
information, normally the demand and associated values of normal goods, are missing for 
many environmental goods.  This shortcoming in cost-benefit analysis has led some 
researchers to develop indirect and nonmarket methods of valuing environmental goods 
monetarily.  Three prevalent methods have been developed and widely used over the last 
few decades:  the travel cost method, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation.  
However, these tools’ development and growth in popularity over the last few decades 
have been accompanied by much debate over the reliability and validity of the methods 
and their results.  This dissertation research tests the convergent validity of these popular 
environmental valuation tools through a meta-analysis of effect sizes from a sample of 
studies using these tools.  The results bring statistical evidence to the debate over their 
uses, and refine the conditions of their implementation by identifying factors that affect 
their results. 
 
Tools of Environmental Valuation 
 The travel cost method recognizes that travel costs are an important component of 
the full cost of visiting any site and enjoying certain environmental goods, and that there 




environmental goods by analyzing consumption behavior in markets directly related to 
the good.  The costs of obtaining or enjoying the services of the environmental asset are 
used as a proxy for price.  The method is conducted through surveys of travelers to sites 
with environmental amenities to be valued.  The surveys ask travelers questions about 
their trips to the sites, the purposes of the trips, the distances traveled, the time and 
money spent, and their socio-economic characteristics.  From the survey data, researchers 
estimate demand curves for the sites and extrapolate their values to relevant populations 
(Freeman, 1993, p. 445).  The method assumes weak complementarity between the 
environmental good and the consumption expenditure.  It is thus possible to infer the 
value of a change in the environmental good from the demand for the market good.   
 A major advantage of this method of environmental valuation is that it is based on 
real, observable market behavior, giving the method some degree of construct validity.  A 
key problem with the travel cost method, however, is that it assumes that users of the 
environmental goods do perceive and respond to the variations in the levels and qualities 
of them (David, 1971; Freeman, 1993, p. 447).  Also, weak complementarity methods are 
properly interpreted as only the lower bounds of maximum willingness to pay.   
 Hedonic pricing is also a weak complementarity method.  It recognizes that 
sometimes the quantity or quality of an environmental good can be an attribute of a 
market good.  In these cases, information on the value of the environmental good is 
embedded in the prices and consumption levels for the marketed goods, and analysis of 
this information can extract the inferred value of the environmental good (Freeman, 1993, 
p. 124).  The method is conducted through statistical analysis of the marketed good, 




characteristics including environmental amenities.  Through regression analysis of the 
data and differential calculus the method isolates the relationships between the levels of 
environmental goods and the prices of the homes.   
Like the travel cost method, a major advantage of hedonic pricing is that it 
indirectly measures the values of nonmarket goods from real, observable market behavior 
(Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 17).  However, also like the travel cost 
method, one of its major disadvantages is its reliance on the assumption that consumers 
of the related market goods perceive the differences in environmental amenities, which 
might not be evident (David, 1971; Hite, 1998).  Like other weak complementarity 
methods, hedonic pricing also underestimates maximum willingness to pay. 
 The third method, contingent valuation, takes a very straightforward approach to 
valuing environmental goods.  It directly asks people the maximum amount they would 
pay for an improvement in an environmental amenity, or the minimum amount of 
payment they would accept for a reduction in an environmental amenity, if it were traded 
in a market.  The responses to the question then represent the value of the environmental 
change (Freeman, 1993, p. 165).  In this method, values are not indirectly inferred from 
market behavior, but directly asked outside of a real market.  Data for contingent 
valuation are gathered through carefully structured surveys that describe hypothetical 
markets in which the goods are traded.  After responses to contingent valuation surveys 
are gathered, the data can then be analyzed to estimate mean values, test hypotheses 
about the influence of income and other demographic characteristics on value, and 




Contingent valuation is unlike the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods in very 
important ways.  First, it is able to measure nonuse values, values people place on 
environmental goods from which they gain no actual use.  Use values, on the other hand, 
are those derived from the current direct or indirect use of the amenity.  In contrast to the 
contingent valuation method, the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods can only 
measure use values.  Second, data for contingent valuation come from stated preferences 
of respondents, rather than from market behaviors.  In contrast, the hedonic pricing and 
travel cost methods are based on revealed preferences from the subjects' real market 
consumption of weak complements of the environmental goods.  Contingent valuation’s 
reliance on stated preferences makes the method susceptible to strategic responses.  
Finally, economic theory predicts that welfare estimates from contingent valuation should 
be different than those from hedonic pricing and the travel cost method, but there is 
dispute over the direction of the difference.   
 
Popularity and Controversy 
All three of these methods have facilitated the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
environmental decision making, and they have been used extensively in recent decades.  
This is most obviously evident in the numbers of environmental valuation studies 
performed.  For example, Carson, Wright, Alberini, Carson, and Flores (1994) compiled 
an extensive bibliography on just one method of environmental valuation, contingent 
valuation, and found 1,672 articles.  Overall, these environmental valuation efforts have 




assessment, environmental costing, and environmental accounting (Navrud & Pruckner, 
1997).   
 The use of these tools has also been popularized and highlighted in benefit 
transfer studies.  These are policy analyses that use results of existing valuation studies, 
implemented for their own specific purposes and contexts, to evaluate policy choices in 
other contexts (Brookshire & Neill, 1992).  The most obvious advantages of the method 
are its economies of money and time (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 9-10; 
Freeman, 1993, p. 484; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 264).  Indeed, the benefit transfer 
method has become a “bedrock” (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 1) of 
environmental policy analysis, and the valuation studies supporting the method have 
become useful beyond their original intent.   
 Despite the popularity of these environmental valuation methods and their use in 
environmental cost-benefit analysis, they are controversial.  Economists and others have 
taken all sides of the discussion on the reliability and validity of the methods and their 
normative implications.  On one extreme, strong proponents of environmental valuation 
and cost-benefit analysis place much confidence in the theory behind the tools used.  For 
Freeman (1993) and other leaders of environmental valuation, state of the art tools such 
as the travel cost method, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation represent valid 
approaches to infer monetary value of environmental goods.  Furthermore, utilizing these 
tools allows government decision makers to effectively address a wide range of 
environmental policy problems such as setting efficient levels of environmental standards 
and analyzing the net benefits of existing and proposed regulations.  Less enthusiastic 




concerned with the vulnerabilities of the tools but concede the necessity of measuring the 
monetary values of environmental goods in a market economy.  The National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration’s blue ribbon panel on contingent valuation exemplify 
this position.  The panel endorsed contingent valuation as a means of valuing 
environmental goods, but they tempered their endorsement with a long list of procedural 
cautions stemming from the technical vulnerabilities of the method (Arrow et al., 1993).   
On the other side of the debate are a range of opponents to cost-benefit analysis 
applied to environmental policies and environmental valuation itself.  Marginal 
opponents are those who like the idea of including monetary valuations of the 
environment in policy analyses, but see too many problems with the methods currently 
available (e.g., Green & Tunstall, 1991; Kellert, 1984; Neill, Cummings, Ganderton, 
Harrison, & McGuckin, 1994).  They note deficiencies in the environmental valuation 
tools that proponents of the tools also recognize.  Some highlight the cognitive 
difficulties of answering valuation questions in contingent valuation (Desvousges, 
Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 15-16).  Others point to the inability of revealed 
preference methods to include nonuse values in their measures, as well as the unverifiable 
and unsatisfactory state of the art of the one method that can measure it (Goodland & 
Ledec, 1994, p. 452).  Perhaps the most common criticisms of current environmental 
valuation tools are the inconsistencies and biases in their results (e.g., Balistreri, 
McClelland, Poe, & Schulze, 2001; Boyle, MacDonald, Cheng, & McCollum, 1998; 
Kealy, Dovidio, & Rockel, 1988; Loomis, Brown, Lucero, & Peterson, 1996; Loomis, 




results of environmental valuation efforts can be so unreliable and subjective that their 
use in policy decision making has been detrimental to the environment instead of helpful.   
Finally, at the other extreme of the continuum, there are strong opponents of 
environmental valuation who object to the very idea of monetizing environmental values.  
Their arguments are mostly normative, pointing to the inappropriateness of utilitarian 
ethics applied to environmental policies.  Kelman (1998), for example, argues that 
environmental goods are priceless and not for sale, so cost-benefit analysis is not 
applicable.  Instead, he claims, environmental policies are more appropriately judged by 
deontological criteria.  Sagoff (1997, 1981) concurs, arguing that the true value people 
place on environmental goods is not confined to market prices nor to people’s desires as 
consumers.  Instead, when people judge the value of environmental goods they do so 
from their obligations as citizens.   
 As if the above controversy over the validity and ethics of environmental 
valuation were not enough, the debate’s fire has been recently fanned by the growth of 
benefit transfer studies.  The method assumes the generalizability of the existing 
literature (Smith, 1992), but does not necessarily verify it.  This is problematic because 
most applications of the travel cost, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation methods 
have been used to evaluate specific, local environmental changes, with their 
generalizability only qualitatively assessed or left to the judgment of their readers 
altogether.   
 Given the popularity of these methods and the controversy surrounding them, it is 
surprising that there have been very few meta-analyses of valuation studies.  Existing 




However, these studies attempted to find the determinants of value, rather than test the 
validity of the methods.  Indeed, Smith and Pattanayak (2002) reviewed 15 meta-analyses 
of nonmarket valuation and found that 13 of them sought to synthesize valuations of 
specific goods and identify the determinants of the values.   
One meta-analysis, however, attempted to address the validity of two valuation 
methods (Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996).  Its findings generally support the 
validity of the methods, but they were based only on studies that compared stated and 
revealed preference methods together.  No one has yet compared the results of different 
stated preference and weak complementarity studies for the purpose of testing the 
convergent validity of the valuation tools.  Furthermore, none of the existing meta-
analyses have used effect sizes as the outcome measure of valuation studies, a common 
practice in meta-analyses that facilitates a broader examination of original studies.  This 
dissertation research fills the gap in the meta-analyses of environmental economics by 
testing the convergent validity of three environmental valuation methods and refining 
their proper contextual uses. 
 
Method 
 The guiding questions of this research are, “are the results from different 
environmental valuation methods collectively reliable, are there contexts in which they 
are more reliable than others, and – to the extent possible – are the results valid?”  Thus, 
there are two objectives for this research.  First, it tests the convergent validity of the 
valuation methods.  Convergence of results is not a sufficient determinant of validity, but 




identifies moderating variables explaining the variance in the valuations.  Second, this 
research folds the results of these statistical analyses into the broader normative 
discussion surrounding environmental valuation.   
 To accomplish these objectives, I performed an extensive meta-analysis of 
environmental valuation studies.  The statistical mechanics of meta-analysis varies with 
the information available from the studies evaluated, but the framework of all meta-
analyses is common (Cooper & Hedges, 1994, pp. 9-13; Hunt, 1997; Hunter & Schmidt, 
1990).  It consists of collecting studies applicable to the research question, coding 
information from them, and analyzing the coded data.  The primary hypotheses tested by 
this method are the existence of moderating variables explaining the variance among the 
studies’ effect sizes.  The primary variable of interest is the method of valuation.  This 
essentially is the test of convergent validity, because if all three methods validly measure 
environmental values, then the method used should not moderate value.  Other variables 
tested for their moderating effects include the type of environmental good, the magnitude 
of environmental change, the description of environmental change, the years of the data, 
and the locations of the studies. 
The above hypotheses were tested by statistical analysis of data collected from the 
existing body of environmental valuation studies.  Following the meta-analytic 
framework, the research began with a thorough and systematic search for applicable 
studies, followed by the coding of information from the studies.  Studies included in the 
data set met three criteria: they were published in leading environmental valuation 
journals, employed at least one of the three valuation methods of interest, and 




 I searched five bibliographic databases pertaining to environmental issues.  In 
each database I systematically searched for journal articles pertaining to the travel cost 
method, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation.  The journals cited in these searches 
were recorded, as well as the number of hits for each journal.  Altogether, 141 journals 
were cited, with 753 hits (including multiple hits from more than one database).  
However, over a third of all hits came from just five journals.  These top five journals 
were manually searched.  To capture the most current practices used in each of the 
valuation methods, I started the literature search from December 2001 and worked back 
to the beginnings of the contemporary practices of each method, which provided a 
sufficient sample for the statistical analyses.  From each study meeting the criteria of 
inclusion a list of variables was coded, and these variables provided the data for the 
statistical analyses.   
Analysis of the resulting data consisted of descriptive statistics, calculations of 
effect sizes, and tests for moderating variables.  Effect sizes are standardized measures of 
the impact the independent variable has on the dependent variable.  In this research the 
effect sizes are differences in valuation for an environmental good that is subject to 
degradation or improvement.  Calculations of effect sizes vary according to the 
information reported in the original studies, but follow the general form 
 
d = (YE – YC)/S, 
 
 
where YE - YC is the difference in average effect (valuation) before and after the 
treatment (change in environmental quality), and S is the pooled standard deviation from 




facilitating comparability between studies.  With effect sizes calculated, the heart of the 
meta-analysis proceeded with the combining of effect sizes while adjusting for sample 
size, and testing for the moderating effect of variables   
 
Data and Results 
 The manual search resulted in over 400 articles dealing with some aspect of these 
environmental valuation methods.  Further examination of these resulted in a total of 228 
articles that met all the selection criteria.  These 228 articles were analyzed in depth and 
their data were coded.  The 228 cases resulted in a total of 614 valuations of changes in 
environmental goods.  With these data, the body of environmental valuation studies were 
characterized as such:  
 
 Water, land, and air are well represented in the valuation studies.  Animals are too, 
but the diversity of species valued make their comparability, and the transferability of 
their results, questionable.  Other environmental goods such as plants, toxics, and 
wastes, have received relatively little attention in environmental valuation. 
 
 Contingent valuation is the most popularly used valuation method, representing a 
majority of the valuations in this data set.   
 
 Different methods tend to be used in different situations.  Specifically, contingent 
valuation tends to be used with qualitative descriptions of holistic changes in 




favored when valuing animals.  Hedonic pricing tends to be used with quantitative 
descriptions of incremental changes.  Its use has been limited to valuing water, land, 
and especially air.  The travel cost method is rarely used to value changes in 
environmental goods.  
 
 Certain journals disproportionately publish valuations from different places, of 
different goods, or using different methods.   
 
 Although environmental valuation outside of the U.S. has received little attention, the 
attention it has received is heavily focused on land values, and less so on air or animal 
values.  Also, valuations outside the U.S. are more likely to employ contingent 
valuation than hedonic pricing or the travel cost method. 
 
 There has been a sharp rise in environmental valuation studies since the mid-1980s.  
The rise has been characterized by studies on land and water goods, and studies 
employing contingent valuation.  The rise coincides with a few events – especially the 
maturation of contingent valuation – that have helped make environmental valuation 
popular. 
 
 For each observation with sufficient reported information an effect size was 
calculated.  The effect sizes were corrected for sampling error and combined, following 
Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) procedures.  The average effect size weighted by sample 




value of an environmental good due to its improvement is 6.90 standard deviations.  This 
summary statement overlooks all the variance there is in the studies generating this data 
set, but the direction and order of magnitude of the mean effect size is instructive.  It tells 
us that, assuming the validity of the valuation methods (an assumption questioned in this 
research), people do place a significant monetary value on improved conditions of the 
environment.  However, tests of homogeneity strongly suggested the presence of 
moderating variables.  Thus, the hypothesized moderators were next tested, including 
environmental good, magnitude of change, description of change, valuation method, year 
of data collection, and location of study.  Those found to be significant were included in 
regression analyses of effect sizes, to determine the relative effects of the moderators.  
These analyses resulted in the following conclusions: 
 
 Type of good is a significant moderator.  Air and water have significantly larger 
average effect sizes than land and animal, and air has a significantly larger average 
effect size than water. 
 
 Magnitude of change and type of description of change are significant moderators, 
but their effects are mixed.  These conflicting results may be due to validity problems 
in the measures themselves. 
 
 The method of valuation, the primary variable in this research, is a significant 
moderator.  Effect sizes from contingent valuations are, on average, significantly 




significant difference between the effect sizes of the travel cost and hedonic pricing 
methods.  On average, contingent valuation produces effect sizes that average 40% to 
55% less than those of the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods.  The difference 
varies with the environmental goods valued.  There is evidence, however, that 
contingent valuations have become more reliable over time.  Even so, the difference 
between the results of contingent valuations and  travel cost or hedonic pricing 
methods remain significant.  There are competing explanations for this difference, 
including the researchers’ designs, the respondents’ replies, and the scopes of the 
methods’ measurements.  
 
 The year of data collection is not a significant modifier.  There is not significant 
evidence to demonstrate changes in environmental values over the years. 
 
 Location of study is a significant moderator.  Effect sizes in the United States average 
twice the magnitude of all other countries in the data set, but the relatively small 
number of foreign studies in the data set casts doubt on this finding.  Within the 
United States effect sizes in California are, on average, significantly different than 
those from other states in the data set.  Specifically, effect sizes for air tend to be 
much smaller in California, and those for land tend to be much larger. 
 
 While these results are supported by much empirical evidence, they do have 
limitations.  The most apparent are the unexplained variance in the regression models and 




spurious effects in the analyses.  A common limitation of any meta-analysis is the 
possibility of publication bias, but this is not of great concern to this meta-analysis 
because of the size of the data set and because several studies did report insignificant 
effects.  A final limitation of these results is perhaps the most important: its 
generalizability.  The sample of studies in this research is not representative, but were 
selected from the most prolific journals in environmental valuation to presumably capture 
high quality studies.  This strategy was used to qualitatively minimize the chances of a 
type 1 error.  The consequence of this strategy is that the magnitude of the divergence is 




 Following these analyses, the most fundamental question that must now be asked 
is, “What do environmental valuations tell us?”  The evidence in this research does not 
completely support one side of the debate over environmental valuation, but it certainly 
leans with the critics.  Interestingly, the evidence brings attention to a second question 
that appears equally important: “Whose values do they represent?” 
 Addressing the first question, proponents and opponents agree that environmental 
valuations are intended to measure economic values of environmental goods.  Total 
economic value of environmental goods is composed of direct use values, indirect use 
values, option values, existence values, and bequest values (Barbier, 1994).  But the three 
methods of valuation do not all claim to measure total economic value, only portions of 




Contingent valuation, in contrast, is claimed to be able to measure all types of economic 
value, but these distinctions are often absent in its applications and left to the judgments 
of its readers.  Thus, the first conclusion that can be made is that environmental 
valuations speak of direct use economic values, and in some cases (contingent valuation) 
it may also speak of other dimensions of economic value. 
 How authoritatively do they speak of these values?  The evidence from this study 
is mixed.  It clearly says that environmental values are positive.  The consistency with 
which positive measures of values were attributed to environmental improvements lends 
some credibility to the methods.  That is, the methods measure the direction of value 
well1.  But what can be said about the magnitudes?  Do they accurately express the same 
economic values of environmental goods?  The divergence of effect sizes among the 
methods say no.  Contingent valuations and the two weak complementarity methods 
produce significantly different average effect sizes, while controlling for environmental 
good, holistic versus incremental changes, and quantitative versus qualitative measures of 
change.     
 At first glance, the answer to the second question seems simple: the values 
expressed or revealed are those of the subjects, be they respondents in a contingent 
valuation study, home buyers in a hedonic pricing study, or visitors in a travel cost study.  
But this interpretation belies the contextual problem of the valuation methods.  The 
results of contingent valuations are significantly influenced by the information provided 
by the researchers.  A similar problem exists for the hedonic pricing and travel cost 




models are, in essence, researchers’ judgments of the weak complementary bundles of 
goods consumers are purchasing with their properties and travels.  The reality of what 
consumers are consciously purchasing may range from none of the environmental goods 
identified by the researchers to entire spectra of economic values of the goods.  For all 
three methods, researchers frame the environmental goods being valued by identifying 
the goods, specifying their scopes, and selecting the measures of them.  None of these 
tasks is an objective decision, and all of them influence or define the results of valuation 
studies.  Thus, when assessing the meanings of the outputs of environmental valuations, it 
is important to recognize that the values expressed are not only those of the subjects, but 
also those of the researchers.   
 One value of researchers that is consistently expressed in the applications of these 
methods is in the scope of value itself.  For each of these three methods, value is limited 
to an economic dimension and is measured in monetary terms.    However, there is 
significant evidence that people object to expressing their values for environmental goods 
in solely economic terms, and find it difficult to do so (Baron & Spranca, 1997; 
Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992;  Sagoff, 1998; Stevens, Echeverria, Glass, Hager, & More, 
1991).  Thus, it seems clear that the values of environmental valuation researchers can be 
in conflict with those of the people they study. 
Given these mixed results, what uses of these valuation methods remain 
defensible?  Others have described guidelines for the proper application of environmental 
valuation tools, and the results from this study provide greater detail to these guidelines.  
Considering Navrud and Pruckner’s (1997) hierarchy of need for accuracy in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 This claim is based on the assumption that values for environmental improvements are 




environmental valuation and Norton’s (1995) environmental risk decision square, along 
with evidence from this research, the defensible uses of the environmental valuation 
methods are quite narrow.  They can be appropriate in cases of local reversible impacts, 
and in such cases, hedonic pricing and travel cost methods are more reliable choices 
when accuracy is demanded.  But, again, these two methods only capture direct use 
values and ignore all nonuse values.  When accuracy is not needed, then estimates of total 
economic value from contingent valuation may stimulate discussions for local, reversible 
impacts.  But when both accuracy and total economic value are needed, none of these 
three methods will suffice. 
The results of this research also speak to the defensible uses of existing valuation 
studies in benefit transfers.  The literature already identifies key study qualities to 
consider when transferring results from one context to another.  They include the 
environmental good, the change in the good, the time in which the values were measured, 
the location of the study, the quality of the study, the demographics of the beneficiaries 
and the population studied, and the hypothetical markets in contingent valuations.  All of 
these factors are presumed to moderate value, and the analyses in this research qualify 
and quantify the effects of some of them.  But most importantly, this research adds the 
method of valuation to the list of factors to consider when transferring benefits.  Overall, 
contingent valuations produced effect sizes that averaged 40% to 55% less than those of 
the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods.  However, the effect varies substantially by 
environmental good.  Ultimately, benefit transfers are vulnerable to the same validity 
issues as the original studies, but to a greater degree because of the additional issue of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             




comparability of the circumstances in the original studies and the target situation.  Thus 
benefit transfers should be limited to situations demanding low accuracy and relative 
economic values. 
 What environmental valuations aim to tell us is a limited, economic view of 
value.  However, economic values are not as relevant to environment policy as the 
popularity of environmental valuations suggests.  Instead, the environment elicits many 
other dimensions of value that have been vying for a substantial voice in public policy.  
To the extent that environmental valuations limit the discussions to only economic 
considerations, they are detrimental to environmental decision making.  Instead, 
valuations of the environment ought to facilitate expressions of many dimensions of 
value.  The literature again provides guidance on other values relevant to environmental 
decision making.  They include communal and public values to complement individuals’ 
private values (Bozeman, 2002; Gowdy, 1997; Norton, Costanza, & Bishop, 1998; 
Sagoff, 1997; Stone, 1997), cooperative values to complement competitive values 
(McLaughlin, 2003; Shabman & Stephenson, 1996), deontological values to complement 
utilitarian values (Milbrath, 2003), and environmental quality measures to complement 
personal wealth measures (Brady, 1983; Brower, 1995).  Taken together, the relevant 
measures of environmental values include economic terms, non-economic social terms, 
and environmental terms.  They represent a pluralistic approach to replace one that has 
been dominated by economic considerations (Gowdy, 1997; Norgaard, 1985).  These 
prescriptions for what environmental valuations ought to tell us begs the question, “How 






all aspects of relevant values is unlikely and perhaps undesirable, alternative methods are 
available to capture the relevant values with a combination of measures.   
 Good methods of measuring environmental values are those that facilitate public 
decision making by 1) articulating those values, 2) making tradeoffs among conflicting 
goals, 3) understanding sources of conflict, 4) solving distributional problems, 5) 
integrating values with technical analysis, and 6) anticipating future consequences 
(Maguire, 2002).  By themselves, the three methods of economic valuation in this 
research do ostensibly well in facilitating tradeoffs, but they fail miserably on all other 
counts.  However, a pluralistic approach to environmental valuation that incorporates 
some of the alternative methods introduced here can meet all of these criteria, and thus 








On the northern coast of Alaska, bordering the Beaufort Sea, is the remote Arctic 
Coastal Plain area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.  The 1.5 million acre area is a 
calving ground for the Porcupine River caribou and ecologists describe it as the greatest 
primeval wilderness ecosystem in the United States (Markey, 2001).  Recognizing this 
unique ecology, neighboring Canada has protected the parts of the habitat lying on its 
side of the international border.  However, geologis ts describe the Coastal Plain as the 
greatest oil and gas reserve in the United States.  Just to the west of the Coastal Plain are 
the Prudhoe Bay oil fields and the beginning of the great Alaska Pipeline.  The fields 
have been developed for oil and gas extraction for over 20 years and they currently 
constitute 21% of the nation’s crude oil production (Young, 2001).  Oil is transported 
from Prudhoe Bay south through the Alaska Pipeline, a major artery in the country’s life-
blood of oil.   
Thus the Coastal Plain is the coveted prize in an ongoing legislative battle being 
fought in Congress.  On one side are proponents of opening the Coastal Plain for oil and 
gas development.  Representative Don Young of Alaska led these efforts on January 3, 
2001.  Following a campaign promise of President George W. Bush, Young introduced in 
the House of Representatives bill HR39, The Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy 
Security Act.  Among other things, the bill proposed to repeal prohibitions against oil and 
gas development in the Coastal Plain and order the Department of the Interior to lease the 
land for such purposes.  Young’s Alaskan colleague in the Senate at that time, four-term 
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Senator Frank Murkowski, introduced corresponding bill S388 in the upper house on 
February 26.   
On the other side were proponents of preserving the Coastal Plain in its natural 
state.  Anticipating the efforts to open the protected land to development, preservationists 
quickly introduced alternative bills in both houses.  On February 28, 2001, 
Representative Ed Markey of Massachusetts introduced bill HR770, the Morris K. Udall 
Arctic Wilderness Act.  If passed it would have designated the Coastal Plain area as 
wilderness for permanent preservation in its undeveloped state.  Senator Joseph 
Lieberman of Connecticut introduced companion bill S411 in the Senate on the same day.   
All four bills were under review in the houses’ committees on environment and 
natural resources at the close of the 107th Congress.  Three of them were reintroduced in 
the 108th Congress, but none left its committee for a floor vote.1  With President Bush’s 
reelection in November, 2004, it is likely that this battle will continue in the 109th 
Congress. 
 The debate over these alternatives has included assessments of the costs and 
benefits of each, and thus this battle for the Coastal Plain illustrates the problematic 
intersection of environmental policy and decision analysis.  The benefits and costs of 
these two alternative policies are difficult to measure on comparable terms, especially in 
the measure of choice: money.  Some of the outcomes of the alternatives are easy to 
quantify monetarily.  Proponents of oil and gas development, for example, cite the 
expected savings from developing the Coastal Plain, as well as the costs of not 
developing it (Young, 2001).  They claim the production of 11.6 to 31.5 billion barrels of 
                                                 
1 SR388 in the 107th Congress was not reintroduced in the 108th Congress.   
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oil at prices below those of imported oil, and the reduction of the current $100 billion per 
year bill on foreign energy.  However, other important aspects of the alternatives resist 
quantification.  Proponents of preserving the Coastal Plains, for example, cite benefits 
such as the existence of unique wildlife and wilderness, and the preservation of the 
“wilderness heritage” to “bequeath undisturbed to future generations” (Markey, 2001, 
section 2.a.1). 
 Faced with the need to quantify the values of such environmental qualities, 
researchers developed a few tools to extrapolate their monetary values from behaviors 
and responses of consumers, and thus complete the calculations of costs and benefits of 
policies affecting the environment.  However, these tools’ development and growth in 
popularity over the last few decades have been accompanied by much debate over the 
reliability and validity of the methods and their results, as well as the appropriateness of 
monetizing environmental values.  This research tests the convergent validity of three 
popular environmental valuation tools through a meta-analysis of effect sizes from a 
sample of studies using the valuation tools.  The results of this research complement 
those of the few other meta-analyses of environmental valuation, by using effect sizes as 
the outcome measures of original studies, a common practice in other fields using meta-
analysis.  This approach offers a broader examination of environmental valuation studies 
that brings statistical evidence to the debate over their uses, and refines the conditions of 
their implementation by identifying factors that affect their results.   
 The remaining part of this chapter describes in detail the problem of cost-benefit 
analysis in environmental policy analysis, then introduces the three environmental 
valuation tools that are analyzed in this research.  Chapter 2 describes the history and 
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growth of these valuation tools, and discusses in detail the academic and public policy 
controversies that currently surround them.  Chapter 3 describes the meta-analytic 
framework that is used to test these valuation tools.  It discusses in detail the hypotheses 
that were tested, the method of collecting data to test the hypotheses, and the statistical 
analyses that were performed.  Chapter 4 summarizes the data collected for this research 
and their descriptive statistics.  Chapter 5 details the results of the hypotheses tested.  
Finally, Chapter 6 folds the results of the analyses back into the broader debate of 
valuation in environmental policy analysis, and discusses their implications on the use of 
the valuation tools. 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 
Cost-benefit analysis has long been a popular method of policy analysis.  In the 
United States, assessments of the costs and benefits of government projects began as 
early as 1808 (Hines, 1973).  Formal prescription of cost-benefit analysis as a means of 
justifying public projects was first enacted in the Flood Control Act of 1936 (Ofiara & 
Seneca, 2001; Parsons, 1995).  It required the benefits of any adopted action to exceed 
the costs.  In recent history, formal cost-benefit analyses of all newly proposed 
regulations were prescribed in 1981 through President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 
12291.  Today, cost-benefit analysis is the most popularly used tool of decision analysis 
(Munger, 2000, p. 352).  Part of the popularity of this method of policy analysis resides in 
the ubiquity of its well understood measure – money – and its quantitative nature (Patton 
& Sawicki, 1993).    
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Simply put, cost-benefit analysis is an economic tool used to measure the 
monetary worthiness of actions.  Its method follows the rational framework for policy 
analysis (Bardach, 2000; Patton & Sawicki, 1992; Tong, 1986) and fundamentally 
consists of calculating the benefits and costs of alternative actions, and then for each 
alternative comparing the two sums against each other (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 
1998, p. 10; Munger, 2000, p. 356; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 41; Paris & Reynolds, 
1983).  The usual decision rule is to reject alternatives whose costs are greater than their 
benefits, and to accept actions whose benefits are greater than their costs.  When more 
than one alternative have greater benefits than costs, then the one providing the greatest 
benefit (Paris & Reynolds, 1983; Parsons, 1995, p. 400), or the greatest benefit per unit 
cost, is most acceptable. 
When applied to policies affecting the environment, however, cost-benefit 
analysis faced a serious problem.  The root of the problem lies in the measure of costs 
and benefits.  Standard texts in the method prescribe the measure of outcomes in 
monetary terms (Munger, 2000, p. 352; Weimer & Vining, 1992, p. 260), or at least 
recognize that it is standard practice to do so (Freeman, 1997, p. 189).  But many costs 
and benefits in environmental policies are not easily calculated in monetary terms 
because the market does not usually include prices or payments directly for 
environmental goods.  In his popular book Earth in the Balance, then-Senator Al Gore 
described the problem this way: 
 
“The hard truth is that our economic system is partially blind.  It ‘sees’ 
some things and not others.  It carefully measures and keeps track of the 
value of those things most important to buyers and sellers, such as food, 
clothing, manufactured goods, work, and, indeed, money itself.  But its 
intricate calculations often completely ignore the value of other things that 
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are harder to buy and sell: fresh water, clean air, the beauty of mountains, 
the rich diversity of life in the forest, just to name a few… just as our eyes 
fail to see all but a narrow portion of the light spectrum, our economics 
fail to see – let alone measure – the full value of major parts of our world.”  
(Gore, 1992, p. 183) 
 
 
Gore went on to exemplify the consequences of this problem of environmental 
economics: 
 
“In fact, the partial blindness of our current economic system is the single 
most powerful force behind what seem to be irrational decisions about the 
global environment… When we add up the costs and benefits of growing 
the grain, the loss of that freshwater resource will be ignored.  And largely 
because we have failed to measure the value of clean, fresh groundwater, 
we have contaminated more than half of all the underground reservoirs in 
the United States with pesticide runoff and other poisonous residues that 
are virtually impossible to remove.” (Gore, 1992, pp. 183-184) 
 
 In economic terms, this problem stems from environmental “externalities” of 
public policies and from the characteristics of  “public goods” or “common property” 
often found in environmental goods and services.  Many policies exert environmental 
impacts that are external to market transactions, so the monetary values of these impacts 
resist measurement (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 14; Freeman, 1993, pp. 
2-3).  Specifically, price and quantity information, normally the demand and associated 
values of normal goods, are missing for many environmental goods (Ofiara & Seneca, 
2001, p. 197).  For example, a traditional cost-benefit analysis of adopting technologies 
to reduce air pollution from industries might easily measure the costs of purchasing, 
installing, and maintaining such technology, but it would have much difficulty in 
measuring the monetary benefits of cleaner air because air is not directly traded in the 
market.  This problem exists for all kinds of environmental goods not directly traded in 
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the market, such as the quality of water (in rivers, lakes, aquifers, etc.), the health of 
ecosystems, the existence of endangered species, etc.   
Furthermore, many environmental goods exhibit characteristics of public goods or 
at least common property: non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption.  For 
example, the provision of clean ambient air through tough pollution controls is non-
excludable: once it is provided, its benefits cannot practically be limited to only paying 
consumers.  Also, the clearer visibility from the clean air is non-rival in consumption: the 
“use” of the visibility by one consumer does not limit its availability for others.  Many 
environmental goods also have the characteristic of not allowing individual consumers to 
specify their level of consumption.  People cannot, for example, completely select the air 
quality around their homes or have much control over it.   
All these characteristics of many environmental goods, not just clean air, make 
markets for them difficult to function properly (Freeman, 1993, p. 23) and can lead to 
their undervaluation and misuse as Gore (1992) described.  In the example of the Coastal 
Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, the environmental benefits of preserving the 
unique ecosystem, and the environmental costs of developing the area for oil and gas 
exploration, are mostly external to market transactions and exhibit public good 
characteristics.  Accurate and precise measures of the policy alternatives’ costs and 
benefits are thus elusive and controversial. 
 Sometimes in environmental policy we are interested in costs to the environment, 
such as the cases of environmental disasters that inflict harm.  In these cases of natural 
resource damage assessments, the problem of monetary measurement also exists 
(Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 10).  A prime example of this lies at the other 
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end of the Alaska Pipeline, away from Coastal Plain and at its southern terminus in 
Valdez, Alaska.  On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez hit Bligh Reef in Prince 
William Sound, spilling 10 million gallons of oil into it.  It was the largest oil spill in U.S. 
history, affecting 1,500 miles of coastline (US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 1999, p. 2).  In the aftermath of the spill, the federal and state governments 
sought to quantify the values of the economic and environmental damages from the spill.  
Monetary losses to fisheries, chartered boating, and other market services and goods were 
relatively easy to measure, but losses to the visual beauty and ecology of the area were 
much more difficult and suspect.  Yet, measuring values of lost scenery and wildlife were 
of great importance because of the litigation that would result from the spill (Keeble, 
1999, p. 197).  Natural resource damage assessment is the process of quantifying and 
monetizing these damages to the environment (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 36), and it 
generally involves identifying the environmental resources services provided, measuring 
the reduction of these resources and services, and determining the values placed on them 
by those who had benefited from them (Freeman & Kopp, 1999, p. 52).  However, 
environmental damage assessment suffers the same problem as environmental cost-
benefit analysis: many environmental goods are not directly traded in the market, and 
they often exhibit characteristics of public goods. 
 Despite these difficulties in measuring the monetary values of environmental 
goods, the need to do so remains.  Gore (1992, p. 346) called for changes in 
environmental policy analysis to include environmental costs and benefits, in order to 
fully account for the outcomes of our policies and to prevent undervalued uses of natural 
resources.  As environmental economist A. Myrick Freeman III stated, “It is this failure 
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of the market system to allocate and price resource and environmental services correctly 
that creates the need for economic measures of values to guide policymaking” (Freeman, 
1993, pp. 2-3). 
 
 
Three Tools of the Trade  
This shortcoming in cost-benefit analysis has led some researchers to develop 
indirect and nonmarket methods of valuing environmental goods monetarily.  Three 
prevalent methods have been developed and widely used over the last few decades:  the 
travel cost method, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation.   
 
Travel Cost Method 
 The travel cost method recognizes that travel costs are an important component of 
the full cost of visiting any site or enjoying certain environmental goods, and that there is 
wide variation in the travel costs for visitors.  The method thus indirectly values 
environmental goods by analyzing consumption behavior in markets directly related to 
the good.  The costs of obtaining or enjoying the services of the environmental asset are 
used as a proxy for price.   
The method is conducted through surveys of travelers to sites with environmental 
amenities to be valued.  The surveys ask travelers questions about their trips to the sites, 
the purposes of the trips, the distances traveled, the time and money spent, and their 
socio-economic characteristics.  From the survey data, researchers calculate travel costs 
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(C) as functions of distance costs (DC), time costs (TC), and entry fees (F) (Hanley & 
Spash, 1993, pp. 84-85): 
 
Cij = C(DCij, TCij, Fi),   i = 1...n, j = 1...m 
 
where “i” is each respondent and “j” is a given site.  Researchers then estimate trip 
generation functions that predict the number of visits that will be taken by person “i” to 
site “j” as functions of the travel costs, socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, 
and the purpose of the trips.  This multiple regression equation can then be used to 
estimate demand curves for the site and to extrapolate its value to the relevant population 
(Freeman, 1993, p. 445). 
To make the link between the costs of enjoying an environmental amenity and the 
value of the amenity, the method assumes weak complementarity between the 
environmental good and the consumption expenditure.  That is, the enjoyment of the 
environmental good requires the purchase of a market good.  It is thus possible to infer 
the value of a change in the environmental good from the demand for the market good.  
These environmental and market goods are weak complements of each other (Freeman, 
1993, p. 104).  An example is traveling to enjoy a remote lake:  enjoyment of the lake 
requires the purchase of a travel mode. 
The travel cost method is the oldest of the three methods discussed.  The method 
was conceived by Harold Hotelling in the late 1940s (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 
1998, p. 20; Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 83) but was not formally developed until the late 
1950s through the mid-1960s (Freeman, 1993, p. 444; Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 83).  
Since then the method has been most widely used in pricing outdoor recreation such as 
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fishing, hiking, and camping (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 19), but it is 
also used to value broader environmental goods and changes in environmental qualities.  
It usually does the latter by one of two ways.  One way recognizes that respondents have 
different levels of demand (i.e., numbers of visits) for similar sites with different levels or 
qualities of environmental amenities.  Another way recognizes that respondents will 
change their demand for one site based on changes in the qualities of environmental 
amenities there.  Either way, the responses of people to these variations become the basis 
for estimating the values of changes in the level or qualities of environmental goods 
(Freeman, 1993, pp. 443-444).  This variation of the method to value changes in site 
quality is sometimes called the travel cost varying parameter model (Ofiara & Seneca, 
2001, pp. 207-208). 
For example, Choe, Whittington, and Lauria (1996) used the travel cost method to 
estimate value losses from degraded shore water quality in the Philippines.  They 
surveyed residents near a beach recently contaminated with unsafe levels of fecal 
coliforms and pathogens.  The survey asked respondents to report the number of visits to 
the beach they made per year before and after the contamination.  The change in 
visitation rates, and their corresponding costs, represented the change in value.  They 
found that the change in water quality from safe to unsafe levels of these pollutants 
resulted in a loss of visitations with a value of 36 to 51 pesos per person per month. 
 A major advantage of this method of environmental valuation is that it is based on 
real, observable market behavior, giving the method some degree of construct validity.  
 
 12 
In contrast, one of the other two methods rely on responses to hypothetical markets2 
(Ofiara & Seneca, 2001).  A key problem with the travel cost method, however, is that it 
assumes that users of the environmental goods do perceive and respond to the variations 
in the levels and qualities of them (David, 1971; Freeman, 1993, p. 447).  Also, weak 
complementarity methods are biased, underestimates of maximum willingness to pay for 
environmental improvements.  Their estimated environmental values are properly 
interpreted as lower bounds of willingness to pay.  Other problems include the difficulty 
of including multipurpose trips, and how to value respondents’ time (Hanley & Spash, 
1993, pp. 86-91; McConnell, 1975). 
 
Hedonic Pricing 
 Hedonic pricing is also a weak complementarity method.  It recognizes that 
sometimes the quantity or quality of an environmental good can be an attribute of a 
market good.  For example, a family can choose a vista with the house they buy.  In these 
cases, consumers have some freedom to choose their consumption level of the 
environmental good through their selection of the marketed bundle.  Information on the 
value of the environmental good is embedded in the prices and consumption levels for the 
marketed goods, and analysis of this information can extract the inferred value of the 
environmental good (Freeman, 1993, p. 124). 
                                                 
2 Sometimes researchers add hypothetical market questions to a travel cost survey to 
gauge the change in behavior in response to some hypothetical future condition of the 
environmental good.  For example, one might ask respondents how their number of trips 
to a site would change in response to some improvement to the site, like reduced air 
pollutants to increase visibility.  However, such an approach – which some call the 
contingent activity method (Freeman, 1993, p. 166) – is a departure from the original 
method which is based on real market behavior.   
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 The method is conducted through statistical analysis of the marketed good, which 
is usually housing.  Prices for homes are modeled as functions of several characteristics 
including environmental amenities.  Through regression analysis of the data and 
differential calculus the method isolates the relationships between the levels of 
environmental goods and the prices of the homes.  Specifically, the prices of homes (P) 
are modeled as a function of three vectors of attributes:  site characteristics (S) such as 
the numbers of rooms and lot size, neighborhood characteristics (N) such as crime rate 
and quality of schools, and environmental qualities (Q) such as waterfront and air quality 
(Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 76): 
 
 P = P(Si, Nj, Qk),    i = 1...m, j = 1...n, k = 1- l. 
 
Next, this equation is partially differentiated with respect to Q to determine the implicit 
price, r, for the environmental good: 
 
δP/δQ = r .   
 
Finally, demand curves for Q can be estimated by regressing its implicit price on Q and 
relevant socio-economic characteristics (SE) such as age, income, and education: 
 
 r = P(Qk, SEl),    k = 1...m, l = 1... n. 
 
 For example, Kiel (1995) used hedonic pricing to estimate the losses in land value 
from the presence of hazardous waste sites.  To do so, she analyzed the Woburn, 
Massachusetts housing market and the two Superfund sites within that city.  The prices of 
the houses were regressed on the minimum distances from each house to either 
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Superfund site.  Interestingly, she repeated this analysis for six consecutive spans of time 
representing different stages of discovery and clean up of the hazardous waste sites.  
During the discovery phase, when odors from the sites were first noticed and wells in the 
area tested and closed, she found that a one mile increase in distance from nearest 
hazardous waste site increased property value by $1854.   
Lewis Court is widely credited with formulating the idea behind the hedonic 
pricing method in 1941, but at least two applications of it were published in the 1920s 
(Colwell & Dilmore, 1999).  Ronald Ridker first used housing data to estimate changes in 
environmental quality in 1967 (Freeman, 1993, pp. 367-370), and the method was refined 
by a cast of researchers from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s (Desvousges, Johnson, & 
Banzhaf, 1998, p. 17; Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 74).  The late 1970s through the 1980s 
then saw an “explosion” of empirical studies of the monetary values of nonmarket 
environmental amenities based on hedonic pricing (Freeman, 1993, pp. 367-370).  The 
method has been used to value all sorts of natural resources including noise and vistas, 
but it has been most commonly used to value air quality (Desvousges, Johnson, & 
Banzhaf, 1998, p. 18).   
Like the travel cost method, a major advantage of hedonic pricing is that it 
indirectly measures the values of nonmarket goods from real, observable market behavior 
(Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 17).  However, also like the travel cost 
method, one of its major disadvantages is its reliance on the assumption that consumers 
of the related market goods perceive the differences in environmental amenities, which 
might not be evident (David, 1971; Hite, 1998).  For example, the quality of air between 
neighborhoods might not be readily apparent to home buyers.  Also, consumers might not 
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necessarily be able to select their most preferred bundle of amenities from the complete 
range of possible combinations because marketed goods like homes are “pre-packaged” 
(Freeman, 1993, pp. 415-416; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 212-215).  That is, each 
amenity of the marketed good might not be able to vary independently of the others, 
causing problems with multicollinearity.  Another problem with the method, especially 
when applied to home buying, is that many amenities of the marketed good are only 
available in discrete units, not continuous variables (e.g., number of rooms, waterfront, 
etc.).  This violates basic assumptions of the statistical model (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 
212-215), though it is still often applied in such cases.  The method is also sensitive to the 
functional form selected for the hedonic price equation and to omissions of variables 
(Hanley & Spash, 1993, pp. 78-79).  Finally, like other weak complementarity methods, 
hedonic pricing underestimates willingness to pay. 
 
Contingent Valuation 
 The final method, contingent valuation, takes a very straightforward approach to 
valuing environmental goods.  It directly asks people the maximum amount they would 
pay for an improvement in an environmental amenity, or the minimum amount of 
payment they would accept for a reduction in an environmental amenity, if it were traded 
in a market.  The responses to the question then represent the value of the environmental 
change (Freeman, 1993, p. 165).  In this method, values are not indirectly inferred from 
market behavior, but directly asked outside of a real market. 
Data for contingent valuation are gathered through carefully structured surveys 
that describe hypothetical markets in which the goods are traded.  The surveys generally 
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include descriptions of the environmental good and the market in which it is 
hypothetically traded, questions about the values of the environmental good, and 
questions about the respondents’ demographics and prior knowledge (Desvousges, 
Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 14; Freeman, 1993, p. 170; Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 
3-4).   
The valuation questions can take several different forms.  One distinction is 
whether the questions ask for respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for an 
environmental good, or their willingness to accept (WTA) payment to forgo the good3.  
Willingness to pay is the maximum sum of money a respondent would be willing to pay 
for an increase in an environmental amenity or to prevent a degradation in one.  
Willingness to accept is the minimum sum of money a respondent would require to forgo 
an improvement in an environmental amenity or to accept a degradation in one.  WTP 
takes as its reference point the absence of the improvement while WTA takes as its 
reference point the improvement, and WTP is constrained by income while WTA is not 
(Freeman, 1993, p. 8). 
 Other distinctions that can be made about the types of valuation questions include 
the structures of the questions and the hypothetical market (Desvousges, Johnson, & 
Banzhaf, 1998, p. 15; Freeman, 1993, p. 165; Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 55; Ofiara & 
Seneca, 2001, pp. 199-200).  Valuation questions can be open-ended or offer discrete 
choices.  Open-ended valuation questions allow respondents to state any value they 
choose.  Thus the responses are continuous variables.  On the other hand, discrete choice 
                                                 
3 Willingness to pay for an environmental improvement and willingness to accept 
payment for an environmental degradation are both measures of compensating variation, 
one construct of consumer welfare.  For a complete discussion of welfare measures in 
environmental valuation, see Freeman’s (1993) chapter 3. 
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questions confine the respondents to choose one of multiple pre-determined values.  
Discrete choice questions can also take many forms including referendum, iterative 
bidding payment cards, etc.  Responses to bidding games and open-ended WTP questions 
require no analysis to obtain a measure of individual welfare change (Freeman, 1993, p. 
173), while responses to discrete choice questions do require aggregate analyses. The 
types of hypothetical markets that are commonly used include taxes, fees, and other 
mechanisms of public funding.   
 After responses to contingent valuation surveys are gathered, the data can then be 
analyzed to estimate mean WTP or WTA values (Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 54), test 
hypotheses about the influence of income and other demographic characteristics on value 
(Freeman, 1993, p. 173), and estimate total benefits through extrapolation of results to the 
relevant populations (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 3-4). 
An example of the contingent valuation method used to value an environmental 
good is Kramer and Mercer’s study of the value of tropical rain forest protection (1997).  
They surveyed a random sample of 1200 United States residents in 1992 and asked them 
their willingness to donate to a United Nations fund to increase from 5% to 10% the 
amount of the world’s rain forests preserved in their natural state.  They concluded that 
Americans are willing to make a one-time donation of $21 to $31 per household.  When 
extrapolated to the population of households this range becomes $1.9 to $2.8 billion. 
The method was originally proposed by Robert Davis in 1963 (Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989, p. 9), and it underwent substantial refinement throughout the 1970s and 
1980s (Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 53; Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 9-14).  It gained 
approval by the federal government for valuing costs and benefits under the Water 
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Resources Council’s 1979 “Principles and Standards for Water and Related Land 
Resources Planning” and under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 13).  In 1993, it 
received a major endorsement when the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) proposed the first federal government guidelines for its use in 
environmental policy analysis (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 168).  The endorsement followed 
NOAA’s use of contingent valuation in its assessment of natural resource damages 
caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound.  This high-profile use of 
contingent valuation, and the subsequent federal endorsement of it, helped make it a 
broadly accepted method of environmental valuation.  It has been widely used to measure 
all kinds of environmental goods such as water quality, biodiversity, and wildlife.   
Contingent valuation is unlike the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods in very 
important ways.  First, it is able to measure nonuse values (Freeman & Kopp, 1999, p. 
53; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 200-204).  These are values people place on 
environmental goods from which they gain no actual use (Freeman & Kopp, 1999, pp. 
52-53; Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 63; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 36).  Use values, on the 
other hand, are those derived from the current direct or indirect use of the amenity 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 62).  For example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
Freeman and Kopp (1999, p. 51) explain that “People who have never been to Prince 
William Sound and never plan to visit nevertheless may feel a keen sense of loss over the 
damages it has sustained from ten million gallons of spilled oil.”  This sense of loss 
reflects the nonuse value placed on the condition of the place.  Nonuse values are 
sometimes called “intrinsic values” or “existence values” to contrast it with instrumental 
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value (Freeman, 1993, p. 142).  But some insist that existence values are actually a type 
of nonuse value that stems from individuals’ knowledge that the environmental amenity 
exists for future generations (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 37).  The net nonuse value for an 
environmental amenity is its total value minus the use value (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 
69).  In contrast to the contingent valuation method, the hedonic pricing and travel cost 
methods can only measure use values.  Of course, some are skeptical of this advantage of 
contingent valuation specifically because no other method can measure it.  These skeptics 
rightfully note that the values cannot be verified without actual payments made.  (Ofiara 
& Seneca, 2001, pp. 200-204) 
Second, data for contingent valuation come from stated preferences of 
respondents, rather than from market behaviors.  The value a respondent places on an 
environmental good is assumed to be the statement made in response to the question.  In 
contrast, the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods are based on revealed preferences 
from the subjects' real market consumption of weak complements of the environmental 
goods.  Contingent valuation’s reliance on stated preferences makes the method 
susceptible to strategic responses.  Different circumstances and perceptions of 
respondents provide incentives to some to deliberately overstate or understate their true 
preferences (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001; Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 143-146), or 
at least provide no incentive for respondents to respond truthfully (Freeman, 1993, pp. 
167-168).  For example, a contingent valuation study designed to value the protection of 
the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil and gas exploration 
might ask respondents their willingness to pay for its permanent protection.  
Environmentalists who do not expect to actually pay the amount they state could have an 
 
 20 
incentive to overstate their preference, especially if they believe the overvaluation would 
influence the actual protection of the area.  On the other hand, oil and gas company 
employees or other local residents who stand to benefit from the potential increase in 
industrial activity could have an incentive to understate their preferences, with hope of 
influencing actual development of the area.  In both cases, there is little incentive to 
answer truthfully, largely because it is a hypothetical market (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 
200-204).  However, there is much evidence that suggests that these potential strategic 
responses are not actually a significant problem for contingent valuation studies in most 
circumstances (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, p. 170).  Respondents apparently tend to answer 
truthfully. 
Contingent valuation’s reliance on stated preferences also makes it dependent 
upon the respondents’ comprehension of the surveys and hypothetical markets.  This 
could lead to problems including difficulties with answering the valuation questions, and 
the formation of preferences during the survey (Bjornstad, Cummings, & Osborne, 1997; 
Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001; Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 15-16).  
That is, respondents might have trouble understanding the hypothetical market, and they 
might decide on their response during the survey instead of stating an established 
preference.  Both of these problems stem from the fact that the described market is not 
real.  Because nonmarket goods are not sold in the market, respondents have not had 
previous opportunity or need to evaluate their preferences for them.   
 Third, contingent valuation elicits “ex ante” measures of value, while the travel 
cost and hedonic pricing methods obtain “ex post” measures (Freeman, 1993, pp. 14-15; 
Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 198).  The ex ante measures are based on presumed future 
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behavior reflecting the stated preferences, while ex post measures are based on market 
behaviors that have already occurred.  This attribute of contingent valuation further 
makes it susceptible to strategic responses because stated behavior (i.e., willingness to 
pay) does not necessarily equal real future behavior.  Indeed, Freeman (1993) prescribes 
more use of ex post analysis to validate ex ante analyses (p. 14). 
Despite the vulnerabilities of contingent valuation, there is a growing body of 
research that suggests that properly designed and implemented contingent valuation 
studies can result in reliable and valid valuations of environmental amenities (Freeman & 
Kopp, 1999, p. 53). 
 Finally, economic theory predicts that welfare estimates from contingent 
valuation should be different than those from hedonic pricing and the travel cost method, 
but there is dispute over the direction of the difference.  On one hand, as previously 
stated, the weak complementarity methods underestimate willingness to pay for 
environmental improvements.  Because the enjoyment of a nonmarket environmental 
good is inseparable from the complementary market good, the willingness to pay for the 
environmental good cannot be directly established.  Instead, maximum willingness to pay 
is estimated to be equal to at least the attributable portion of the amount paid for the 
market good.  Contingent valuation avoids this bias by directly asking consumers for 
their maximum willingness to pay for environmental improvements.  On the other hand, 
Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze, and d’Arge (1982) have argued that value estimates from 
hedonic pricing should be larger than those from contingent valuation4.  They note that 
                                                 
4 While their argument is specifically applied to the difference between hedonic pricing 
and contingent valuation estimates, the logic is applicable to the differences between 
travel cost and contingent valuation estimates as well.   
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hedonic pricing estimates are derived from the variation in preferences among many 
different consumers (i.e., multiple indifference curves between environmental amenities 
and income).  In contrast, contingent valuation estimates are derived from constant 
preferences (i.e., indifference curves) of individual consumers.  They demonstrate tha t 
the consequence is that the willingness to pay derived from static preferences (contingent 
valuation) must be less than or equal to that derived from varying preferences (hedonic 
pricing).  Smith and Pattanayak (2002) make the same observation, identifying the 
difference as that between Marshallian demand measured by hedonic pricing and the 
travel cost method, and Hicksian demand measured by contingent valuation.  Regardless 
of these differences, policy prescriptions for these three methods of valuation do not 
make such distinctions, as described in Chapter 2. 
 Beside the travel cost, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation methods, other 
ways of valuing environmental goods have also been developed.  But some are variations 
or combinations of these three, and none are as popularly used in environmental 
valuation.  Contingent ranking, a derivative of contingent valuation, is a survey method in 
which respondents are asked to rank several goods in order of preference, to determine 
marginal rates of substitution.  If one of the goods has monetary value, then the 
willingness to pay for an environmental good in the list can be calculated (Freeman, 
1993, p. 166).  Contingent activity is a combination of contingent valuation with the 
travel cost method, in which survey respondents are asked how they would change their 
level of some activity in response to a change in an environmental amenity (Freeman, 
1993, p. 166).  The averting-behavior method uses the household-production framework 
to estimate the value of environmental quality (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, 
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pp. 18-19).  The restoration and replacement cost method values environmental changes 
through calculations of the costs needed to physically implement improvements.  It is 
relatively easy to implement, but does not account for individuals’ preferences for 
changes in environmental quality.  It also does not guarantee that people are actually 
willing to pay the cost of improved environmental quality (Desvousges, Johnson, & 
Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 21-22).  The random utility model (RUM) is a relatively recent, 
sophisticated extension of the travel cost method (Freeman, 1993, pp. 478-479).  Instead 
of determining numbers of visits to a site as in the travel cost method, the RUM 
determines whether to visit a site and which site among multiple substitutes.  The RUM 
thus estimates people’s utility function by focusing on each separate choice of which sites 
to visit or whether or not to visit. 
 The development of these tools to value environmental goods in monetary terms 
has apparently filled the gap that had existed in cost-benefit analysis of policies affecting 
the environment.  But these solutions have been the focus of much debate and skepticism, 







Popularity and Controversy 
 All of these methods have facilitated the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
environmental decision making, and they have been used extensively in recent decades.  
But their use has been fraught with controversy.  This chapter begins by describing the 
growing use of environmental valuation tools due to two main factors: the growth of cost-
benefit analysis as a major decision-making tool in environmental policy, and the growth 
of benefit transfer studies as a short-cut to valuing environmental goods.  It then surveys 
the controversies surrounding environmental valuation and describes the need for the 
assessment of the valuation tools. 
 
History and Growth 
 The growing use of these environmental valuation tools parallels the popularity of 
cost-benefit analysis.  The growth of cost-benefit analysis, in turn, has been due to 
several factors including the status of economics in the social sciences, the rational and 
empirical foundations of cost-benefit analysis and its common unit of measure, and 
extensive government use and prescription. 
 On a macro-level, the use of cost-benefit analysis and its tools have benefited 
from the dominance of economics in the social sciences.  Rees (1994) explains that the 
economic paradigm dominant in the current worldview has its roots in 19th century 
scientific materialism, a “deep entrenchment of scientific rationality and its companion, 
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social utilitarianism, as the primary beacons of human progress” (p. 438).  He claims that 
economics strove to be to the social sciences what physics is to the natural sciences, the 
fundamental science to which all else reduces: “The founders of the neoclassical school, 
impressed with the spectacular successes of Newtonian physics, strove to create 
economics as a sister science” (p. 438).   
Cost-benefit analysis is a primary evaluative tool in economics, and it exhibits 
characteristics of the scientific method’s positivism that stemmed from the natural 
sciences.  As Parsons (1995) explains, “The attractiveness of [cost benefit analysis] as a 
tool of decision-making is somewhat obvious: it provides an apparently neutral technique 
for identifying goals, their impacts, and their costs and benefits, and it creates a 
measurable, ‘objective’ statement which can serve to aid the formulation and selection of 
choices and options” (p. 410).  This ability to sort out and rank competing alternatives 
makes the method popular with public decision makers, and provides them “the essential 
core of rational analysis in government decision-making and in the legitimation of 
decisions.”  Ellis (1998) adds that the method is also appealing because it is empirically 
verifiable.  “It is an empirical fact  that people value happiness, and there are even 
tangible ways to measure this value, even if only approximately and indirectly” (p. 57, 
original italics).   
 Cost-benefit analysis’s unit of measure also contributes to its popularity (Patton & 
Sawicki, 1993, p. 210).  The method typically accounts for the costs and benefits of 
alternative choices in monetary terms, which are well understood and can make 
competing alternatives commensurable (Freeman, 1993, p. 12).  By converting values to 
dollars (or other applicable currency), analysts can compare alternatives and easily 
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convey the results.  Bardach (2000), in his policy analysis text, even prescribes this 
measure for nonmarket goods.  “Using money as the metric [for nonmarket goods] is a 
very good idea, and it often works much better than one might imagine.  For instance, 
even the ‘value of life’ can sometimes be reasonably well described by the metric 
‘willingness to pay X dollars for a reduction in the risk of death by Y percent a year’ or 
something like it” (p. 38).  Environmental valuation tools aim to measure these monetary 
values of nonmarket environmental goods.   
Besides being well understood and commensurable, monetary measures also 
appear precise and quantitative, two additional qualities of choice for government 
decision makers.  These qualities reduce the necessity, and the appearance, of bureaucrats 
making case-by-case judgments, and thus reduce the possibility of wide variances in 
decisions for similar situations (Ellis, 1998, p. 152). 
 Finally, the growth of cost-benefit analysis in public decision making, and the 
corresponding growth of environmental valuation tools, can also be attributed to their 
prescription and use by government.  At the highest level of governance in the United 
States, most presidents since Gerald Ford have actively and formally promoted some 
form of cost-benefit analysis in government decision making (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 
58-59).  Ford’s Executive Order 11281, in 1974, required all federal agencies to quantify 
and publish costs and benefits of anticipated new standards in the form of inflationary 
impact statements.  It was the first executive rule requiring the comparison of costs and 
benefits.  In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12044, requiring 
economic impact assessments of proposed regulations.  Agencies were required to select 
alternatives with the least economic burden.  President Ronald Reagan followed with his 
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Executive Order 12291 in 1981 which returned to an emphasis on cost-benefit analysis 
and recommended actions whose benefits exceed costs.  In 1993, President Bill Clinton 
issued Executive Order 12866 which relaxed Reagan’s recommendation for net benefits 
in proposed actions, but still required cost-benefit analyses to be performed.  Most 
recently, in 2002, President George W. Bush’s administration has also prescribed and 
emphasized the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the efficacy of environmental and 
other government regulations (InsideEPA, 2002). 
 At the bureaucratic level, promulgated rules and regulations have also prescribed 
cost-benefit analysis, specifically in environmental policy.  In U.S. federal water 
resources planning, guidelines for economic assessment of water resources projects were 
established by the U.S. Water Resources Council in 1973 and 1983.  Economic methods 
recommended for environmental valuation included the travel cost method and 
contingent valuation (Loomis, 1986; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 56-58).  The Department 
of the Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (of the 
Department of Commerce) have also directly promoted environmental valuation 
techniques when they promulgated procedures for the assessment of natural resource 
damages.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (also known as “Superfund”) require 
the assessment of economic losses due to injuries to natural resources, and such losses 
can include nonuse values (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 36).  The Department of Interior’s 
rules recommend the use of several valuation methods for this task: market price, 
appraisal, factor income, travel cost, hedonic pricing, unit value, and contingent valuation 
methods (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, pp. 70-71).  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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Administration’s rules also recommend several techniques: habitat equivalency, travel 
cost, factor income, hedonic pricing, market models of demand and supply, contingent 
valuation, conjoint analysis, and benefits transfer methods (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 
78).  It is worth noting that the methods common to both agencies’ rules include the 
travel cost, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation methods.  While these methods 
observe different things to infer the values of environmental goods, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, these regulations prescribe the alternative methods interchangeably, making an 
implicit assumption about their convergent validity. 
 Congressional legislation has also promoted cost-benefit analysis and 
environmental valuation.  The Flood Control Act of 1936 is commonly seen as the start 
of systematic cost-benefit analysis in any area of U.S. federal policy (Hines, 1973).  
Much later, two environmental statutes required the balance of costs and benefits in 
setting environmental standards: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act 
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (Van Houtven & Cropper, 1999, p. 43).  Two other 
high-profile environmental laws, however, prohibit the use of cost-benefit considerations 
in establishing standards (Rosenbaum, 1998, pp. 158, 163).  These prohibitions reflect a 
controversy in environmental valuation discussed in the next section, but also reflect the 
wide use of cost-benefit analysis in the government and the need to normatively assess its 
proper use.  Indeed Van Houtven and Cropper (1999, 1996) examined whether these 
prohibitions or requirements for cost-benefit analysis make any difference in the 
regulations that were written, and found that both costs and benefits appear to influence 
the setting of standards, regardless of the mandates.  More costly standards are less likely 
to be implemented, while standards that save more lives are more likely to be 
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implemented.  In all the environmental regulations they examined, cost-benefit 
considerations explained 85% of the standards set. 
In 1994, the Republican revolution in the U.S. House of Representatives included 
an attempt to expand cost-benefit analysis to all social policy decisions in every federal 
agency (Ellis, 1998, p. 147), and to require proposed regulations to show projected net 
benefits before adoption (Rosenbaum, 1998, pp. 158-159).  This would have been a 
significant expansion of Reagan’s requirements.  The proposal was defeated, but the 
debate illustrated the clout that cost-benefit analysis has gained in public policy decision 
making. 
The growing use of environmental valuation techniques is not limited to the 
United States.  European nations have traditionally placed much less emphasis than the 
U.S., both in law and in practice, on economic efficiency in environmental policy.  
However, the advent of the European Union will likely change this (Navrud & Pruckner, 
1997).  The Union has prescribed using environmentally adjusted national accounting 
systems (Repetto, 1998) and cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy.  Both 
prescriptions would increase the use of environmental valuation studies there. 
 Finally, the growth of cost-benefit analysis and environmental valuation 
techniques is most obviously evident in the numbers of environmental valuation studies 
performed.  Van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, and Pepping (1997) have called the growth 
a “renaissance of interest in the use of traditional cost-benefit techniques based on 
expressing environmental effects in common monetary units,” resulting in “a 
considerable number of studies that have sought to place monetary values on negative 
environmental externalities” (p. 46).  For example, Carson, Wright, Alberini, Carson, and 
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Flores (1994) compiled an extensive bibliography on just one method of environmental 
valuation, contingent valuation, and found 1,672 articles.  Overall, these environmental 
valuation efforts have been used for cost-benefit analyses of government actions, 
environmental damage assessment, environmental costing, and environmental accounting 
(Navrud & Pruckner, 1997). 
 
Benefit Transfer 
The use of these tools to measure the values of environmental goods has also been 
popularized and highlighted by their use in benefit transfer studies.  These are policy 
analyses that use results of existing valuation studies, implemented for their own specific 
purposes and contexts, to evaluate policy choices in other contexts (Brookshire & Neill, 
1992).  However, they are much more than a deductive application of a developed theory 
to a new circumstance.  Rather, benefit transfer refers specifically to the transfer of 
values, especially environmental valuations from one situation to another (Desvousges, 
Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 3-5). 
The basic framework of the benefit transfer method follows four broad steps 
(Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 265; Kask & Shogren, 1994):   
 
1. identify the good or nature of the commodity to be assessed, 
2. identify potentially applicable studies, 
3. evaluate their relevance to the transfer under consideration, and 
4. develop benefit estimates based on the applicable studies. 
 
The transfer of values from existing studies to the current cases involves adjustments 
based upon the differences between the contexts of the past and current studies.  These 
differences could be demographic (e.g., differences in income, setting, etc.) or 
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methodological (e.g., differences in valuation tools, environmental measures, etc.).  
Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf (1998, pp. 5-9) prescribe specific procedures in 
making these value adjustments:  
 
1. identify the cause and effect links between the variables of interest and 
the existing literature that quantify them; 
2. obtain background information on the current case, such as baseline 
environmental quality and socioeconomic data; 
3. combine the information from the above two steps to perform 
preliminary assessment of benefits or costs and identify new areas for 
adjustment, and make adjustments accordingly; 
4. transfer the benefits and/or costs to the current case, quantifying the 
linkages; and 
5. project the per unit results from step 4 to the relevant market to obtain 
the total benefits and costs.   
 
Morgan and Owens (2001) provide a recent example of benefit transfer to value 
water quality improvements.  Their study estimated the monetary value of benefits the 
Clean Water Act and other environmental policies have had on the Chesapeake Bay from 
1972 to 1996.  They do so by first comparing the actual conditions of the Bay in 1996 
with estimates of its 1996 condition if these policies were not implemented.  The 
difference was estimated to be a 60% improvement in water quality with the policies in 
place since 1972.  They then selected existing valuation studies based upon the 
environmental good being valued (water quality), the site of valuation (Chesapeake Bay), 
and similar measures of water quality that they used in their modeling (nitrogen, 
phosphorus, and fish catch rate).  They found two such studies.  Both measured only 
recreational values, so the benefit transfer also only estimated recreational values.  From 
these studies’ results, the authors transferred values to estimate a 60% improvement.  The 
result was an aggregate annual value of $357.9 million to $1.8 billion.  
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Application of the transfer method in the United States began concurrently with 
the early prescription of cost-benefit analysis with the Flood Control Act of 1936.  Both 
cost-benefit analysis and the transfer method were also promoted for damage assessment 
by Superfund, which established liabilities for natural resource damages.  The 
promulgation of its rules led to required compensation within the welfare economics 
paradigm (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 2). 
 Some of the appeal of the benefit transfer method are obvious.  Most obvious are 
its economies of money and time (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, pp. 9-10; 
Freeman, 1993, p. 484; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 264).  Implementing original valuation 
studies can be quite expensive.  When budgets do not allow for this, the benefit transfer 
method provides a means of applying results from past studies to current situations.  
Original studies are also labor intensive and can take much time to prepare and 
implement.  When the luxury of time does not exist, as is often the case with public 
policy analyses in the political arena or damage assessments in judicial contexts, the 
benefit transfer method can produce estimates in significantly less time.  Even when 
money and time are available for original studies, the need for a current valuation might 
not warrant a new application, and benefit transfer can produce acceptable estimates. 
 The method also has other, less obvious but nonetheless important, advantages: 
the method is consistent with economic theory (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, 
p. 9); it organizes the underlying linkages between the variables, providing logical 
extrapolations of values; and its use can identify areas needing more valuation attention.   
 With these advantages, the benefit transfer method has become a “bedrock” 
(Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 1) of environmental policy analysis, and the 
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valuation studies supporting the method have become useful beyond their original intent.  
Indeed, the popularity of the benefit transfer method is evident in the development of 
benefit transfer databases.  These databases catalog published environmental valuation 
studies, recording their conclusions as well as many demographic and methodological 
characteristics of the studies.  Policy analysts conducting benefit transfer studies can then 
use these databases to search for original valuation studies pertinent to their new cases.  
Environment Canada, Canada’s national agency concerning environmental policy, has 
sponsored a major endeavor to produce such a database called the Environmental 
Valuation Reference Inventory1.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has also 
funded efforts to create databases of environmental valuation studies. 
 
Proponents and Opponents 
Despite the popularity of these environmental valuation methods and their use in 
environmental cost-benefit analysis, they are controversial.  Economists and others have 
taken all sides of the discussion on the reliability and validity of the methods and their 
normative implications.  Table 2.1 summarizes the major arguments taken by proponents 
and opponents of environmental valuation techniques. 
On one extreme, strong proponents of environmental valuation and cost-benefit 
analysis place much confidence in the theory behind the tools used.  One such proponent 
is Freeman, who has published extensively on environmental valuation tools.  He clearly 
prescribes the application of cost-benefit analysis to environmental issues and nonmarket 
goods as an ethical act (Freeman, 1997, p. 189) that provides “normative guidance” 
                                                 
1 See http://www.evri.ec.gc.ca/evri/. 
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(Freeman & Portney, 1999, p. 16).  The ethic is based on utilitarian efficiency (Ellis, 
1998, pp. 15-32; Paris & Reynolds, 1983) applied to the management of scarce resources: 
 
“If society is to make the most of its scarce resources, it should compare 
what it receives from pollution control and environmental protection 
activities with what it gives up by taking resources from other uses… 
Society should undertake environmental protection and pollution control 
only if the results are worth more, in terms of individuals’ values, than 
what is given up by diverting resources from other uses.  This is the 
underlying principle of the economic approach to environmental policy.  
Benefit-cost analysis is a set of analytical tools designed to measure the 
net contribution of any public policy to the economic well-being of the 
members of society.”  (Freeman, 1997, p. 189).   
 
 
 Besides promoting the utilitarian ethic behind environmental economics, Freeman 
(1993) also promotes the valuation tools used in it.  In his seminal text on environmental 
valuation, he describes the effectiveness of economic valuation tools for environmental 
goods by writing, “… I believe an economist could specify the economic theory and 
models he would use, the data he would like to have, and the empirical techniques he 
would apply to the data to obtain measures of benefits” (p. 484).  Furthermore, he refuted 
visceral objections by critics who say nonmarket environmental goods such as ecology, 
health, and aesthetics cannot or should not be monetized.   
 
“It is not correct to say that there are some things like human health and 
safety or the preservation of endangered species that cannot be valued in 
terms of dollars or some other numeraire.  The real world often creates 
situations where trade-offs between such things as deaths avoided and 
some other things of value cannot be avoided.  The questions really are 
how the problem of making choices about such trade-offs is to be 
approached, and what information can be gathered to help in the problem 
of choice.” (Freeman, 1993, p. 10) 
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Others have echoed this view.  Costanza et al. (1997) argued that people express values 
for environmental goods every time they make choices and tradeoffs concerning them.  
Weaver (1996) provided some survey evidence that supports this claim.  In his study of 
U.S. farmers, Weaver concluded that some people do think in utilitarian, and self-
interested, terms when dealing with environmental issues.  For Freeman and other leaders 
of environmental valuation, state of the art tools such as the travel cost method, hedonic 
pricing, and contingent valuation represent valid approaches to infer monetary value of 
environmental goods (Loomis & Walsh, 1986).  Furthermore, utilizing these tools allows 
government decision makers to effectively address a wide range of environmental policy 
problems such as setting efficient levels of environmental standards and analyzing the net 
benefits of existing and proposed regulations (Freeman, 1997, pp. 189-191). 
 However, Freeman (1993) notes that there are limitations to the tools and 
framework.  First, the utilitarian ethic of welfare economics focuses on the welfare of 
humans.  He concedes that environmental cost-benefit analysis is inadequate to quantify 
ecocentric values (p. 485).  Second, he also notes that economic efficiency is not the 
only, or even the primary, valid criterion against which to judge environmental policies 
(pp. 8-9).  As such, cost-benefit analysis should not be used as a simple decision rule 
replacing the judgment of decision makers.  Rather, its conclusions should be weighed 
along side other criteria such as equity and acceptability.  Third, despite his confidence in 
the valuation tools, the state of the art is not perfect.  He states that the economic values 
people place on nonmarket goods can “seldom be measured with precision” (pp. 191-
192), and that the political contexts in which cost-benefit analyses are performed can 
influence the outcomes of the analyses.  That is, the tools are vulnerable to manipulation.   
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 Richard Carson similarly defends the specific method of contingent valuation 
against criticisms of the method’s reliability and validity.  Carson, a leading promoter of 
the method (Mitchell & Carson, 1989), recently reviewed the major criticisms against 
contingent valuation and the evidence of the criticisms.  He concludes that the problems 
seen in the results of contingent valuation studies are not due to the method itself, but 
instead are due to spurious factors in the design and implementation of specific studies.  
The alleged problems – such as strategic bias, scope effects, hypothetical bias, etc. – can 
be resolved with careful and proper design and implementation (Carson, Flores, & 
Meade, 2001).  Furthermore, when accounting for these spurious factors, he finds that the 
results are consistent with economic theory.  There is certainly empirical evidence 
supporting these claims.  Many studies have been conducted that successfully alleviated 
problems including hypothetical and payment vehicle biases (e.g., Champ & Bishop, 
2001; Cummings & Taylor, 1998; Morrison, Blamey, & Bennett, 2000), reliability (e.g., 
Carson et al., 1997; Reaves, Kramer, & Holmes, 1999; Sanders, Walsh, & McKean, 
1991; Whitehead & Hoban, 1999;), and protest responses and yea-saying (e.g., Blamey, 
Bennett, & Morrison, 1999). 
Even with the methods’ limitations, strong proponents note that measuring the 
values of environmental goods has helped shape real policy decisions regarding the 
environment.  For example, returning to the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince 
William Sound, the accident caused the deaths of over 1600 birds and 700 otters, plus 
unknown thousands of other animals and plants (Keeble, 1999, p. 185).  Government 
valuation of the environmental damages, plus estimates of the losses to the local 
economy, totaled $2.8 billion (Freeman & Kopp, 1999, pp. 51-53), which the government 
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sought from Exxon.  In October 1991, Exxon and the U.S. and Alaskan governments 
agreed on a settlement of $1.025 billion (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 1999, p. 3).  This money was designated for remedial and compensatory clean 
up, and research on spill prevention and remediation, under the approval of a federal and 
state trusteeship.  Ultimately, the monetization of environmental goods has helped 
facilitate the restoration of the damaged ecosystem. 
 Less enthusiastic than Freeman but still supportive of environmental valuation are 
proponents who are concerned with the vulnerabilities of the tools but concede the 
necessity of measuring the monetary values of environmental goods in a market 
economy.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s blue ribbon panel on 
contingent valuation exemplify this position.  The panel, which included Nobel Prize 
laureates Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow, endorsed contingent valuation as a means of 
valuing environmental goods, but they tempered their endorsement with a long list of 
procedural cautions stemming from the technical vulnerabilities of the method (Arrow et 
al., 1993).  They “believe” in the method, but conceded that it is a “brand new science 
[that] is fraught with pitfalls” (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Merchant 
Marine Fisheries, 1991).  Goodland and Ledec, from the World Bank’s Department of 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, are much more pragmatic in their endorsement of 
environmental cost-benefit analysis: 
 
“Despite the many deficiencies of CBA, it can still be useful for advancing 
environmental goals.  Even unreasonably low or highly inaccurate 
estimates of environmental benefits and costs are better than none, 
because the alternative is to assume implicitly that these benefits and costs 
are zero.  Rather than abandon CBA, environmentalists should insist that it 
take environmental and other social costs explicitly into account.” 




Other economists and policy analysts agree (Bardach, 2000, p. 39; Leonard & 
Zeckhauser, 1998, pp. 6-9).  Rosenbaum’s (1998, p. 165) list of cautions that should be 
taken when implementing cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy exemplify the 
concern of these marginal proponents.  Among his prescriptions are the following: 
 
 cost-benefit analysis does not need to be done for all environmental 
regulations, but it also should not be categorically excluded, because 
there are instances in which it can identify more efficient solutions; 
 cost-benefit analyses should be open for review and challenge, since 
the method is vulnerable to manipulation; and 
 Congress should specifically state in regulatory legislation the weight 
given to economic criteria such as costs and benefits, compared to 
other criteria of evaluation. 
 
On the other side of the debate are a range of opponents to cost-benefit analysis 
applied to environmental policies and environmental valuation itself.  Marginal 
opponents are those who like the idea of including monetary valuations of the 
environment in policy analyses, but see too many problems with the methods currently 
available (e.g., Green & Tunstall, 1991; Kellert, 1984; Neill, Cummings, Ganderton, 
Harrison, & McGuckin, 1994).  Much of the criticism of environmental cost-benefit 
analysis focuses on a false sense of objectivity it projects.  Such criticism notes that the 
rational and quantitative framework of cost-benefit analysis can lead analysts and the 
public to believe that its results are objective, value-neutral facts.  However, cost-benefit 
analyses are often used to justify decisions already made or enhance the appearance of a 
favored alternative, rather than objectively compare alternatives (Paris & Reynolds, 1983; 
Tong, 1986, pp. 14-15).  Findley and Farber (1992) have found evidence for this claim in 
federal Environmental Impact Statements.  “Agencies often engage in extremely slipshod 
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cost-benefit analysis of their proposals, frequently biasing their results in favor of their 
projected course of action” (p 52).  Parsons (1995) summarized this criticism in a 
sentence: “Value-free it might look, but value-free it ain’t” (p. 401).   
Another criticism of cost-benefit analysis applied to environmental policy is its 
“ethical poverty” (Gillroy, 1992).  The ethical foundation of cost-benefit analysis lies in 
efficiency, but there are other moral principles – such as equity, freedom, benevolence, 
etc. – that may be more applicable in public issues such as environmental policy (Sagoff, 
1997).  Kneese (1999, p. 55), a self-described long-time student and practitioner of cost-
benefit analysis, agrees.  He states that cost-benefit analysis cannot solve certain 
questions and decisions of environmental policy and may actually obscure them.   
Of the alternative ethical principles, equity is an often-cited rival to efficiency in 
environmental issues.  Cost-benefit analysis is blind to inequity (Ellis, 1998, p. 62; Paris 
& Reynolds, 1983) or, as proponents of it describe it, is “distributionally neutral” 
(Freeman & Portney, 1999, p. 17).  Who bears the costs and who gains the benefits of 
any environmental decision is not of concern in a cost-benefit analysis, only the net 
balance to society is measured.  Thus, critics note, even an efficient policy in terms of net 
benefits can lead to unjust outcomes.  It may be economically efficient, for example, to 
build hazardous waste facilities in economically depressed areas, but it can also be unjust 
to the residents in the area.  In this example, the benefits of properly handling hazardous 
waste is spread to the entire community while the burden of living near the facility is 
borne by a few. 
Marginal opponents also note deficiencies in the environmental valuation tools 
that proponents of the tools also recognize.  Some highlight the cognitive difficulties of 
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answering valuation questions in contingent valuation (Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 
1998, pp. 15-16).  Others point to the inability of revealed preference methods to include 
nonuse values in their measures, as well as the unverifiable and unsatisfactory state of the 
art of the one method that can measure it (Goodland & Ledec, 1994, p. 452).  Some argue 
that even contingent valuation does not reliably measure nonuse value (Cummings & 
Harrison, 1995; Shechter, Reiser, & Zaitsev, 1998).  Rosenbaum (1998), who supports 
cautious use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy, concedes that the tools’ 
methods for valuing environmental goods follows “a tortuous, inevitable contentious 
logic” (p. 166).   
Perhaps the most common criticisms of current environmental valuation tools are 
the inconsistencies and biases in their results (e.g., Balistreri, McClelland, Poe, & 
Schulze, 2001; Boyle, MacDonald, Cheng, & McCollum, 1998; Kealy, Dovidio, & 
Rockel, 1988; Loomis, Brown, Lucero, & Peterson, 1996; Loomis, Brown, Lucero, & 
Peterson, 1997; Seip & Strand, 1992).  For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency conducted a valuation study to estimate the value of benefits from improved 
visibility at the Grand Canyon due to scrubbers installed at electric utility facilities.  Their 
estimate of annual benefits was $130 to $250 million.  The electric industry conducted 
their own valuation study on the same issue and concluded an annual benefit of $50 
million (Reisch, 2001, p. 5).  The Exxon Valdez case is another example.  NOAA 
conceded that the valuation studies of the damages to Prince William Sound varied by $5 
billion (House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1991).  
What are the consequences of such inconsistencies?  King (1998) argues that the results 
of environmental valuation efforts can be so unreliable and subjective that their use in 
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policy decision making has been detrimental to the environment instead of helpful.  He 
reviewed cases of wetlands valuations and the policy decisions resulting from them and 
found that valuation efforts have led to the overuse and degradation of wetlands. 
 Finally, at the other extreme of the continuum, there are strong opponents of 
environmental valuation who object to the very idea of monetizing environmental values.  
Their arguments are mostly normative, pointing to the inappropriateness of utilitarian 
ethics applied to environmental policies.  Kelman (1998), for example, argues that 
environmental goods are priceless and not for sale, so cost-benefit analysis is not 
applicable.  Instead, he claims, environmental policies are more appropriately judged by 
deontological criteria.   
Sagoff (1997, 1981) is a little more tempered in his criticisms, but still sides with 
more deontological approaches2 to evaluating environmental issues.  He grants that 
environmental valuation findings represent some kind of information, but not necessarily 
the true value of environmental goods.  The true value people place on environmental 
goods, he argues, is not confined to market prices nor to people’s desires as consumers.  
Instead, when people judge the value of environmental goods they do so from their 
obligations as citizens.  “We act as consumers to get what we want for ourselves,” he 
argues, but “we act as citizens to achieve what we think is right or best for the 
community” (Sagoff, 1981, p. 445, original italics).  These two roles are not the same and 
Sagoff provides several examples of how people’s preferences as consumers are not 
consistent with their judgments as citizens.  More recently, Sagoff (1998) has 
                                                 
2 Deontology is a theory of ethics based upon duties and rights.  It stands in contrast to 
economics’ utilitarian ethics, which is based on the greatest amount of benefits for the 
greatest amount of people. 
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acknowledged some utility in valuation exercises.  Specifically, he developed a 
modification of contingent valuation that uses a jury-like group of respondents to 
collectively deliberate, and come to consensus, on some environmental value.  But he 
maintains that the results of such deliberation reflect public and communal interests of 
citizens, not private preferences of consumers for which proponents of environmental 
valuation strive.  To Sagoff, measuring private preferences in environmental valuation 
remains invalid. 
 There is some empirical evidence supporting Sagoff’s claims.  Gintis (2000) 
reviewed empirical studies evaluating choice behaviors and motivations and found that 
choices people make in many contexts often do not resemble the rational actor of 
neoclassical economic theory, whom he calls homo economicus.  Instead, people are 
much more cooperative and less self-interested than economic theory assumes.  The 
implication, Gintis suggests, is that an economic framework for environmental decision 
making is inappropriate.  In an early cross-cultural study of the contexts of cost-benefit 
analysis, Smith and Hogg (1971) found that while the economic, consumer model of 
behavior may be culturally acceptable in the U.S., other cultures value being benefactors 
more than being beneficiaries.  Cost-benefit analysis does not account for the possibility 
of willingness to incur great costs. 
In psychological evaluations of contingent valuation, researchers have concluded 
that responses are often dominated by value expressions much broader than the intended 
appraisals of economic tradeoffs (Blamey, 1998) and that respondents object to the idea 
of specifying a monetary, utilitarian value for environmental goods (Hanley, Spash, & 
Walker, 1995; Jakobsson & Dragun, 2001; Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop, & Nancarrow, 
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1999).  One study specifically tested Sagoff’s hypothesis of the citizen-consumer 
dichotomy and not only found evidence that the dichotomy exists, but also concluded that 
people’s preferences for environmental goods are not consistent with transitivity, an 
economic axiom on which environmental valuation rests (Common, Reid, & Blamey, 
1997).  The latter conclusion has been found in other studies also (e.g., Giraud, Loomis, 
& Johnson, 1999; Johnston & Swallow, 1999).  One study measuring the value of 
wildlife with contingent valuation summarizes these concerns well: 
 
“…many respondents were either uncertain about their valuation, believed 
that wildlife should not be valued in dollar terms, or felt that the money 
should come from somewhere else (taxes and fees).  Moreover, a majority 
of those who would pay exhibited behavior which appears inconsistent 
with the neoclassical economic theory of trade-offs between money and 
wildlife.  In essence, this [contingent valuation study] may have asked 
people to choose between ordinary goods (income) and a moral 
principle… Such choices are likely to produce conflict and ambivalence, 
and the resulting behavior (protest and avoidance) is likely to be 
inconsistent with the usual economic assumptions… We therefore 
conclude that benefit-cost analysis should not be used to make decisions 
about wildlife recovery programs” (Stevens, Glass, More, & Echeverria, 
1991, p. 333). 
 
 
In a broader, sociological study, Kempton, Boster, and Hartley (1995) conducted 
an extensive survey to measure environmental values in America.  They note that 
historians such as White (1967) describe Americans as viewing nature in utilitarian 
terms, due to a Judeo-Christian interpretation of Genesis as a license to use and master 
nature as they see fit.  Such a view would reveal itself in utilitarian arguments for 
environmental protection or exploitation.  Contrary to this, however, the authors found in 
their research that only a small minority of Americans take a purely utilitarian view.  This 
was true of all five clusters in their sampling plan, representing a range of environmental 
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perspectives from Earth First! members to sawmill workers.  Instead, all clusters favored 
more aesthetic and biocentric perspectives (p. 102-115). 
Besides these ethical arguments, some strong opponents also summarily dismiss 
the validity of environmental valuation efforts.  Most economists deny the possibility of 
making cardinal or interpersonal comparisons of utility (Paris & Reynolds, 1983), yet 
environmental valuation tools attempt to do exactly these two things: measure individual 
utility and compile them.  Others say the public nature of environmental issues make 
individual preference measurement inappropriate (Moody, 1974; Sagoff, 1994).     
 As if the above controversy over the validity and ethics of environmental 
valuation were not enough, the debate’s fire has been recently fanned by the growth of 
benefit transfer studies.  As previously described, analysts using this method calculate 
environmental values not through original application of one of the valuation methods, 
but through review of existing literature that they deem most similar to the new 
circumstances they face.  This approach assumes the generalizability of the existing 
literature (Smith, 1992), but does not necessarily verify it.  This is problematic because 
most applications of the travel cost, hedonic pricing, and contingent valuation methods 
have been used to evaluate specific, local environmental changes, with their 
generalizability only qualitatively assessed or left to the judgment of their readers 
altogether.  Indeed, there is generally little said about the generalizability of each 
application's results.   
 A few studies have attempted to test the reliability of benefit transfers by 
comparing their results with original applications of valuation methods.  The results of 
these case studies have been mixed.  Piper and Martin (2001) and Chestnut, Ostro, and 
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Vichit-Vadakan (1997) concluded that benefit transfer can produce reasonable estimates 
when using broad based environmental valuation models or when measuring values as 
portions of income rather than absolute amounts.  Others have concluded that benefit 
transfer results are unreliable (e.g., Boyle, Bergstrom, & Poe, 2001; Brouwer, 2000; 
Downing & Ozuna, 1996; Kirchoff, Colby, & LaFrance, 1997; Loomis, Roach, Ward, & 
Ready, 1995).  Brouwer’s (2000) test resulted in transfer errors up to 475% of the 
estimates from original valuation applications. 
 
Need for Evaluation 
The wide use of the three environmental valuation methods, along with their 
controversy, necessitate their evaluation.  On one hand, from a purely pragmatic 
perspective, environmental valuation methods are worthy of assessment simply because 
they are popular and exert real influence on policy (Rosenberg, 1992; Smith, 1993).  
Thousands of articles on these methods have been published in the last few decades, 
affecting the public policies and legal cases they analyze.  In the Exxon Valdez case 
alone, environmental valuation influenced a billion dollar settlement.   
 On the other hand, from both academic and pragmatic perspectives, 
environmental valuation methods are in need of assessment because there is much 
controversy over their reliability and validity.  Besides the methodological and normative 
concerns of the proponents and opponents discussed above, other academic concerns 
include the high variance of values for similar goods valued by different methods or 
under different circumstances.  This wide variance from different studies is “regularly 
cited” but little effort has been made to evaluate the causes (van den Bergh, Button, 
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Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 46).  The effects of valuation studies’ characteristics – 
such as ages, valuation methods, and environmental goods – on their results must be 
determined in order to appropriately use them in future benefit transfer studies (Ofiara & 
Seneca, 2001, p. 265; Smith, 1992).  Also, the increase in the use of benefit transfer 
studies has demanded development of standards and protocols for their implementation 
(Boyle, Bergstrom, & Poe, 2001; Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 1998, p. 3).  Finally, 
there is also plain public skepticism about the methods and their results.  In the legal war 
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the controversy over the values of the lost wildlife 
and damaged ecosystem was due not only to the accuracy of the biological surveys, but 
also to the methods used to measure the values of the damages (Keeble, 1999, pp. 197-
199).  The public has become increasingly distrustful of “expert” opinions such as those 
given in cost-benefit analyses (Freeman & Portney, 1999, p. 19).   
 In short, the practical use of environmental valuation methods make their 
examination relevant.  A well designed and implemented examination, in turn, could 
address some of the concerns described.  For example, evaluative efforts could determine 
the convergent validity of the methods, and identify variables explaining the variances.  
Such findings could help refine the proper uses of the methods in original studies as well 
as in benefit transfer studies (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 52). 
 Given the popularity of these methods, the controversy surrounding them, and the 
potential refinements to be gained from their evaluation, it is surprising that there have 
been very few meta-analyses of valuation studies (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & 
Pepping, 1997, p. 46).  A few have been performed, but none with the scope and 
approach done here.  Existing meta-analyses have tended to focus on specific goods such 
 47
 
as outdoor recreation (Rosenberger & Loomis, 2000; Shrestha & Loomis, 2001; Smith & 
Kaoru, 1990), wetland services (Woodward & Wui, 2001), ground water values (Boyle, 
Poe, & Bergstrom, 1994), and air quality (Smith & Huang, 1993).  Some meta-analyses 
have focused on specific valuation tools (Smith, Bruford, & Wayne, 1996; Smith & 
Huang, 1993; Smith & Kaoru, 1990).  However, these studies attempted to find the 
determinants of value, rather than test the validity of the methods.  Indeed, Smith and 
Pattanayak (2002) reviewed 15 meta-analyses of nonmarket valuation and found that 13 
of them, including some of those cited here, sought to synthesize valuations of specific 
goods and identify the determinants of the values. 
One meta-analysis, however, attempted to address the validity of two valuation 
methods.  Carson led a meta-analysis of studies that tested the convergent validity of 
values measured by both contingent valuation and revealed preference methods (Carson, 
Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996).  His findings generally support the validity of the 
methods, but they were based only on studies that compared stated and revealed 
preference methods together (i.e., the purpose of those original studies was to test the 
validity of contingent valuation).  No one has yet compared the results of different stated 
preference and weak complementarity studies for the purpose of testing the convergent 
validity of the valuation tools.   
 Also, the existing meta-analyses have used the outcome measures of the original 
studies (e.g., mean dollar values) when comparing results across the studies.  This 
approach limits the scope of a meta-analysis to just those studies using similar measures, 
and it does not account for the variability in the results within each study.  Both of these 




Meta-analyses in other fields, however, typically account for the variability in the results 
of studies by calculating effect sizes as the outcome measure.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
effect sizes are standardized measures of study outcomes that not only make it possible to 
compare results from studies using different outcome measures, but also make such 
comparisons more meaningful by accounting for the variability in the original studies.  
These two characteristics of effect sizes allow the researcher to include more studies in a 
meta-analysis and to measure broader trends among the studies.  
This dissertation research fills these gaps in the meta-analyses of environmental 
valuation by testing the convergent validity of three valuation methods – using the effect 





 The guiding questions of this research are, “are the results from different 
environmental valuation methods collectively reliable, are there contexts in which they 
are more reliable than others, and – to the extent possible – are the results valid?”  My 
goal then is to refine the proper contextual uses of these three methods in original 
applications and benefit transfers.  To meet this goal, there are two objectives for this 
research.  First, it tests the convergent validity of the valuation methods.  Convergent 
validity in this context is the measure of how closely results from different methods come 
together to one value (Bishop, Champ, Brown, & McCollum, 1997; Carson, Flores, & 
Meade, 2001; Whitehead, 1995).  While convergence of results is not a sufficient 
determinant of validity, it is a necessary condition.  Thus, this research can signal 
problematic results, but not affirm valid ones.  While measuring convergent validity, this 
research also identifies moderating variables explaining the variance in the valuations.  
Second, this research folds the results of these statistical analyses into the broader 
normative discussion surrounding environmental valuation.     
This chapter begins by introducing the meta-analytic framework that was used to 
assess the valuation tools and by describing the significance of the analysis in 
environmental policy.  It then describes in detail the hypotheses of the research, the 
procedures and scope of data collection, and the statistical analyses performed with the 
data.  Next, it addresses some difficulties in the research that were anticipated and how 
they were addressed.   
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Meta-Analysis of Environmental Valuation 
 To address the controversies surrounding these environmental valuation methods, 
I performed an extensive meta-analysis of environmental valuation studies.  Meta-
analysis is a statistical method that integrates research findings from many studies 
addressing the same subject (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p. 491).  By doing so it can 
assess the commonalities and variations across a range of prior studies.  The method has 
significant advantages over traditional methods of research synthesis (van den Bergh, 
Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, pp. 37-38).  Unlike early, qualitative comparisons of 
valuation studies (e.g., Bergstrom, 1990; Gregory, Mendelsohn, & Moore, 1989; Loomis, 
1987; Schulze, d’Arge, & Brookshire, 1981), meta-analysis synthesizes results 
quantitatively and thereby adds more information to descriptive taxonomies.  The method 
is also statistically sound, unlike earlier quantitative methods such as vote-counting1.  The 
result is a method that can provide a greater amount and quality of information than other 
methods of research synthesis.  The statistical mechanics of meta-analysis varies with the 
information available from the studies evaluated, but the framework of all meta-analyses 
is common (Cooper & Hedges, 1994, pp. 9-13; Hunt, 1997; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).  It 
consists of collecting studies applicable to the research question, coding information from 
them, and analyzing the coded data. 
The idea of quantitatively combining the results of different studies has been 
traced back to the early 20th century  (Cooper & Hedges, 1994, p. 5; Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 1991, p. 491), but the formal introduction of meta-analysis is widely credited to 
                                                          
1 The vote-counting method of research synthesis resolves conflicting results from 
different studies by tallying the number of studies finding each result.  The result with the 
most votes is favored.  This approach ignores statistical explanations for differences in 
results, such as sample sizes and representativeness. 
 51
Gene Glass in 1976 (Cooper & Hedges, 1994, p. 5; van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & 
Pepping, 1997, p. 35).  Prior to this, quantitative syntheses of studies were rare (Cooper 
& Hedges, 1994, p. 6).  Following Glass’s introduction, which was in education research, 
the method gained popularity in psychology and medicine.  However, its application in 
economics and environmental valuation has been “extremely limited” (van den Bergh, 
Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 38) even though some have noted its great 
potential to summarize information in these fields ( Desvousges, Johnson, & Banzhaf, 
1998, pp. 28-30; Skalski, 1995).  Indeed, meta-analysis is applicable to any field with 
significant numbers of empirical studies with wide ranging or conflicting results.  
Environmental valuation is such a field.     
   
Anticipated Results  
 Meta-analysis is used here to produce four important insights.  First, at the most 
basic level, it provides descriptive statistics of existing environmental valuation studies.  
This includes the distribution of studies by environmental good, geography, time, and 
publisher.  Such information helps identify gaps in the existing body of valuation studies 
and direct future studies (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, pp. 40-42; 
Lipsey, 1994, pp. 116-117).   
 Second, a meta-analysis measures the central tendencies and variances of the 
values of environmental goods.  For results that show wide variation, the meta-analysis 
tests for potential moderating variables.  This is a key benefit of meta-analysis and is the 
most significant result of this research (Lipsey, 1994, pp. 118-120; van den Bergh, 
Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, pp. 40-42).  Moderating variables – sometimes called 
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confounding variables outside of meta-analyses – are those that account for a significant 
portion of the variation in the primary results.  By identifying moderators, this meta-
analysis refines the uses of these environmental valuation tools.  One important potential 
moderator that this study tests is the method of valuation.  This constitutes a test of 
convergent validity.  If the valuation method is a moderator then it can also show how the 
method affects the variation.  For example, it could show which methods produce higher 
or lower estimates, which produce wider ranges, etc.  Other important potential 
moderators tested include the type of environmental good (e.g., air, water, wildlife, etc.), 
and the measures of these goods.  One would reasonably expect both of these factors to 
be moderators of value, but Chapter 2 describes the controversy over the ability to 
measure them.  Confirming the effect of these potential moderators lends statistical 
evidence to the methods’ validities.  A list of potential moderators tested are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 Next, the above two results lead to the third: this meta-analysis refines the 
defensible contextual uses of the three environmental valuation tools.  On one extreme, if 
the analysis shows high convergent validity, then the refinements would not be any more 
confining than the prescriptions in the existing literature.  On the other extreme, if the 
analysis shows low convergent validity, then the prescriptions would be more confining.  
In the middle are moderate results that could show some convergent validity, but also 
identifies moderators.  In this case, this meta-analysis would detail the conditions in 
which different valuation tools produce the most defensible results.   
Finally, with any of these above possibilities, this meta-analysis weighs heavily 
on the broader normative debate over environmental valuation, by providing statistical 
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evidence to the basic question, “Can consumers reliably monetize the values they place 
on environmental goods?”  If they can, we are still left with the broader, normative 
question, “Should we place monetary values on environmental goods?”  But if they 
cannot, then the normative question becomes moot2. 
 
Significance 
Two important questions that any meta-analysis is poised to address are “How 
confident can we be that the findings can be generalized beyond a small subset of 
populations, settings, and procedures?” and “Does the research advance the theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon?” (Hall, Tickle-Degnen, Rosenthal, & Mosteller, 1994, 
pp. 18-21).  Indeed, this meta-analysis has important practical and theoretical 
implications for environmental valuation. 
Its impact on the practice of environmental valuation starts with estimating the 
economic values of environmental changes from the pool of existing studies for each 
good.  It provides more broad estimates of the overall central tendencies and dispersions 
among many studies.  More importantly, however, this meta-analysis tests how 
dependent the findings are on specific circumstances of the studies.  One reason for the 
variation in results of environmental valuations is the “complex multidimensional nature 
of societal and environmental systems and interactions” (van den Bergh, Button, 
Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 10).  This meta-analysis helps sort out that complexity.  
                                                          
2 Strong opponents of environmental valuation would object to this sequence of 
questions, claiming that the first question to ask is the normative one.  They might argue 
that if monetization of environmental values should not be done, then the practical 
question is moot.  However, I have chosen to ask the practical question first, to test the 
convergent validity of the methods from their own theoretical framework of 
econometrics.  
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The analysis clarifies the generalizability and utility of the valuation methods by 
identifying moderating variables that account for any trends in the variance of values.  
Comparison of these results among the three valuation methods also determines their 
relative strengths and weaknesses.  The practical implications of such findings are 
obvious: they refine the defensible uses of environmental valuation in cost-benefit 
analysis and benefit transfer studies (Boyle & Bergstrom, 1992; Brouwer, 2000; 
Desvousges, Naughton, & Parsons, 1992; Walsh, Johnson, & McKean, 1992).  Such 
findings are important to the many agencies and organizations that currently depend on 
such studies in their environmental decision making.  They include the principle trustees 
of federal lands in the United States (the Department of the Interior [including the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Land Management], 
the Forest Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the 
Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy), the chief implementers of 
environmental legislation (such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers), as well as private organizations 
concerned with the same issues (for example, environmental groups and industry 
representatives). 
 This research also contributes to the understanding of the theoretical relationships 
between changes in environmental goods and their monetary values.  Foremost, it 
determines whether the relationship can be measured reliably by different methods.  If 
not, then opponents of environmental valuation will have a statistical argument to add to 
their thus far normative and qualitative arguments.  If so, then proponents will have the 
statistical evidence to support their theoretical arguments. 
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Additionally, the significance of this research also stems from its scope.  Few 
researchers have performed secondary analyses of environmental valuation, and none 
have done so with the scope done here.  Unlike existing meta-analyses, this research 
compares the results of different stated preference and weak complementarity studies, 
covers a broad range of environmental goods, and collects a large sample of studies.  The 
large scope gives the results of this research  practical and theoretical impacts regardless 
of the actual results. 
 
Hypotheses 
After measuring the central tendencies and dispersions of the values of 
environmental goods, I then tested select variables for their moderating effects on the 
variance in the values.  Stated formally in the format of statistical hypothesis testing, the 
null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H0: there are no moderators. 
H1: there are moderators. 
 
Moderators 
First, the type of environmental good was tested as a moderating variable.  
Common sense and economic theory both state that different environmental goods have 
different values, and some tests have presented empirical evidence to this effect (e.g., 
Smith, 1996).  To confirm this, alternative hypotheses were tested: 
 
Potential moderator 1: type of good 
H0: type of good is not a moderator. 




Beyond confirmation of what is intuitively obvious, this test could detail the degree of 
differences among environmental goods and estimate the variance of each.  For example, 
perhaps environmental goods that do appear in some markets and are more familiar to 
consumers (e.g., land, water) exhibit less variance than those that are not found in 
markets (e.g., air, wildlife).  Also, analysis of this hypothesis while controlling for the 
method of valuation revealed whether certain goods are better measured by certain 
methods (Freeman, 1993, p. 487). 
Second, the magnitude of the environmental change was tested as a moderating 
variable.  Again, common sense and economic theory appear to settle this question easily: 
the greater the change in environmental good, the greater the change in value (Freeman, 
1993, p. 168;  Freeman, 1998, pp. 26-28).     
 
Potential moderator 2: magnitude of change 
H0: magnitude of change is not a moderator. 
H1: magnitude of change is a moderator. 
 
 
But testing this hypothesis was not easy because environmental valuation studies have 
inconsistent measures of environmental change.  Hedonic pricing studies, for example, 
tend to measure changes in environmental goods incrementally, such as the improvement 
in air quality in incremental units of pollution (e.g., parts per billion of particulate 
matter).  Meanwhile, contingent valuation studies tend to measure changes in discrete, 
holistic terms, such as the improvement of air quality to a threshold condition (e.g., from 
“non-compliant” to “compliant” with air quality standards).  Thus, this meta-analysis 
only gauges the effect of broad measures of magnitude, which are described in Chapter 4. 
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 Third, and closely related to the magnitude of changes, is the method of 
measuring and describing the changes.  Specifically, quantitative versus qualitative 
descriptions of the changes in the environmental goods were tested for their effect on 
values.   
 
Potential moderator 3: type of description of environmental change  
H0: type of description is not a moderator. 
H1: type of description is a moderator. 
 
 
Intuition does not provide clear guidance here.  On one hand, quantitative descriptions 
would seem to produce more accurate estimates of value than qualitative descriptions.  
For example, the price one would be willing to pay for a television with a 19” screen 
would probably be easier to estimate than the price one would pay for a television with a 
“small” screen.  However, quantitative descriptions of environmental goods are often 
obscure to a layperson, while qualitative descriptions are better understood.  For example, 
people might better understand the difference between “bad” and “good” water quality 
than the difference between water with 100 or 30 “parts per million total suspended 
solids” even though the latter is one way water quality is quantified.  Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that qualitative descriptions might produce more reliable 
estimates.  
Finally, convergent validity of the three methods was tested (Freeman, 1993, p. 
176; Lipsey, 1994, p. 119; Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 265; van den Bergh, Button, 
Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 50).  That is, the method of valuation was tested as a 
moderating variable.  If all three methods validly measure the same environmental 
values, then they should not moderate value.  At least one limited meta-analysis has 
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drawn this conclusion from an analysis of studies using both contingent valuation and 
revealed preference methods (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 50).  
Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, public policies prescribe these valuation methods without 
distinction, making an implicit assumption that values derived from these methods are 
comparable. 
 
Potential moderator 4: method of valuation 
H0: valuation method is not a moderator. 
H1: valuation method is a moderator. 
 
 
Yet, there are good reasons for skepticism. First, each of the methods has its own 
limitations which may bias their measures.  Contingent valuation, for example, is 
especially prone to biases because it relies on the ability and willingness of respondents 
to answer truthfully.  Also, the travel cost method is generally unable to account for 
substitution among sites and thus tends to overstate benefits3.  It is thus reasonable to 
expect different central tendencies and variances among the different methods.  Second, 
contingent valuation can measure nonuse values in addition to use values, whereas the 
weak complementarity methods cannot measure nonuse values.  Thus, it is also 
reasonable to expect valuations from contingent valuation studies to be higher than 
similar valuations by the other methods4.  Third, contingent valuation is an ex ante 
                                                          
3 Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf (1998) explain, “If there are substitutions for the 
site, an increase in travel costs would induce people to visit another site rather than forgo 
recreation altogether.  This substitution means that not all the value of the trip is lost.  It is 
only reduced by the difference in satisfaction given by the second-choice site relative to 
the first-choice site” (p. 20).  The absence of substitution effects thus causes the method 
to overstate benefits.  
4 Freeman (1993) calls the verification of nonuse values as the most important question 
about them, rather than the motives for them.  “Arguments about motivations seem to be 
offered primarily to persuade the reader of the plausibility of the hypothesis that nonuse 
values are positive.  But the real test of this hypothesis will come from the data.  Rather 
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approach to valuation while hedonic pricing and the travel cost method are ex post 
approaches.  Ex ante analysis involves the prediction of the economic consequences of 
future or hypothetical events, while ex post analysis involves measuring the actual 
economic consequences of events.  It is reasonable to expect ex post analyses to exhibit 
greater accuracy than ex ante analyses since measurement of past behavior is generally 
more accurate than prediction of future behavior5.  Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
there are theoretical reasons why contingent valuation results should be different than 
those from hedonic pricing and the travel cost method.  This test of convergent validity 
will bring statistical evidence to all these explanations for divergence. 
There are a few other variables that are less controversial but worth testing for 
their moderating effects.  The value in testing them is more to control for their effects 
than for the insight to their effects themselves.  Nonetheless, the degree of their effects 
can be instructive.  The first variable is the incomes of respondents.  Clearly the amount 
of income available to consumers limit and affect what they can consume (Ellis, 1998, p. 
159; Freeman, 1993, p. 168).  Second, the years of the data collection were tested (Ofiara 
& Seneca, 2001, p. 265).  Values for the environment may change over time, so it is 
reasonable to expect environmental valuations to change with time as well.  Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
than further debating definitions and possible motivations, it would be more useful to 
proceed with a test of the hypothesis that nonuse values (defined in a way that makes 
testing of the hypothesis feasible) are positive” (p. 145).  If the contingent valuation 
method is shown to be a moderating variable, then one explanation for it could be the 
verification of positive nonuse values.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the nonuse values 
for specific goods could then be estimated by deducting revealed preference estimates for 
the goods from corresponding contingent valuation estimates (pp. 159-161). 
5 Freeman (1993) prescribes more use of ex post analysis to validate ex ante analyses.  “It 
is particularly important that the economic analysis of environmental and resource 
policies include ex post analysis.  It is necessary… to devote more effort to verifying 
these models through ex post comparisons of the predictions with observed results” (pp. 
14-15). 
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locations of the studies were also tested.  These results describe the geographic 
generalizability of valuation studies.  For each of these variables, the null hypothesis is 
that it is not a moderating variable, and the alternative hypothesis is that it is. 
 
Rival Hypotheses 
 It is likely, of course, that the environmental valuation data exhibit high variance 
even after accounting for the above potential moderators.  I did not expect to identify 
sufficient moderators to explain all or even most of the variance.  There are rival 
hypotheses beyond the scope of this dissertation that might further explain the variance.  
First, the variance might be due to some other variables not tested in this research.  The 
variables tested in this dissertation are those whose effects, or the lack thereof, are 
instructive to the future use of the valuation methods and which I can measure in existing 
valuation studies.  However, there could be other variables outside the measures of the 
studies that account for the dispersion of values. 
Second, there may simply be a truly wide variance in the values of environmental 
goods.  This is not unreasonable to expect because they are often nonmarket goods, and 
consumers are not accustomed to pricing them.  Furthermore, even some marketed goods 
have wide ranging prices.  For example, art work, which in some ways shares some of the 
aesthetic and intangible benefits of environmental goods, exhibit wide ranging values for 
similar goods.  The wide ranges in values, then, could simply be a reflection of the 
diversity of views and values held for the environment.   
Also, one of the valuation methods contributes to the variance in results.  Randall, 
Hoehn, and Brookshire (1983) have argued that contingent valuation studies result in 
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highly contingent responses.  That is, responses to contingent valuation surveys are 
unique to the hypothetical markets described in the surveys.  They vary with several 
aspects of the hypothetical market, including the amenity of interest, the status quo level 
of the amenity, the offered change in the level of the amenity, the institutional structure 
of provision, the method of payment, the decision rule to provide the change, etc.  Thus, 
residual variance among contingent valuation results should be expected. 
 
Data Collection 
The above hypotheses were tested by statistical analysis of data collected from the 
existing body of environmental valuation studies.  Following the meta-analytic 
framework, the research began with a thorough and systematic search for applicable 
studies, followed by the coding of information from the studies.   
 
Case, Unit of Analysis, and Sample Frame 
 Meta-analysis is fundamentally a statistical analysis of the body of literature on a 
given topic.  Thus, the basic artifact from which it gathers data, or its “case” (Vogt, 1999, 
p. 34), is the study.  For this dissertation, the case is the environmental valuation study.  
The unit of analysis for this research is the valuation function.  This could be an average 
willingness to pay, a trip generation function, a hedonic price function, or another 
quantitative expression of environmental value.  Notice that more than one analytical unit 
can come from each case (Lipsey, 1994, pp. 112-114).  For example, one study might use 
multiple methods to value a good, and thereby generate multiple valuation functions from 
one case.  (However, when a study reports multiple valuation functions from the same 
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data – such as when a study reports all the functional forms considered – only the most 
highly recommended one will be used.)   
Meta-analyses of topics with small and known populations of studies often 
include the entire population in their analyses, thus reducing the analysis to descriptive 
statistics.  It is not necessary, however, to include every paper on a topic in a meta-
analysis.  For well-published topics such as environmental valuation, it is not even 
desirable to do so.  In such cases, a representative sample of studies is preferable, from 
which inferences on the population of studies can be made (White, 1994, p. 44).  Thus, 
for this meta-analysis, I collected a sample of applicable studies representing the most 
current practices of the three environmental valuation methods.  The specific parameters 
used to select studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis are as follows: 
First, the studies were published in periodicals.  This parameter is needed for a 
purely pragmatic reason: unpublished studies are largely unknown and inaccessible.  
They are not only inaccessible to a meta-analyst, but also to benefit transfer analysts 
searching for applicable studies.  Because I am interested in the assessment of studies 
being used to value environmental goods, excluding unpublished studies is acceptable.  
There is also a compelling methodological reason for this parameter: publication is a 
signal of the quality of the study.  Manuscripts submitted to academic journals typically 
undergo peer reviews.  These reviews provide some level of assurance to the quality of 
the design, implementation, and results.   
Second, the studies must employ the travel cost method, hedonic pricing, 
contingent valuation, or any combination of them.  These three methods are at the heart 
of the research questions, so they are an essential parameter. 
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Third, the studies must quantitatively value a change in the quality of an 
environmental good or a change in the level of an environmental service.  It is not enough 
to simply value a static good, such as the value of a stand of trees.  Rather, the studies 
must value a change in the good, such as the value of preserving the stand of trees from 
being completely cut down.  This condition is necessary to more clearly define the 
magnitudes of the environmental goods being valued.  It is also necessary for the 
calculations of effect sizes, as discussed later in this chapter.  Valuations of outdoor 
recreation were only included when they were related to changes in environmental 
quality.  For example, the value of fishing in a stream would not be included in the meta-
analysis, but the value of fishing in a stream before and after an increase in the stream’s 
water quality would be included.     
 The search for studies meeting the above three parameters consisted of a manual 
search of key periodicals in environmental policy.  This method is widely used by 
literature reviewers with favorable results (White, 1994, p. 45).  Manual search is not an 
efficient method (that is, it captures many irrelevant articles per relevant article), but it 
virtually assures the researcher that all relevant studies in the frame of the manual search 
are found.     
 To determine the key journals to be manually searched, I searched five 
bibliographic databases pertaining to environmental issues.  In each database I searched 
for journal articles pertaining to the travel cost method, hedonic pricing, and contingent 
valuation.  The five databases included one general academic database (Academic Search 
Primer), two environmentally focused databases (Environmental Sciences and Pollution 
Management Set, and Aquatic Sciences and Abstracts & Oceanic Abstracts), an 
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economic database (EconLit), and an agricultural database (AGRICOLA).  For each 
database, key word searches used three phrases: “travel cost*,” “hedonic,” and 
“contingent valuation.”  The journals cited in these searches were recorded, as well as the 
number of hits for each journal.  Altogether, 141 journals were cited, with 753 hits 
(including multiple hits from more than one database).  However, over a third of all hits 
came from just five journals.  (See Figure 3.1.)  These top five journals, all available in 
local university libraries, were manually searched6: 
 
 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
 Environmental & Resource Economics 
 Journal of Environmental Management 
 Land Economics 
 Water Resources Research 
 
To capture the most current practices used in each of the valuation methods, I 
started the literature search from December 2001 and worked back to the beginnings of 
the contemporary practices of each method, which provided a sufficient sample for the 
statistical analyses.  The number of studies in a meta-analysis need not be large7, but 
normal statistical criteria favor the use of as many observations as possible. 
 
 
                                                          
6 The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management and Ecological Economics 
– two widely regarded journals in nonmarket valuation – ranked numbers 6 and 7 by the 
number of hits.  Thus, they were not included in the sample frame for this research. 
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 From each case a list of variables was coded, and these variables provided the 
data for the statistical analyses.  The information coded focused on those directly needed 
to test the research hypotheses (i.e., study results, method and substantive variables), but 
also included extrinsic variables such as journals and authors (Lipsey, 1994, pp. 112-
116).  Most of the information was directly transcribed from the studies and required 
little or no inference (e.g., sample size, response rate, etc.), a few required minor 
inference (e.g., type of effect, effect size, etc.), and none required high inference (e.g., 
quality of the study) (Hall, Tickle-Degnen, Rosenthal, & Mosteller, 1994, pp. 25-26). 
 Foremost in importance was the recording of each study’s results.  This not only 
included the specific quantification of value (e.g., average willingness to pay, hedonic 
price function, trip generation function), but also reported statistics related to the value, 
such as variance (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 307-308).  Another critical variable is the 
method of valuation (Ofiara & Seneca, 2001, p. 265; Stock, 1994, p. 128).  At the surface 
level this includes the broad type of valuation tool used (travel cost method, hedonic 
pricing, or contingent valuation), and whether multiple methods were used in the study 
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 307-308).  For each method, however, additional details 
were also coded to further qualify it.  The variables coded for each method included the 
following8: 
 
Travel Cost Method 
 Variation of the method (Hanley & Spash, 1993, p. 91; Hellerstein, 
1995): individual or zonal origins of travel. 
 Type of dependent variable (Freeman, 1993, p. 444): number of trips 
to a site, whether to visit a site. 
                                                          
8 Literature indicating the potential influence (i.e., moderating effect) of certain variables 
in the outcomes of the methods are cited. 
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Hedonic Pricing (Freeman, 1993, pp. 375-379) 
 Weakly complementary good: residential property, agricultural 
property, commercial property, or others. 
 Source of the dependent variable: actual market transactions, census 
tract data on house values, professional appraisals, or others. 
 Functional form of the dependent and environmental variables 
(Chattopadhyay, 1999). 
 Explanatory variables: the numbers of explanatory variables 
describing sites, neighborhoods, environmental goods, and others. 
 
 
Contingent Valuation (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 301-308) 
 Elicitation method: iterative bidding or bidding game, direct or open-
ended question, payment card or discrete choice, referendum with or 
without follow-up, or others. (Alberini, 1995; Balistreri, McClelland, 
Poe, & Schulze, 2001; Boyle et al., 1996; Brown, Champ, Bishop, & 
McCollum, 1996; Halvorsen, 1998; Huang & Smith, 1998; Jordan & 
Elnagheeg, 1994; Mattsson & Li, 1994; Morrison, 2000; Ready, 1996; 
Ready, Navrud, & Dubourg, 2001; Reaves, Kramer, & Holmes, 1999; 
Scarpa & Bateman, 2000; Whitehead, Blomquist, Ready, & Huang 
1998) 
 Payment vehicle: taxes, fees, price increase, etc. 
 Type of dependent variable: willingness to pay or willingness to 
accept. (Adamowicz, Bhardwaj, & Macnab, 1993; Knetsch, 1990; 
Kolstad & Guzman, 1999; Loehman, Park, & Boldt, 1994; Mansfield, 
1999) 
 Medium of the survey: telephone, mail, in-person, focus group, or 
others. (Ethier, Poe, Schulze, & Clark, 2000; Loomis & King, 1994; 
Mannesto & Loomis, 1991) 
 Separation of estimates: use and nonuse, or combined. (Bishop, 
Champ, Brown, & McCollum, 1997; Butte & van Kooten, 1999) 
 
 
Next, I coded substantive variables central to the hypotheses presented.  These 
included the type of environmental good, the magnitude of the environmental change, the 





Type of good   
 The affected services or commodities such as air, water, fishery, forest, 




Magnitude of the environmental change  
 The baseline and ending environmental quality, and the change 
(Michael, Boyle, & Bouchard, 2000). 
 Temporal and spatial boundaries of the change. 
 Type of effect (Freeman, 1993, pp. 12-14) or treatment (Stock, 1994, 
p. 128), such as direct impacts on humans (morbidity, mortality, 
visibility, odor, visual aesthetics), ecosystem effects (impacts on 
productivity of ecological systems [forestry, fisheries], recreational 
uses, biodiversity, stability), impacts through nonliving systems 
(weather, climate, materials, soils), etc. 
 
 
Type of description of environmental change (Boyle, 1989; Michael, 
Boyle, & Bouchard, 2000) 
 Quantitative versus qualitative descriptions of change.  That is, 
objective measures that are reproducible (e.g., dissolved oxygen in 
water) or qualitative perceptions of change. 
 Incremental versus holistic change. 
 Numbers of measures used (Freeman, 1993, pp. 469-461), such as one 
measure, one summary measure or index, or multiple measures. 
 
 
Other substantive variables 
 Income of the study’s unit of analysis. 
 Year of data (Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 301-303; Ofiara & Seneca, 
2001, p. 265; Whitehead & Hoban, 1999). 
 Location of the study and its setting (Stock, 1994, p. 127), such as 
local, regional, national, international, etc. 
 Descriptions of the subjects, including both the sample frame and the 
population it is meant to represent; the original sample size, response 
rate, and useable number of responses; and whether probability or non-
probability sampling was used (Dalecki, Whitehead, & Blomquist, 
1993; Mitchell & Carson, 1989, pp. 301-303; Stock, 1994, pp. 127-
128). 
 
Finally, some extrinsic variables (Lipsey, 1994, p. 114) were also coded, 
including bibliographic study identifiers (Stock, 1994, p. 127).  Any findings and 
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comments relevant to this research were also recorded.  The code sheet used for this data 
collection is in Appendix A. 
 
Analysis 
Analysis of the resulting data consisted of descriptive statistics, calculations of 
effect sizes, and tests for moderating variables.  First, descriptive statistics of the data 
summarized the distribution of valuation studies by good, valuation method, year, and 
location.  The measures of value varied, including willingness to pay, willingness to 
accept, trip generation functions, and hedonic price models.  Thus, standardized effect 
sizes were calculated for each environmental valuation, and these effect sizes were 
summarized by descriptive statistics. 
 Effect sizes are standardized measures of the impact the independent variable has 
on the dependent variable.  More specifically, it is “A statistic… indicating the difference 
in outcome for the average subject who received a treatment from the average subject 
who did not” (Vogt, 1999, p. 94).  This definition stems from the medical sciences, which 
uses meta-analysis extensively.  In  a medical context, for example, an effect size might 
measure the difference in the average recovery time between patients who received a 
treatment and those who did not.  In this current research, an effect size is the difference 
in value between an environmental good that is subject to some degradation or 
improvement and one that is not.   
Calculations of effect sizes vary according to the information reported in the 
original studies, but follow the general form 
 




where YE - YC is the difference in average effect (valuation) before and after the 
treatment (change in environmental quality), and S is the pooled standard deviation from 
both cases (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990, pp. 233-235).  The effect size is unitless, thus 
facilitating comparability between studies.   
Methods of calculating effect sizes from various statistics and models are 
described in several sources (Fleiss, 1994; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rosenthal, 1994; 
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991; van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997), but 
patterns did emerge in this data set.  When studies used the travel cost method to value a 
change in an environmental good, they typically did so by some form of a two-sample 
test.  In one procedure, visitation behaviors are examined before and after some change in 
the environmental quality of a site (e.g., change in visits to a lake before and after water 
quality improvements).  This is essentially a pre-post test, and the effect size, d, was 
directly calculated with YE - YC representing the change in visitation before and after the 
environmental quality change.  In another procedure, two sites similar by several 
characteristics except the environmental quality in question are compared (e.g., 
difference in visitation between a clean lake and a polluted one).  Again, in these cases 
effect size were directly calculated with YE - YC representing the difference in visitation 
between two comparable sites.  Sometimes this latter procedure was expanded to more 
than two sites with varying levels of the environmental good in question.  In this cross-
sectional approach, the level of the environmental good becomes an independent variable 
in the trip generation function, and the coefficient of that variable is the change in 
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visitation for a unit change (for a ratio level measurement) or a discrete change (for a 
nominal measurement) in the environmental good, YE - YC .  
When studies used hedonic pricing to value an environmental good, they almost 
always followed this last example of the travel cost method:  the level of the 
environmental good was used as an independent variable in the hedonic pricing function.  
In these cases, the implicit price9, r, of the environmental good is the difference in price 
at two levels of the environmental good.  That is, YE - YC  = r = δP/δQ.  Again, when the 
environmental good is measured with ratio level data, then the price is for an increment 
of environmental change.  When it is measured with nominal data, then the price is for a 
discrete or holistic environmental change. 
Finally, when studies used contingent valuation, the reported mean willingness to 
pay (or willingness to accept) represents the change in value for the change in the 
environmental good.  That is, the mean WTP = YE - YC .  This assumes that the mean 
WTP for the status quo environmental condition (control situation), YC , is zero, while the 
mean WTP for the improved condition (experimental situation), YE, is the stated WTP.  
This is a reasonable assumption because contingent valuations ask respondents their 
WTP above current expenditures for the improved environmental condition.  
 With effect sizes calculated, the heart of the meta-analysis proceeded with the 
combining of effect sizes while adjusting for sample size, and testing the presence of 
moderators with tests of homogeneity (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 
1997, pp. 70-72).  Homogeneity tests check the assumption that there exists a common 
                                                          
9 See Chapter 1. 
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effect size among studies.  Rejecting this assumption leads to the search for variables 
explaining the variance.   
 The methods of testing specific potential moderating variables vary with the 
characteristics of the data available.  Meta-analyses have used non-parametric statistics, 
statistical correlation, differences in means tests, and regression analysis to test 
hypotheses (van den Bergh, Button, Nijkamp, & Pepping, 1997, p. 51).  In this research, 
moderating effects were tested primarily through the difference in means tests (e.g., t-
tests and analyses of variance) and regression analyses. 
 
Troubleshooting 
 The elegant simplicity of the meta-analytic framework hides the many difficulties 
meta-analysts often face.  A small-scale, pilot meta-analysis that I prepared under a grant 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and presented to the National Center for 
Environmental Economics in March 2001, revealed problems that I expected to face in 
this dissertation research10.  It helped me to address those issues as I conducted this 
comprehensive meta-analysis.  One of the anticipated problems was defining a reasonable 
population frame for this analysis.  The population of environmental valuation studies is 
too large to include them all in this meta-analysis.  Thus, I carefully defined a limited 
sampling frame of studies, described earlier in this chapter.  Another anticipated problem 
was the poor reporting standards in environmental valuation studies.  Carson, Flores, 
                                                          
10 The purpose of the pilot study was specifically to test the feasibility of conducting an 
extensive meta-analysis of environmental valuation as described here.  It did so by 
conducting a mini-meta-analysis of the value of clean water.  The results of the pilot 
study were positive: not only is it possible to conduct a large-scale meta-analysis on 
environmental valuation, but the results identified significant moderators that need 
verification in this dissertation.   
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Martin, and Wright (1996) described this problem in the aftermath of their meta-analysis, 
saying, “Our efforts to conduct this analysis… have been greatly hindered by the curse 
suffered by other meta-analyses of nonmarket data: incomplete reporting of necessary 
details” (p. 98).  In the pilot meta-analysis I performed, 46% of applicable studies 
provided sufficient information to be included in the meta-analysis.  Thus, I anticipated 







This chapter summarizes and describes the data collected for this research.  It 
begins with an accounting of the cases and units of analysis gathered.  Then, through a 
series of graphs and tables, it describes the distributions of the major variables measured, 
their relationships to each other, and temporal trends in the data.  These findings 
constitute the first anticipated result discussed in Chapter 2, descriptive statistics of 
existing environmental valuation studies. 
 
Cases and Units of Analysis 
 The five key journals were manually searched.  I examined the titles, abstracts, 
and contents of each article in each issue of these journals from 1970 to 2001.  Two of 
the five journals began their publication during this period.  The Journal of 
Environmental Management published its first volume in 1973, and Environmental and 
Resource Economics published its first volume 1991.  The other three were well 
established by 1970.  Of all these journal issues, only a few were not available in any 
local library.1, 2 
 The manual search resulted in over 400 articles dealing with some aspect of these 
environmental valuation methods.  These articles were collected for further assessment 
and coding.  This resulted in a total of 228 articles (cases) that met all the selection 
                                                 
1 Journal holdings of Atlanta area libraries were searched in the Georgia Libraries Journal 
List (GOLD) database. 
2 All issues of Environmental and Resource Economics in 1991 and the last four issues in 
2001 (September through December) were not available at the time of data collection. 
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criteria discussed in Chapter 3.  (See Appendix B for a complete listing of these articles.)  
These articles were analyzed in depth and their information was coded.  The 228 cases 
resulted in a total of 614 valuations of changes in environmental goods (units of 
analysis).  Not all of these valuations contained information on all the variables I wished 
to code, but each had information on at least some of the variables.  Therefore, different 
subsets of this total number were used for different data analyses in this chapter and the 
next.   
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Primary Independent Variables 
 The 614 valuations are described below by their distributions over the four 
primary independent variables of interest:  environmental good, magnitude of change, 
description of change, and method of valuation.  Descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variable, effect sizes, are presented in Chapter 5.   
 
Environmental Good 
 The specific good valued by each unit of analysis was recorded as described in 
each study.  These goods varied considerably by specifics such as location and measures 
of quality.  To summarize characteristics of the data, they were aggregated under broader 
categories.  For example, valuations of clarity in Lake Tahoe and body-contact safety of 
coastal waters were combined under a category for “water quality”, while valuations of 
lake levels in Mono Lake and flows in the Wisconsin River were combined under a 
category for “water quantity”.   Of course, these constructed categories were not always 
definitive.  The level (water quantity) of Mono Lake, for example, affects its salinity 
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(water quality) and its suitability for wildlife.  In such cases, the good category was 
determined by what subjects were actually asked to value or assumed to have valued 
through their market behavior.  Still, judgment was used in these determinations.  To 
measure even broader characteristics of the data, these two water categories were further 
combined into the general category of good called “water”.  Similar categories and 
subcategories were developed for most goods valued.  The distribution of goods valued in 















































Figure 4.1: Distribution of Valuations by Environmental Good 
 
 
 Water, land, and air are clearly the most often valued goods in this data set, with 
each representing about a quarter of the observations.  Animals are fourth, accounting for 
15.5% of the valuations.  Several goods follow with relatively small numbers: toxics (14), 
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plants (8), noise (4), waste (3), biodiversity (2), energy (2), general environment (2), 
recycling (1), and combinations of goods (4).   
Like water, land goods were subcategorized as land quality and land quantity.  
The former refers to characteristics of a given area of land, such as soil quality, elevation, 
ground cover, etc.  The latter refers to the amount of a given type of land, such as the 
acreage of designated wilderness.  Animal and plant valuations were also divided into 
subcategories of quality and quantity.  The quality of an animal or plant includes its 
health, size, etc.  The quantity of animals or plants refers to their population in an area.  
This includes the popular valuation of saving a species from extinction. 
The air category only had valuations of its quality.  This is not surprising since 
humans have thus far been more concerned with, and affected by, the quality of ambient 
air than its quantity.  Also, human-induced activities such as combustion and 
deforestation have had a more significant impact air’s quality than quantity.   
Each of these categories of goods includes many specific goods.  Examples of 
these are given in Table 4.1.  The table reveals an important point that must be made 
about these categories and their use in the meta-analysis: all but one of the categories 
have multiple goods that we can expect to account for much of the variance in 
valuations.3  The animal category, for example, includes species ranging from the 
common black fly to the exotic bighorn sheep and the endangered spotted owl.  One 
might reasonably expect the human valuations of these diverse species to also be diverse.  
However, the air category only has one good: air quality.  It does not have multiple goods  
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, there are insufficient numbers of valuations for each of these goods to 
test this claim statistically.  Thus, it was necessary to aggregate the data into the broader 
categories of goods. 
 78
Table 4.1: Constituents of Environmental Goods 
 
Good Example constituents 
 
Water aquatic system, bay, drinking water, estuary, flooding, groundwater, 
harbor, irrigation, lagoon, lake, natural water, ocean, pond, rainfall, 
river, sea, sound, stream, surface water, swimable water, water basin, 
water front, water quality, water supply 
 
Land beach, countryside, creek side, development, elevation, forest, 
grassland, green space, habitat, landfill, marsh, natural land, open 
space, park, rain forest, shoreline, soil, Superfund site, wetland, 
wilderness, woodland 
 
Air air quality 
 
Animal bear, bighorn sheep, black fly, caribou, coyote, deer, eagle, elk, fish, 
game, moose, pheasant, possum, salmon, seal, spotted owl, 
squawfish, striped shiner, trout, walleye, whale, whooping crane, wild 
turkey, wildlife, wolf, woodpecker 
 
Toxic hazardous waste, heavy metals, lead, pesticides 
 
Plant aquatic plants, daffodils, trees, wildflowers 
 





to explain some of the variance.  Thus, when testing the effects of the independent 
variables on valuation, as discussed in the next chapter, I expected the subset of air 
studies to have more of its variance explained.   
 
Magnitude and Description of Change 
 Two other primary independent variables are the magnitudes of the changes in the 
environmental goods, and the descriptions of the changes.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
these variables were also categorized in order to characterize the data set, and to 
aggregate the data for statistical analysis.   
The magnitudes of the changes in the environmental goods were categorized as 
incremental and holistic changes.  For example, a unit change in tropospheric ozone 
concentrations would be categorized as an incremental change of air quality, while a 
change in ozone concentrations to meet air quality standards would be categorized as a 
holistic change.  Similarly, a unit change in acreage of woodlands would categorized as 
an incremental change, while an addition of an entire park would be categorized as a 
holistic change.  These categories are admittedly arbitrary (e.g., the addition of one park 
could be incremental when compared to the addition of several parks), and they reduce 
all levels of changes to just two categories, but the data reduction was desirable for 
several reasons.  First, the variance in the changes bordered on each being unique.  
Indeed, there are few studies in the data set that valued the same changes in an 
environmental good.  Thus, data reduction was necessary to develop sufficient degrees of 
freedom for statistical analysis.  Second, the uniqueness of the changes is a problem also 
faced by practitioners of benefit transfer.  To overcome this problem, they seek studies 
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that are similar in environmental changes, not identical, to the current situation they 
study.  Thus, the categorization of changes help policy analysts by identifying the 
relevant types of changes to consider when reviewing existing valuation studies.  Third, 
while the categories are arbitrary to some extent, they are still meaningful.  They 
represent valuations at the margin (incremental changes) versus those for outcome-
oriented, new states of quality or quantity (holistic changes).  This difference is 
hypothesized to moderate valuations.  Fourth, this hypothesis can be tested with the 
reduced data. 
 The descriptions of the changes were categorized as qualitative and quantitative.  
For example, a 10% reduction in biochemical oxygen demand in a river would be 
categorized as a quantitative description, while an improvement of water quality to 
“clean” or “safe” levels would be categorized as a qualitative description.  The 
justification for this data reduction is similar to that for the magnitude of changes: the 
high variance in the data, bordering on uniqueness, necessitated data reduction for 
statistical purposes; and the insights that could be gained from data reduction are 
desirable.  
 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 display the frequency distributions of these two variables, and 
Table 4.4 displays their cross-tabulation.  Table 4.2 shows that both categories of changes 
are well represented in the data set, with 58.3% of changes being holistic and 41.0% 
being incremental.  Similarly, Table 4.3 shows that both types of descriptions are often 
used, with 57.2% being quantitative and 42.5% being qualitative.  However, the cross-
tabulation of these two variables show a strong relationship between them.  Specifically, 
qualitative descriptions tend to be associated with holistic changes, and quantitative  
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Valuations by  
Magnitude of Change 
 
Change Frequency % Frequency 
Holistic 358 58.3 
Incremental 252 41.0 
Unknown 4 0.7 




Table 4.3: Distribution of Valuations by  
Description of Change 
 
Description Frequency % Frequency 
Qualitative 261 42.5 
Quantitative 351 57.2 
Unknown 2 0.3 




Table 4.4: Magnitudes of Change Used with  
Descriptions of Change 
 













261 349 610 
χ2 = 180.4  
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descriptions tend to be associated with incremental changes.  Conversely, qualitative 
descriptions tend not to be used with incremental changes, and quantitative descriptions 
are less frequently used with holistic changes.  The χ2 (chi square) test of independence4 
for categorical data resulted in a test statistic of 180.4, statistically confirming the 
relationship at a level of significance of α = 0.01.5  The relationship is not surprising.  
Quantitative measures of changes are ratio or interval types of data, and are thus 
amenable to incremental aggregation or disaggregation.  Air quality, for example, can be 
quantitatively measured by concentrations of particulates or other pollutants, so its 
valuation can be made in increments of changes.  Qualitative measures, on the other 
hand, are ordinal or categorical types of data, and are not reliably amenable to 
aggregation.  So a description of air quality change from poor to excellent would tend to 
be valued holistically.  There are exceptions to both these relationships, as indicated in 
Table 4.4.  Sometimes, quantitative measures are used in holistic valuations, such as 
when air quality is measured in concentrations of pollutants, but the change valued is that 
to meet air quality standards.  In such a case, the change is not a unit of concentration but 
a jump to safe air quality levels.  Other times, ordinal qualitative measures are used in 
incremental valuations, such as when subjects are asked to value changes in air quality 
                                                 
4 The χ2 test of independence measures the relationship between two categorical variables 
by comparing observed cross-tabulation distributions with expected distributions if the 
variables are unrelated (i.e., independent).  Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses 
for the χ2 test of independence are 
 H0: the variables are independent 
 H1: the variables are not independent 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic is greater than the critical value, defined 
by the degrees of freedom (d.f.) in the table, and a selected level of significance, α.  
Otherwise the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
5 The critical value of χ2 for 1 d.f. and α = 0.01 is 6.6.  The test statistic is greater than the 
critical value, therefore the null hypothesis of independence is rejected. 
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 The primary independent variable of interest is the method of valuation.  Figure 
4.2 illustrates the distribution of observations by the valuation methods used.  Included in 
these numbers are only those studies that applied one or more of these three methods to 
value environmental goods.  Excluded from these numbers are the many studies in these 
journals that use these methods to value non-environmental goods6.  For example, many 
studies used the travel cost method to value recreational goods such as golfing, hunting, 
fishing, rafting, etc.  Many others used hedonic pricing to measure non-environmental 
determinants of property value, such as racial make-up of neighborhoods, zoning, electric 
power lines, etc.  Still others used contingent valuation to measure market goods such as 
community infrastructure, safety measures, licenses and permits, etc. 
 The contingent valuation method (CV) accounts for a majority of the valuations, 
at 55.0%.  This is somewhat surprising because it is the youngest of the three methods.  
However, it is also the most versatile of the three, prescribed for all sorts of 
environmental goods when the other two are more limited in their applicability (Freeman, 
1993, pp. 486-487).  The figure also shows that the travel cost method (TC) is rarely used 
to value changes in environmental goods, accounting for just 3.9% of the valuations.  
Many more travel cost studies than 24 were found during the manual search of the five 
                                                 
6 While these methods were developed in part to address the gap between environmental 
policy analysis and cost-benefit analysis (see Chapter 1), they have broader applications 
in valuing non-environmental and market goods.   
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key journals, but the vast majority of them were valuations of outdoor recreation, not 
changes in environmental goods.  Indeed, the adaptations necessary to use the travel cost 
method to value changes in environmental goods are significant and make alternative 
methods more appealing.  Finally, the hedonic pricing method (HP) stands in the middle, 























TC = travel cost, HP = hedonic pricing, CV = contingent valuation 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Valuations by Valuation Method 
 
 
Relationships Among the Variables 
 Besides the relationship between the magnitudes and descriptions of 
environmental changes, other relationships between the primary independent variables 
are also noteworthy.  The cross-tabulations and χ2 test statistics for the relationships 
between method of valuation and the other independent variables are presented in Tables 
4.5 through 4.8.  Table 4.5 displays the frequency distributions of the methods used for 
each major category of environmental goods.  The χ2 statistic for this contingency table is 
132.1, far greater than the critical value of 26.2 for 12 d.f. and α = 0.01.  However,  
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Table 4.5: Methods Used to Value Goods 
 































































Table 4.6: Methods Used to  
Value Goods – Reduced Table 
 
 WC CV Total
Water 89 78 167
Land 74 89 163
Air 97 51 148
Animal 8 86 94
Other 8 32 40
Total 276 336 612
WC = weak complementarity method 
χ2 = 90.5 
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several cells in the table have very few observations which may skew the test results.7  
Thus, the relationship between method and good was retested with the reduced cross-
tabulation in Table 4.6.  In this table, the travel cost and hedonic pricing methods were 
combined into a “weak complementarity” (WC) category, reflecting their common 
approach of indirectly measuring values through market behaviors for associated goods, 
and contrasting them against contingent valuation’s direct valuation through hypothetical 
market behaviors.  Also, the toxic and plant categories were combined with the “other” 
category.  The reduced table confirms the relationship between method of valuation and 
environmental good.  The χ2 statistic is 90.5, greater than the critical value of 13.3 for 4 
d.f. and α = 0.01.  Comparison of the observed distribution with the expected distribution 
under the null hypothesis8 reveals where the relationships are strong.  Animals are almost 
exclusively valued with contingent valuation, and air has a significant tendency to be 
valued with hedonic pricing.  Water, land, and other goods exhibit no significant 
relationship with the method of valuation. 
Table 4.7 shows a very strong relationship between method of valuation and the 
magnitude of change valued.  The χ2 test statistic is 326.8, compared to its critical value 
of 9.2 for 2 d.f. and α = 0.01.  Specifically, holistic changes tend to be valued with 
contingent valuation, while incremental changes tend to be valued with hedonic pricing.  
This is expected.  Few contingent valuation studies ask respondents to value increments 
of changes.  Instead, contingent valuation is quite apt to value end-state outcomes as they 
                                                 
7 A common heuristic for the χ2 test of independence requires at least 5 observations in 
each cell. 
8 The expected distribution is not shown but is easily calculated as (r x c)/t for each cell, 
where r, c, and t are the row total, column total, and total in the observed distribution, 
respectively. 
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may be easier to understand by respondents than incremental changes.  The strength of 
hedonic pricing, on the other hand, is its ability to handle quantitative, ratio data.  It can 
thus measure incremental changes easily.  It is occasionally used, however, to measure 
holistic changes through bivariate independent variables representing the two alternative 
conditions of environmental goods.  Indeed, 44 valuations in the data set did so.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Methods Used with Magnitudes of Change 
 

















23 250 336 609




Table 4.8: Methods Used with Descriptions of Change 
 























23 252 336 611
χ2 = 115.7  
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Similarly, Table 4.8 shows a strong relationship between method of valuation and 
the type of description.  Contingent valuation tends to use qualitative descriptions of the 
changes in environmental goods, while hedonic pricing tends to use quantitative 
descriptions.  This too is not surprising given the strong relationship between the 
magnitude and description of changes, described above. 
Summarizing the uses of the valuation methods, the data provides statistical 
evidence that contingent valuation is associated with valuations of qualitative, holistic 
changes in all sorts of goods, but especially animals.  Hedonic pricing is associated with 
valuations of quantitative, incremental changes in water, land, and especially air.  The 
travel cost method is rarely used to value changes in environmental goods.  Instead, it is 
more commonly used to value outdoor recreation. 
Turning the focus to the environmental goods, the relationship between the 
environmental good and the magnitude of change is given in Table 4.9, while that 
between the good and its description of change is given in Table 4.10.  Table 4.9 shows a 
strong relationship between the types of changes and the types of environmental goods.   
 






























167 161 148 95 39 610

































167 163 148 95 39 612
χ2 = 24.3  
 
 
The χ2 test statistic is 124.5, greater than the critical value of 13.3 for 4 d.f. and α = 0.01.  
Comparison of the observed distribution with the expected distribution under 
independence reveals that the relationship is strongest with air and animals.  Valuations 
of air tend to measure incremental changes.  This reflects the common use of hedonic 
pricing to value changes in air quality.  In these studies, air quality is usually measured as 
concentrations of specific pollutants.  This ratio type data in the hedonic models result in 
valuations of incremental changes.  Valuations of animals tend to measure holistic 
changes.  This reflects a common scenario used in contingent valuations of animals: 
respondents are asked for their willingness to pay for preventing the extinction of an 
endangered species or to increase its population to some viable number.  They are not 
typically asked to value an individual animal.  Land and water, on the other hand, are not 
strongly associated with either type of change.   
 Table 4.10 shows only a very mild relationship between type of description and 
the environmental goods.  The χ2 test statistic is 24.3, just greater than the critical value 
of 13.3 for 4 d.f. and α = 0.01.  Changes in air quality are mildly more likely to be 
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described quantitatively.  This again reflects the popular use of hedonic pricing to value 
air quality.  Also, changes in land are mildly more likely to be described qualitatively.  
Animals, water, and other types of goods do not show significant association with the 
type of description.  This weak relationship between the description of change and the 
type of good is somewhat surprising.  We have already seen that there is a strong 
relationship between the magnitude of change and the description of change, and we have 
seen that the magnitude of change is strongly associated with the type of good.  Thus it is 
reasonable to expect the description change to be strongly associated with the type of 
good.  Instead, the association is weak.  This shows that the magnitude of change and the 
description of change have different effects on the other variables, so both should be 
included in the meta-analyses and regression analyses in Chapter 5.  That is, the two 
variables are indeed measuring different things. 
 
Other Variables of Interest 
 Besides these four primary independent variables, there are others of interest.  
Distributions of valuations by journal and region describe the specialties of the journals, 
and identify the regions that have received much attention as well as those that have 
received little attention.  First, the frequency distributions of the two variables are 
presented in Figures 4.3 through 4.5.  Land Economics (LE) by itself accounts for a 
majority of the valuations, even though it accounts for only a plurality of the cases.  This 
is due to the many cases in that journal that report more than one valuation.  The Journal 
of Environmental Management (JEM) and Environmental and Resource Economics 
(ERE) are next, accounting for 13.4% and 8.8% respectively, even though they are the 
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youngest of the five journals.  This reflects a focus of these two journals on 
environmental valuation.  The American Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE) and 





















Figure 4.3: Distribution of Valuations by Journal 
 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of valuations by country.  This indicates the 
locations of the subjects valuing environmental goods, not the necessarily location of the 
goods.  As it shows, 83.2% of the valuations in the data set were done in the United 
States.9  Certainly a portion of this lopsidedness is due to the language of the search and 
articles for this data collection.  The search was done with English language bibliographic 
databases and resulted in English language journals and articles.  These studies, in turn, 
presumably tended to be done in English language countries.  Notice that the leading four 
countries – United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada – all use English as a  
                                                 
9 It is important to note that this does not necessarily represent the distribution of the 
population of valuations worldwide.  Recall that these five journals were the top cited 
journals in bibliographic searches on environmental valuation, not a representative 


















































Figure 4.4: Distribution of Valuations by Country 
 
 
primary language.  Still, the dominance of the United States, relative to even the other 
English language countries, is due in part to the history of environmental valuation there.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, government prescription of cost-benefit analysis and 
environmental valuation tools has been strong in the U.S. 
Of the data set’s valuations done in the United States, Figure 4.5 shows their 
distribution by state.  Western states appear to be well represented, while there is a 
noticeable lack of studies in Southern states.  A cursory evaluation of the authors of the 
articles suggests that the geographic distribution is influenced by the locations of the 
























































































Figure 4.5: Distribution of Valuations by U.S. State 
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example, John Loomis is one of the most prolific scholars in this data set, appearing as 
author or co-author in 36 cases.  His career has included significant tenures in Colorado 
and California, two of the better represented states in the data set.   
The distribution of valuations by journal and country reveals some interesting 
trends, as shown in Table 4.11.  For this statistical analysis, the countries were collapsed 
into two categories: United States and non-U.S.  It shows a clear relationship with a χ2 
test statistic of 159.5, which is greater than the critical value of 13.3 for 4 d.f. and α = 
0.01.  Specifically, Environmental and Resource Economics and the Journal of 
Environmental Management disproportionately publish studies of foreign human 
subjects, while Land Economics disproportionately publish studies of U.S. human 
subjects.  Also, although the American Journal of Agricultural Economics and Water 
Resources Research each published just 2 non-U.S. valuations, their expected number of 
non-U.S. valuations under independence is also very low, so these two journals are not as 
strongly associated with country as the other three are.10   
 The distribution of valuations by journal and type of environmental good is given 
in Table 4.12.  A cursory examination of it shows one obvious relationship: Water 
Resources Research is strongly associated with valuations of water.  It has no valuations 
of air, 4 of animals, another 4 of land, and 30 of water.  This bias for water is given in the 
journal’s title.  A χ2 test of independence of the full table results in a test statistic of 
113.5, greater than the critical value of 32.0 for 16 d.f. and α = 0.01.  It confirms the 
                                                 
10 The 2 observations in each of these journals’ non-U.S. cells violates the heuristic of a 
minimum of 5 per cell for the χ2 test of independence.  They were left in the analysis 
because their expected values were also small.  However, to confirm the relationship 
between the other three journals and the country of study, a second χ2 test was performed 
with a 2x3 contingency table leaving out AJAE and WRR.  The test statistic was 134.9, 
far greater than the critical value of 9.2 for 2 d.f. and α = 0.01.   
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strong relationship between Water Resources Research and water.  To test the 
relationship between the other 4 journals and the environmental goods a second χ2 test 
was performed with an identical table sans Water Resources Research.  The resulting test 
statistic was a much more modest 56.6, but it is still greater than the critical value of 26.2 
for 12 d.f. and α = 0.01.  A closer examination of the test reveals that the Journal of 
Environmental Management is positively associated with valuations of land but 
negatively associated with valuations of air.  Also, the American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics is positively associated with valuations of water, but negatively associated 
with valuations of land.  Valuations published in the other two journals, Environmental 
and Resource Economics and Land Economics, are relatively unassociated with specific 
environmental goods.  Furthermore, animal valuations are independent of journal. 
 



































50 52 82 363 38 585


















































































53 54 82 387 38 614
5x5 χ2 = 113.5 
5x4 χ2 (eliminating WRR) = 56.6 
 
 
 Next, the cross-tabulation of journals and methods of valuation is given in Table 
4.13.  An initial χ2 test of independence using the full table resulted in a test statistic of 
113.5, greater than the critical value of 20.1 for 8 d.f. and α = 0.01.  However, the small 
amount of travel cost valuations may have skewed the results.  Therefore, the travel cost 
and hedonic pricing observations were again combined into one “weak complementarity” 
category and the χ2 test was recalculated.  This time, the test statistic was 55.7, still 
greater than the critical value of 13.3 for 4 d.f. and α = 0.01.  Thus, there is a significant 
relationship between journal and method of valuation.  Specifically, Land Economics is 
positively associated with studies using weak complementarity methods (especially 
hedonic pricing), while Environmental and Resource Economics and the Journal of 
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Environmental Management are positively associated with studies using contingent 





















































53 54 81 387 38 613
3x5 χ2 = 113.5 
2x5 χ2 (combining TC and HP into WC) = 55.7 
 
 
 The regional distributions of valuations by environmental good and valuation 
method are shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.15.  The χ2 test statistic for Table 4.14 is 55.6, 
greater than the critical value of 13.3 for 4 d.f. and α = 0.01.  This indicates a relationship 
between region and good.  Specifically, valuations of land is disproportionately 
represented outside of the U.S., while air and animal valuations are disproportionately 
underrepresented outside the U.S.  Water values, however, receive proportionate attention  
                                                 
11 These relationships apply only to studies valuing environmental goods.  This set of 
journals also publish studies using these methods to value non-environmental goods, but 
such studies are not considered in this analysis.  For example, the American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics publishes many studies using hedonic pricing to value zoning, 
racial make up, etc. 
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Table 4.14: Goods Valued by Countries 
 




























487 98 585 
χ2 = 55.6  
 
 
Table 4.15: Methods Used by Countries 
 


















487 97 584 




inside and outside the U.S.  Similarly, the χ2 test statistic for Table 4.15 is 18.9, greater 
than the critical value of 6.6 for 1 d.f. and α = 0.01.  As before, travel cost and hedonic 
pricing methods were combined into one category of “weak complementarity” methods.  
The test statistic indicates a modest relationship between region and method of valuation.  
Specifically, outside of the U.S. contingent valuation is a disproportionately popular 
method.  Inside the U.S. the two types of methods are proportionately represented. 
 
Temporal Trends in Publications 
 The preceding analyses have focused on the descriptive statistics of the 
environmental valuations.  Here, we examine the cases over time to find any temporal 
trends.  For this examination, the case was chosen for analysis instead of the unit of 
analysis because the latter could be skewed by a few studies reporting numerous 
valuations of the same good.  For example, one study from Land Economics reporting 10 
different valuations of the Prince William Sound could misrepresent the amount attention 
Land Economics has spent on environmental valuation, water, and the U.S.  Examining 
the case, however, would count that study just once for each of those categories, not 10 
times.  Thus, analyzing the cases speaks more closely on the practice of environmental 
valuation, not the valuations themselves. 
 First, Figure 4.6 illustrates the number of publications on four environmental 
goods over the last three decades.  Five-year increments are used in this graph, and the 
next three, to smooth out the annual fluctuations in the data and better reveal the long 
range trends.  The graph shows that land and water studies have come to dominate 
environmental valuation in the last decade.  They have each seen a sharp rise in interest 
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since the mid-1980s.  Animal and air studies, on the other hand, have held a more steady 
and lower interest in the valuation literature.  The relatively few articles on air value 
might reflect the Clean Air Act’s prohibition of cost-benefit analyses in setting air quality 
standards (Rosenbaum, 1998, pp. 158, 163).  It might also reflect the homogeneity of 
goods under this category.  Recall that the other categories contain many different 































Figure 4.6: Valuations of Environmental Goods by Publication Year 
 
 
 Next, Figure 4.7 graphs the number of publications employing specific valuation 
methods against time.  Again we see some clear temporal trends, and they appear to 
support the anecdotal evidence discussed in Chapter 2.  First, we see a growth in total 
environmental valuation studies since the early 1970s.  This coincides with the first of 
































Figure 4.7: Valuation Methods Used by Publication Year 
 
 
setting regulations.  More specific to environmental issues, the beginning of this trend 
also coincides with the Water Resources Council’s prescriptions for environmental 
valuation in 1973.  The sharp rise in studies in the late 1980s might be due in part to 
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 in 1981 recommending only those regulations 
whose benefits can be shown to exceed their costs.  Second, we see that the growth in 
environmental valuation studies since the mid-1980s was due primarily to a growth in the 
use of contingent valuation.  Between 1987 and 1991, contingent valuation came to 
represent a majority of the valuation studies in these five journals.  This period coincides 
with both the publication of Mitchell and Carson’s (1989) seminal text on the method, 
and the Exxon Valdez oil spill which brought much attention to the method.  Four years 
later the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration published the findings of its 
blue ribbon panel on contingent valuation (Arrow et al., 1993), which gave a qualified 
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endorsement of the method and further popularized it.  During this same period, the 
number of environmental valuation studies employing the hedonic pricing rose just 
slightly.  The number employing the travel cost method remained steady but few.  
Indeed, while the travel cost method can be used to value changes in environmental 
goods, its niche is in valuing outdoor recreation and its popularity lies in the latter, not the 
former. 
 Figure 4.8 charts the numbers of environmental valuation studies per journal 
against time.  Each of the five journals has seen a long-term growth in the number of 
valuation studies it publishes.  Land Economics consistently publishes the most, although 
the two new journals – Environmental and Resource Economics and Journal of 
Environmental Management – have quickly become rivals for the title.     
 Finally, Figure 4.9 illustrates the numbers of studies done in the United States and 
elsewhere against time.  It shows a 5 to 10 year gap in popularity between the U.S. and 
all other countries, with the U.S. leading the efforts in environmental valuation.  
However, as shown in Figure 4.4, no single country has even approached the popularity 








































































 To summarize the findings described in this chapter, the 228 cases and 614 units 
of analysis in this data set of environmental valuation studies exhibited the following 
major characteristics: 
 
 Water, land, and air are well represented in the valuation studies.  Animals are too, 
but the diversity of species valued make their comparability, and the transferability of 
their results, questionable.  Other environmental goods such as plants, toxics, and 
wastes, have received relatively little attention in environmental valuation. 
 
 Contingent valuation is the most popularly used valuation method, representing a 
majority of the valuations in this data set.  Although it is the youngest of the three 
methods, it is also the most versatile, which contributes to its popularity.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that the federal government endorsement of it has 
increased its used. 
 
 Different methods tend to be used in different situations.  Specifically, contingent 
valuation tends to be used with qualitative descriptions of holistic changes in 
environmental goods.  While it is used to value all types of goods, it is especially 
favored when valuing animals.  Hedonic pricing tends to be used with quantitative 
descriptions of incremental changes.  Its use has been limited to valuing water, land, 
and especially air.  The travel cost method is rarely used to value changes in 
environmental goods.  
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 The vast majority of valuation studies have involved human subjects in the United 
States.  This may be a reflection of both the location of the scholars publishing 
valuation studies, as well as government promotion of cost-benefit analysis and 
environmental valuation there. 
 
 There is evidence that certain journals disproportionately publish valuations from 
different places, of different goods, or using different methods, as shown in Table 
4:16.   
 




ERE JEM LE WRR 
Country      
    U.S.  − − +  
    non-U.S.  + + −  
Good      
    Air   −  − 
    Animal      
    Land −  +   
    Water +    + 
    Other      
Method      
    WC  − − +  
    CV  + + −  
+ journal is positively associated with valuations with this characteristic 
− journal is negatively associated with valuations with this characteristic 
 
 
 Although environmental valuation outside of the U.S. has received little attention, the 
attention it has received is heavily focused on land values, and not so on air or animal 
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values.  Also, valuations outside the U.S. are more likely to employ contingent 
valuation than hedonic pricing or the travel cost method. 
 
 There has been a sharp rise in environmental valuation studies since the mid-1980s.  
The rise has been characterized by studies on land and water goods, and studies 
employing contingent valuation.  The rise coincides with a few events – especially the 





This chapter reports the analysis of the valuations of environmental changes.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the individual valuations were converted to standardized effect 
sizes to provide a common measure of the dependent variable and to facilitate 
comparability of results.  Thus, this chapter begins with an overall descriptive assessment 
of the effect sizes and the indications of the presence of moderating variables.  It then 
presents the tests for the individual moderating variables hypothesized in Chapter 3, 
including type of good, magnitude of change, description of change, method of valuation, 
and secondary variables of interest.  These tests include reports of the relative effects of 
all the confirmed moderating variables in meta-regression models of the data set.  Next, 




 For each observation with sufficient reported information an effect size was 
calculated by the general equation d = (YE – YC)/S (see Chapter 3).  A few studies valued 
a degradation of an environmental good, not an improvement, such as when respondents 
were asked for their willingness to accept a reduction in air quality, or when a hedonic 
pricing model included a measure of pollution as an independent variable.  In these cases, 
the changes in the environmental goods were transformed into improvements.  That is, 
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YE was recorded as the value of an improved environmental state compared to that for 
YC, so (YE – YC ) was always the change in value for an improved condition. 
The effect sizes were corrected for sampling error and combined, following 
Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) procedures1.  The average effect size weighted by sample 
size, known as the mean effect size or the observed effect size, is  
   
Ave(d) = D = [Σ(nidi)]/[Σni] = 6.90, 
 
where ni and di are the sample size and effect size for observation i, respectively.  This 
number indicates that, based on this data set, the average change in value of an 
environmental good due to its improvement is 6.90 standard deviations.  Notice that the 
effect size is does not specify an absolute change in value, but a relative change in units 
of standard deviations.  The advantages of this approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, are 
that it allows the inclusion of more studies using different outcome measures, and it 
accounts for the variability within the results of each study.  These two factors allowed 
me to make broader conclusions about the body of environmental valuation studies. 
Of course, the summary value overlooks the variance among the studies 
generating this data set, such as differences in treatment (improvement in the 
environmental good), subject (the environmental good), etc.  These factors are addressed 
in the rest of this chapter.  Still, the direction and order of magnitude of the mean effect 
                                                 
1 The pure lack of reported study artifacts limited the corrections to what Hunter and 
Schmidt (1990) called the “bare bones” (p. 100): correcting only for sampling error 
variance.  Other study artifacts – such as measurement errors in the independent and 
dependent variables, study attrition, reporting errors, etc. – were rarely, if ever, reported.  
In fact, many studies examined for this research reported insufficient information to even 
calculate effect sizes or sampling error variance (e.g., they did not report standard 
deviations or sample sizes).  Other meta-analysts of environmental valuation have 
encountered a similar lack of reported artifacts (Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996).   
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size is instructive.  It tells us that, assuming the validity of the valuation methods (an 
assumption questioned in this research), people do place a significant monetary value on 
improved conditions of the environment.  This certainly concurs with the claim that a 
broad ideology of “environmentalism” – one at least as encompassing as the 
environmental goods represented in this data set – has become a “core” value in the 
United States (Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1999, p. 214), the location of the bulk of the 
cases in this data set. 
Continuing with the sampling error analysis, the observed variance of the effect 
size weighted by sample size is 
 
Var(d) = {Σ[ni (di - D)2]}/[Σni] = 52.68. 
 
Finally, the sampling error variance – the amount of variance in the effect size that can be 
attributed to sampling error – is  
 
Var(e) = [(N-1)/(N-3)][4/N][1+(D2/8)] = 0.0136 
 
where N, the average sample size, is the total sample size, T = Σni, divided by the total 
number of effect sizes examined, K. 
 
N = T/K = 776295/434 = 1788.70. 
 
This result indicates that sampling error accounts for very little of the variance in effect 
size.  Specifically, when the data set is considered as a whole, sampling error accounts for 
just 0.03% of the total variance.2   
                                                 
2 Var(e)/Var(d) = 0.0136/52.68 = 0.03%. 
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 The relative magnitude of Var(e) also gauges the homogeneity of the total sample.  
Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) “75% rule” is a heuristic which states that if more than 75% 
of the variance in effect size is shown to be due to study artifacts (such as sampling 
error), then the remaining 25% is likely to also be due to study artifacts, and one can 
conclude that the population is homogeneous.  If, however, less than 75% of the variance 
is due to study artifacts, then the population studied may be heterogeneous and there may 
be moderators explaining the residual variance.  As stated above, sampling error accounts 
for just 0.03% of the total variance in effect sizes, far less than 75%.  Of course, only 
sampling error was accounted in this calculation, and much more the variance might 
actually be explained by other study artifacts that were unaccountable in this meta-
analysis.  The χ2 (chi-square) test of heterogeneity3 was also performed to confirm 
heterogeneity (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).  The test statistic Q is  
 
Q = K Var(d)/Var(e) = 434(52.68/0.0136) = 1681221, 
 
which is far greater than the critical value at α = 0.01.  Thus, heterogeneity is confirmed 
and moderating variables may be present. 
 
                                                 
3 The χ2 test of heterogeneity should not be confused with the χ2 test of independence 
used in Chapter 4.  Both are based upon a χ2 distribution, hence the similar names.  
However, the χ2 test of heterogeneity measures the heterogeneity, and homogeneity, of 
the samples combined in a meta-analysis.  Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses 
are 
 H0: the population is homogeneous 
 H1: the population is not homogeneous. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic is greater than the critical value (defined 
by the degrees of freedom in the sample, and a selected level of significance, α), 
otherwise the null cannot be rejected.  A rejection of homogeneity is an indication that 
there may be moderating variables explaining the high variance. 
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Hypothesized Moderators 
 The four primary hypothesized moderators were tested first: type of good, 
magnitude of change, description of change, and method of valuation.  The operational 
measures of each of these variables created categorical data, so the meta-analysis of each 
consisted of dividing the data set by the discrete values of the hypothesized moderator, 
calculating the mean effect size of each subset, and comparing these means.  Significant 
differences in the means of the subsets demonstrate the moderating effect of the variable 
in question. 
 
Environmental Good  
 Thus, to test the moderating effect of the type of environmental good, the data set 
was divided into the six major categories described in Chapter 4: air, animal, land, plant, 
toxic, and water.  Table 5.1 summarizes the effect sizes for the goods and their 
corresponding analyses.  While the average effect size of all six goods combined is 6.93, 
the average effect sizes of the individual goods range from 1.37 standard deviations for 
animal to 18.90 for air.  These statistics indicate that an improvement in the condition of 
animals results in a 1.37 standard deviation increase in their value, and an improvement 
in the condition of air results in a 18.90 standard deviation increase in value.  The effect 
sizes do not convey the absolute magnitudes of the values of environmental goods, only 
their changes in value relative to their own baseline values.  Thus, a change in the 
condition of air results in a greater change in its value than that for a change in the 
conditions of animals. 
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Combined* 771525 423 6.93 52.97 0.01 0.03% 1666988 6.00 
7.85 
Air 217189 135 18.90 78.33 0.11 0.14% 94858 16.10 
21.71 
Animal 16363 68 1.37 3.31 0.01 0.18% 37351 0.78 
1.96 
Land 442980 112 1.38 16.24 0.00 0.00% 4964084 0.39 
2.37 
Plant 4962 2 1.54 0.02 0.00 3.22% 62 -5.02 
8.10 
Toxic 2419 4 7.49 118.65 0.05 0.04% 10022 -24.98 
39.96 
Water 87612 102 6.63 186.27 0.03 0.01% 724916 3.09 
10.16 
*Includes only the 6 categories of goods in the table, not the entire data set. 
 
 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the effect sizes resulted in F = 
37.294, demonstrating a significant difference in the average effect sizes of the goods.5  
To determine which of the goods are significantly different from others, Fisher’s least 
significant difference (LSD) test was performed.  The LSD test is a modification of the t-
                                                 
4 The one-way ANOVA tests the differences between the mean values of more than 2 
groups.  Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses are 
 H0: b1 = b2 = … = bk (the means of all the groups are equal) 
 H1: not all bk are equal. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic, F, is greater than the critical value 
(defined by two measures of the degrees of freedom in the sample, and a selected level of 
significance, α), otherwise the null cannot be rejected.  A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates significant differences between at least two of the means, and thus the 
moderating effect of the grouping variable, which in this case is environmental good. 
5 In this case, the critical value of F for 5 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 417 
degrees of freedom in the denominator, and at a level of significance of α = 0.01, is 2.24.  
The test statistic is 37.29.  Thus, with 99% confidence the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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test for the difference in means between two independent samples.6  The modification 
accounts for the multiple pairs in an ANOVA and minimizes the chances of a type 1 
error.7  Table 5.2 summarizes the results of the LSD test.  It reveals that the mean effect 
sizes for air and water are significantly different from all the other types of goods except 
plant and toxic.  Plant and toxic, however, had such few observations in the data set (2 
and 4, respectively) that their differences with the others could not be statistically 
confirmed.  Still, the test supports what appears to be evident in Table 5.1, that air and 
water have significantly larger average effect sizes than animal and land, and air has a 
significantly larger average effect size than water.   
 
Table 5.2: t-Statistics from Fisher’s LSD Test  
of  the Differences Between the Mean Effect Sizes  
of Pairs of Environmental Goods 
 
 Air Animal Land Plant Toxic Water
Air ---  
Animal 10.19* ---  
Land 11.85* 0.00 ---  
Plant 2.11 -0.02 -0.02 ---  
Toxic 1.94 -1.03 -1.04 -0.59 --- 
Water 8.08* -2.92* -3.31* -0.62 0.15 ---
* Significantly different at α = 0.01 
 
                                                 
6 In a simple t-test of the difference in the means of two independent samples, the means 
from two groups are compared.  Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses are 
 H0: µ1 = µ2 (the means are equal) 
 H1: µ1 ≠ µ2 (the means are not equal). 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic, t, is outside the two critical values 
defined by the degrees of freedom in the samples and the level of significance, α.  
Fisher’s LSD test is a modified series of t-tests for every pair-wise combination of groups 
in a one-way ANOVA.  In this case, with six groups, fifteen different pairs were tested by 
Fisher’s procedures. 
7 A type 1 error is committed when a null hypothesis is rejected when it is actually true.  
The acceptable level of a type 1 error is the level of significance, α, which is set by the 
researcher. 
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 While it should be no surprise that changes in different environmental goods are 
valued differently, there has been little said of their relative values.  One study in the data 
set concluded that valuations of land changes are highly variant (Willis & Garrod, 1993), 
which would result in lower effect sizes8.  The results in Table 5.1 confirm this, and the 
variety of land types and features valued might explain the high variance.  Table 4.1 lists 
21 different land types, ranging from Superfund sites to wilderness, valued in this data 
set.  With so many different land types valued, the high variance in valuations is 
reasonable.  The same can be said for the animal category.  At least 26 species are 
included in the data set, ranging from black flies to whales, giving the data high variance 
and a low average effect size.  On the other hand, the air category is homogenous, with 
all valuations in the data set aimed at air quality.  Certainly there were different measures 
of air quality used in studies, but the object of valuation was consistently air quality.  It is 
thus reasonable to expect less variance, and a larger average effect size, for this 
homogenous category.  Indeed, it has the largest average effect size of all the goods.  The 
water category is in the middle, with an average effect size between those of air and land 
or animal.  While it contains 25 subcategories, ranging from stream to ocean, people’s 
valuations of them are not as variant as those for land or animal categories. 
 Table 5.1 also shows two confidence intervals that include zero.  The confidence 
intervals for the average effect sizes for plant and toxic categories have negative lower 
bounds and positive upper bounds.  This is due to the low number of observations for 
                                                 
8 Higher variance within each unit of analysis lowers its resulting effect size, because 
variance is captured in the denominator of d = (YE – YC)/S.  The variances reported in 
Tables 5.1, 5.3 – 5.5, and 5.7 – 5.10 are those among the units of analysis.  
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each of those goods.  For all of the other categories of goods, the confidence intervals are 
completely positive, indicating positive valuation of environmental improvements. 
 Finally, the results in Table 5.1 also suggest the presence of additional moderating 
variables, even after accounting for the type of environmental good.  This is 
demonstrated in the Var(e)/Var(d) percentages, all far less than Hunter and Schmidt’s 
75% rule.  They are also confirmed by the values of the Q statistics for all of the goods.  
Thus, while the type of good is confirmed to be a moderating variable, others are likely to 
exist as well. 
   
Magnitude of Change  
 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the magnitudes of changes in the environmental 
goods  were coded as incremental and holistic.  The data set was split into these two 
categories and the average effect size was calculated for each.  The results are shown in 
Table 5.3, and they are quite clear.  The average effect size for a holistic change in an 
environmental good is 0.84 standard deviations, while that for an incremental change is 
9.46.  A t-test9 for difference between these two values resulted in test statistic of t = 
10.57.  With 99% confidence there is a significant difference between the effect sizes of 
holistic and incremental environmental changes.10 
 
                                                 
9 The t-test for the difference between two means from independent samples assumes 
equal variances of the two samples.  Because this cannot be assumed in this case (the 
variance of one is two orders of magnitude larger than the other), separate variances were 
used in the calculation of the test statistic, and the smaller of n1-1 and n2-1 was used as 
the degrees of freedom.  This adjustment is a conservative estimate that reduces the 
chances of a type 1 error. 
10 At α = 0.01 and 430 degrees of freedom, the critical value of t is 2.6 for a two-tail test.   
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Combined 750481 432 7.05 99.54 0.02 0.02% 2583889 5.81 
8.30 
Holistic 209628 216 0.84* 8.84 0.00 0.05% 424623 0.32 
1.37 
Incremental 540853 216 9.46* 134.69 0.02 0.01% 1493123 7.40 
11.52 
* Significantly different at α = 0.01 
 
 
 At first glance, however, the difference is somewhat counterintuitive.  
Incremental changes in the environment resulted in larger relative changes in valuations 
than holistic changes did.  This may be because incremental changes are associated with 
quantitative measures (see Table 4.4), and quantitative measures have a better common 
understanding (i.e., a more reliable measure) among subjects than qualitative measures.  
Similarly, the smaller average effect size for holistic changes may reflect a larger 
variance of responses.  For example, responses to changes in air quality from “unhealthy” 
to “healthy” may be more variant than responses to changes measured in “miles of 
visibility.” 
 The Var(e)/Var(d) percentages and the Q test statistics in Table 5.3 strongly 
suggest the presence of other moderating variables, consistent with the findings from the 
analysis of the types of goods as a moderating variable.  It was expected that the analyses 
of the rest of the potential moderating variables would also suggest the presence of other 
moderating variables, and indeed they did. 
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Description of Change 
 The changes in the environmental goods were also coded by their quantitative or 
qualitative descriptions, and these types of descriptions were tested for a moderating 
effect on valuations.  As discussed in Chapter 3, there are logical reasons to expect a 
difference in valuations between the two types of descriptions, but it is not clear which 
might be larger.  Table 5.4 summarizes the meta-analysis of the data split by quantitative 
and qualitative measures of change, and clearly answers this question.  The average effect 
size for qualitative descriptions of changes is 0.96 standard deviations, while that for 
quantitative descriptions is 8.69.  The difference is statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence level.11  Thus, this data demonstrate that quantitative descriptions of 
environmental change produce significantly larger effect sizes than qualitative 
descriptions.  This conclusion supports the hypothesis that quantitative measures produce 
less variant measures of value than qualitative measures, resulting in larger effect sizes.  
It also undermines the hypothesis that qualitative descriptions of changes in 
environmental goods are better understood (i.e., more reliable) than quantitative 
descriptions.   
   These results support recent evidence from studies focusing on measures of water 
quality.  Michael, Boyle, and Bouchard (2000) tested nine measures of water clarity in a 
hedonic pricing model of lakefront property in Maine.  They found significant differences 
in the values from the different measures of clarity and concluded that the differences 
were large enough to affect water policy decisions.  Poor, Boyle, Taylor, and Bouchard 
                                                 
11 The difference in means test for independent samples resulted in t = 10.61.  Using the 
smaller of n1-1 and n2-1 as the degrees of freedom, the critical value of t at α = 0.01 is 
2.6.  The test statistic is larger, so the null hypothesis of no difference in means is 
rejected.   
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(2001), in another hedonic pricing study of the value of water clarity showed that 
objective, quantitative measures of water clarity were more reliable than subjective, 
qualitative ones. 
 






















Combined 776295 434 6.90 100.74 0.02 0.02% 2809997 5.65 
8.15 
Qualitative 179917 162 0.96* 9.63 0.00 0.04% 387353 0.34 
1.59 
Quantitative 596378 272 8.69* 128.22 0.02 0.02% 1829597 6.90 
10.48 
* Significantly different at α = 0.01 
 
 
 However, the significant difference might be explained by a spurious effect from 
the method of valuation.  As Table 4.8 shows, qualitative descriptions of environmental 
changes are associated with contingent valuation, and quantitative descriptions are 
associated with hedonic pricing.  If the method of valuation is shown to have a significant 
moderating effect on valuation too, then the relative effects of type of description of 
change and method of valuation can be tested together in meta-regression analyses.  
These analyses are next. 
 
Valuation Method 
 The primary variable of interest in this study is the method of valuation.  The data 
set was split into three groups, one for each of the methods studied, and the average effect 
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size of each of the subsets was calculated and compared with the others.  Table 5.5 
summarizes the results.  The average effect sizes ranged from 3.16 standard deviations 
for contingent valuation to 7.23 standard deviations for hedonic pricing.  A one-way 
ANOVA, testing the difference in the average effect sizes of the 3 methods, resulted in a 
test statistic of F = 31.01.  Thus, with 99% confidence the null hypothesis of the equality 
of the means is rejected.12  To identify which average effect sizes are significantly 
different from the others, Fisher’s least significant difference test was again employed.  
As Table 5.6 shows, the average effect size from contingent valuation is significantly 
different from those of the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods.  The difference is 
more significant between contingent valuation and hedonic pricing than between 
contingent valuation and the travel cost method.  However, this is due in part to the small 
number of observations employing the travel cost method.  No significant difference was 
found between the average effect sizes of travel cost and hedonic pricing studies. 
 Comparing contingent valuation against hedonic pricing, the results indicate that 
on average hedonic pricing of changes in environmental goods results in measures of 
value that are over twice those of contingent valuation studies.  This is quite similar to 
results from an earlier meta-analysis of 83 studies that contained both contingent 
valuation and travel cost or hedonic pricing estimates for the same goods (Carson, Flores, 
Martin, & Wright, 1996).  It concluded that contingent valuation estimates run about 20% 
to 30% lower than travel cost estimates and 40% less than hedonic pricing estimates.  In  
 
                                                 
12 The critical value of F for 2 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 430 degrees of 
freedom in the denominator, at α = 0.01, is 4.7.  The test statistic is larger than the critical 
value.  Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Combined 775960 433 6.90 110.19 0.02 0.01% 3070230 5.60 
8.21 
TC 8197 16 7.00 67.50 0.06 0.08% 19362 0.75 
13.24 
HP 705963 204 7.23 116.56 0.01 0.01% 2730001 5.28 
9.18 




Table 5.6: t-Statistics from Fisher’s LSD Test 
of the Differences Between the Mean Effect Sizes 
of Pairs of Valuation Methods 
 
 TC HP CV 
TC ---  
HP 0.13 ---  
CV 2.13** 5.97* --- 
* Significantly different at α = 0.01 




the current data set, which includes much more varied studies, contingent valuation 
estimates run about 55% lower than travel cost and hedonic pricing estimates. 
 However, proponents of these valuation methods could dispute these conclusions 
because the temporal scope of the data set includes early studies published before the 
development of the contemporary practices for two of the methods.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the hedonic pricing method underwent significant refinements through the 
1970s, and contingent valuation underwent significant refinements through the 1980s.  
The data set used for this research includes studies published since 1970.  One could 
reasonably argue, then, that the differences in the average effect sizes between the 
methods of valuation may be affected by the inclusion of older studies that are less 
reliable than more contemporary studies.   
 This argument was tested through two additional meta-analyses of the data set in 
which the year of publication was the hypothesized moderating variable.  This variable 
was tested on the set of hedonic pricing studies and separately on the set of contingent 
valuation studies.  The set of travel cost studies was not tested because the temporal 
frame of the data set is completely after the major developments in the method.   
 First, the hedonic pricing studies were analyzed.  A total of 204 effect sizes were 
calculated from the studies employing hedonic pricing.  These were divided into two 
groups: those published in 1980 or earlier, and those published after 1980.  If the studies 
published after 1980 produce a significantly greater average effect size (i.e., less variant) 
than those published up to 1980, then it could be argued that the more recent studies are 
more reliable than the older ones.  Table 5.7 shows the results of the analysis.  There 
were only 23 observations in the older group, with an average effect size of 3.40 standard 
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deviations.  There were 181 observations in the younger group, with an average effect 
size of 7.26.  A t-test of the difference between the two means resulted in a test statistic of 
t = 1.63.  At a level of significance of α = 0.01, the difference between the means is 
insignificant.13  This is also evident in the overlapping confidence intervals for the 
average effect sizes.  In other words, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a 
statistically significant difference in the average effect sizes of hedonic pricing studies 
done before and after 1980.  In this data set, the method has been reliable over the years.   
 The same cannot be said about the contingent valuation method.  The 213 effect 
sizes calculated from contingent valuations were divided into two groups: the 101 
published in 1993 or earlier, and the 112 published after 1993.  That was the year the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s report on contingent valuation 
(Arrow et al., 1993) was published, and its publication is regarded as the event that 
legitimized the method in the federal government and standardized its practices (Carson, 
1997).  As Table 5.8 shows, the average effect size of the older studies is 1.24 standard 
deviations, while that of the younger studies is 4.33.  A t-test of the difference between 
these two means resulted in a test statistic of t = 4.00, confirming a significant 
difference.14  On average, effect sizes calculated from contingent valuations published in 
1993 or earlier are 71% less than those calculated from studies published after 1993.  
This confirms that part of the difference between the average effect sizes of contingent  
                                                 
13 Because the variances of the two subgroups are nearly equal, the degrees of freedom 
was calculated as d.f. = (n1 + n2 – 2) = 202.  At α = 0.01, the critical value of t is 2.6.  (At 
α = 0.10 it is 1.7.)  The test statistic is less than this, so the null hypothesis of the equality 
of the means cannot be rejected.   
14 Separate variances were used in the calculation of the test statistic.  The degrees of 
freedom were calculated as the smaller of n1 – 1 and n2 – 1.  At α = 0.01, the critical 
value of t is 2.6.  Thus, with 99% confidence, the null hypothesis of the equality of the 
two means is rejected. 
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Combined 705963 204 7.23 116.44 0.01 0.01% 2727112 5.28 
9.18 
HP ≤ 1980 5883 23 3.40 114.04 0.04 0.03% 68127 -2.89 
9.69 


























Combined 61800 213 3.16 40.80 0.03 0.08% 278522 2.03 
4.29 
CV ≤ 1993 23422 101 1.24 2.99 0.02 0.69% 14590 0.79 
1.69 





valuations and hedonic pricing studies is due to the evolving, and apparently improving, 
reliability of contingent valuation.   
 Still, when the hedonic pricing results are compared with only the post-1993 
contingent valuation results, a significant difference remains.  The t-test for the difference 
between these average effect sizes (7.23 for hedonic pricing and 4.33 for post-1993 
contingent valuation) resulted in a test statistic of t = 2.71.15  The difference between the 
means is statistically significant.  After 1993, effect sizes from contingent valuations 
were on average 40% less than those from hedonic pricing.  This result matches that of 
the earlier, more restricted, meta-analysis (Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996).  
Thus, while the evidence suggests that the reliability of contingent valuation has 
improved over the years, there remains a divergence between its results and those of the 
travel cost and hedonic pricing methods. 
 What might contribute to this residual disparity?  One clear factor is the variety of 
implementation methods of contingent valuation that have been shown to affect results.  
At least four design characteristics are relevant.  First is the method of eliciting responses.  
Dichotomous choice questions (with and without follow-up questions), discrete choice 
payment cards, and open-ended questions have been shown to produce significantly 
different results (Boyle, MacDonald, Cheng, & McCollum, 1998; Brown, Champ, 
Bishop, & McCollum, 1996; Kristrom, 1997; Ready, Buzby, & Hu, 1996; Ready, 
Navrud, & Dubourg, 2001; Scarpa & Bateman, 2000).  Second, different payment 
vehicles have been shown to affect results (Morrison, Blamey, & Bennett, 2000).  Lump 
                                                 
15 Again equal variances was not assumed.  At α = 0.01 and 111 degrees of freedom the 
critical value is t = 2.6.  Thus, with 99% confidence, the null hypothesis of the equality of 
means is rejected. 
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sums tend to underestimate value while payment schedules tend to grossly overestimate 
value (Stevens, DeCoteau, & Willis, 1997), and the differences between willingness to 
pay and willingness to accept have both theoretical explanations (Mansfield, 1999) and 
empirical evidence (Adamowicz, Bhardwaj, & Macnab, 1993; Knetsch, 1990; Kolstad & 
Guzman, 1999).  Third, survey research has shown that the mode of elicitation affects 
results of contingent valuations.  The results coming from phone, mail, and in-person 
surveys have been shown to be significantly different (Ethier, Poe, Schulze, & Clark, 
2000; Mannesto & Loomis, 1991).  Even the number of reminders needed to procure 
responses to mailed contingent valuation surveys has been shown to affect responses 
(Dalecki, Whitehead, & Blomquist, 1993).  Fourth, the quality and quantity of 
information provided on the environmental goods and hypothetical markets have been 
shown to affect results (Boyle, Bergstrom, & Poe, 2001; Cummings & Taylor, 1998; 
Hanley, Spash, & Walker, 1995; Randall, Hoehn, & Brookshire, 1983; Whitehead & 
Blomquist, 1991).   
 This last factor, information bias, is dramatically exemplified with a few cases 
from the data set.  Consider, for example, the valuation of possums.  How should humans 
impart value on these animals, which, while fulfilling their roles in their ecosystems, are 
considered ugly pests by many humans?  In one contingent valuation study, respondents 
were told of possums’ ecological role and their threatened status in a local environment.  
They were then asked for their willingness to accept compensation for the complete loss 
of the species in the local environment (Jakobsson & Dragun, 2001).  The question drew 
strong protest responses because respondents objected to the idea of being compensated 
for the deliberate loss of a wild species.  Instead, respondents expressed a willingness to 
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pay to preserve the species.  In another contingent valuation study, however, respondents 
were asked to value “possum control” (Kerr & Cullen, 1995).  The quality of a local 
forest was described as a function of the possum population.  Reductions in the possum 
population would increase the quality of the forest.  Respondents in the study expressed a 
willingness to pay for a reduction in the possum population.  Other environmental goods 
have similarly been valued positively and negatively, based upon their contextual 
presentation.  Plant quantity, for example, can be positive when presented as the number 
of trees in a park (Goldar & Misra, 2001), and negative when presented as lake coverage 
by an aquatic plant (Messonnier, Bergstrom, Cornwell, Teasley, & Cordell, 2000).  These 
wide ranges in values for similar environmental goods increase the variance among their 
effect sizes, and thus decrease their average effect size.  Negative valuations of 
environmental goods are not unique to contingent valuation studies.  Several hedonic 
pricing studies in the data set also produced negative effect sizes for environmental 
improvements.  However, contingent valuation is unique in that negative and positive 
valuations can be directly affected by the researchers through the framing of the 
environmental good.  This vulnerability to information bias creates greater variability, 
and less reliability, among their results. 
 Another form of information bias relates to the described scope of the good.  
While environmental valuation techniques have been developed to measure values of 
environmental externalities of public policies, environmental goods have externalities of 
their own that are often overlooked when their values are measured in economic terms.  
For example, improvements in water qualities or quantities can affect habitats and land as 
well as human consumers of water, but oftentimes these externalities are not described in 
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the hypothetical markets.  Another example is air quality.  Its improvement can also 
affect water and land qualities.  Acid rain is a good example of this.  Reductions in sulfur 
dioxide in the air is positively valued by humans for its direct health benefits, but it also 
has indirect benefits in water and land quality (acidity of rain and runoff), ecosystems, 
etc.  Studies valuing air quality, however, may neglect these externalities.  Without 
explicitly including or excluding such externalities in a contingent valuation, the scope of 
the valuation is unclear and the variation in the results can reasonably be expected to be 
large.  In hedonic pricing and travel cost methods, the scope of the environmental good is 
inferred by the researcher but not described to the subjects, so information biases do not 
exist. 
 With all these design variables shown to affect results of contingent valuations – 
especially information bias - the variance among the results can be expected to be greater, 
and the average effect size can be expected to be smaller. 
 The lower average effect size of the contingent valuation studies might also be 
explained by the method’s susceptibility to cognitive problems and strategic replies of 
respondents, as defined in Chapter 1.  Cognitive problems include respondents’ abilities 
to understand the hypothetical market and quantify their values for the goods.  An 
experiment that compared the contingent valuation of a real market good with actual 
market behavior found discrepancies in value that ranged from 1% to 124% (Kealy, 
Dovidio, & Rockel, 1988).  It concluded that even for well defined, familiar market 
goods, contingent valuation results diverged from actual market behavior.  Even greater 
divergences can be expected for less well defined, less familiar, nonmarket goods such as 
environmental goods (Champ & Bishop, 2001).  Strategic replies are deliberate 
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overstatements and understatements of value intended to influence or protest outcomes.  
Furthermore, such strategic responses are not limited to obvious outliers, such as zero 
bids that are often removed from analyses as protests.  Positive bids included in analyses 
may also hold protests of some kind (Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop, & Nancarrow, 1999).   
 The disparities in average effect sizes might also be explained by the scope of 
what each valuation method measures.  As discussed in Chapter 1, contingent valuations 
can include nonuse values, while the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods only 
capture use values.  Thus, one can reasonably expect contingent valuations to have larger 
ranges of responses.  But even when the three methods are measuring the same scope of 
value of an environmental good, there are theoretical reasons why the results from 
different methods should differ.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the travel cost method and 
hedonic pricing are properly interpreted as lower bounds of maximum willingness to pay.  
Thus, they should be less than or equal to the maximum willingness to pay elicited from 
contingent valuation.  However, others have shown that results from contingent valuation 
should be smaller due to the differences between Hicksian and Marshallian demands 
measured by contingent valuation and the weak complementarity methods, respectively 
(Smith & Pattanayak, 2002).  The results from this meta-analysis clearly support this 
latter explanation. 
 Thus, the disparity between effect sizes of contingent valuation studies and those 
from the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods can be attributed to each aspect of the 
contingent valuation method: the researchers’ designs, the respondents’ replies, and the 
scope of the measurement instrument.  As Randall, Hoehn, and Brookshire (1983) have 
noted, contingent valuations result in highly contingent results. 
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 How are these results explained vis-à-vis other studies that demonstrate 
convergent validity?  Those studies do not compare the results of different studies.  
Rather, they are studies that employ two or more valuations to the same case (e.g., Farber 
1988; Walsh, Ward, & Olienyk, 1989).  While such experiments have superior controls 
for spurious effects – such as environmental good, change in good, and type of 
description of good – their results only demonstrate the comparability of employing the 
methods under carefully controlled, static conditions.  They speak nothing on the 
reliability of the results in varying conditions.  Such information is critical to the 
selection of methods for original studies and the use of existing results in benefit 
transfers.  The results presented in this research address this information need.  Thus far, 
across the broad range of applications, the effect sizes of contingent valuation and the 
other two methods are not convergent.  The conditions under which convergence is 
stronger and weaker are addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Moderating Effects of Other Variables of Interest 
 So far, all four primary independent variables have been shown to moderate 
environmental valuations.  Before their relative effects were analyzed together, a few 
more variables of interest were considered for their moderating effects.  First was the 
income of subjects.  Income is well understood to limit and affect the choices consumers 
make in the market, and a meta-analysis of it could measure its moderating effect on 
environmental valuation.  However, only 29 studies in the data set (12.7%) reported any 
measure of income, and those measures varied by monetary denomination, year, and 
scope (e.g., household versus personal income).  Therefore a meaningful analysis of this 
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variable was not possible.  The lack of reported incomes is disappointing, given the 
theorized effect of income on valuation.  Through the U.S. Census Bureau it may be 
possible to gather comparable income statistics of U.S. samples in the studies, knowing 
their locations and years of study.  Doing so would enable the measurement of the 
correlation between income and effect size.  Such an effort is beyond the scope of this 
project, but reserved for future extensions of this work. 
 Second was the years of data collection.  While the years of publication were used 
as a proxy for the refinements of the valuation methods, the years of data collection were 
used to measure temporal changes in values for the environment16.  That is, analyzing 
subjects’ valuations over time could reveal any broad changes in preferences for the 
environment.  One study has shown, for example, that people’s attitudes toward water 
conservation changes with recent experiences with drought or flooding (Trumbo, Markee, 
O’Keefe, & Park, 1999).   
 In many cases in this study, the data were collected over more than one year.  In 
these cases, the mid-points of the years were assigned.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient17 
was calculated between these midpoint data collection years and the effect sizes, 
weighted by the sample sizes of the observations, resulting in a statistic of r = -0.1118.  
The value is statistically significant, even though the strength of the relationship is quite 
                                                 
16 In only one case in this data set were the years of data collection and publication the 
same.  The difference between these years in all the cases ranged from 0 to 25 years. 
17 Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r, estimates the degree of linear relationship between 
two ratio or interval variables.  Its values range from -1 ≤ r ≤ +1, where -1 signifies a 
perfect inverse relationship, 0 signifies no relationship, and +1 signifies a perfect positive 
relationship.   
18 In this case, the total sample size was T = 743,084 (356 observations weighted by their 
respective sample sizes).  At α = 0.01, the critical value of r is about 0.08.  The measured 
value is greater than the critical value. 
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mild.  It indicates that among all the observations included in this data set, effect size is 
mildly negatively associated with year of data collection.  That is, there has been a slight 
decline in effect sizes over the years.  Of course, this analysis spans all the other variables 
already shown to be significant moderators of effect sizes.  It is possible that the 
relationship is stronger, or even positive, for specific environmental goods or under other 
specific circumstances.  This variable was included in the meta-regression analyses 
reported later in this chapter. 
 Third was the location of the study, to determine whether effect sizes vary by 
region.  This analysis could shed light on the geographic generalizability of valuation 
results.  One study has already shown that interstate transfers (within the United States) 
are problematic, even when the same measurement instrument is used, while intrastate 
transfers can work well (Boyle, Bergstrom, & Poe, 2001).  That is, location moderates 
value. 
 As described in Chapter 4, the distribution of cases across regions is heavily 
skewed toward the United States.  Within the United States the cases are concentrated in 
a few western and northeastern states, with a notable lack of studies of southern states.  
Two meta-analyses were conducted to test the influence of region on effect sizes.  First, 
the cases were split between those conducted in the United States and all other countries.  
Table 5.9 summarizes the results.  Of the 416 usable cases, 349 were in the United States, 
while only 67 were elsewhere.  The average effect size in the United States is 7.54 
standard deviations, while that for all other countries is 3.29.  A t-test of the difference 
between these two means resulted in a test statistic of t = 5.17: the difference is 
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statistically significant19, with effect sizes from the United States averaging more than 
twice those from other countries. 
 






















Combined 769558 416 6.94 109.92 0.02 0.01% 3005383 5.60 
8.29 
U.S. 662177 349 7.54 124.29 0.02 0.01% 2537442 5.98 
9.10 




 Next, as a cursory analysis of the moderating effect of intranational regions, the 
cases within the United States were divided by state.  While 38 states are represented in 
the data set, 27 of them have fewer than 10 cases.  Thus, this analysis was limited to the 
10 states with the most observations.  They are California, Colorado, the District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  Table 5.10 summarizes the results.  Combined, the average effect size from 
the 10 states is 1.11 standard deviations.  Separated, the effect sizes range from 0.53 in 
the District of Columbia to 5.81 in California.  A one-way ANOVA resulted in a test 
statistic of F = 9.30, confirming that not all of the means are equal20.  Fisher’s LSD test 
                                                 
19 A t-test of the difference between two means, with unequal variances, resulted in a test 
statistic of t = 5.17.  At α = 0.01, and 66 degrees of freedom, the critical value is t = 2.6.  
Thus, with 99% confidence the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected. 
20 At α = 0.01, with 9 degrees of freedom in the numerator and 242 degrees of freedom in 
the denominator, the critical value is F = 2.5.  The test statistic is larger.  Thus, with 99% 
confidence the null hypothesis of the equality of all means is rejected. 
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was again employed for the subsequent pair-wise analyses.  Table 5.11 shows the t-
statistics from the test, highlighting those values that indicate a significant difference 
between the values of the pairs of states.  Interestingly, California is the only state of 
these 10 that has a significantly different average effect size than others.  In fact, its 
average effect size is significantly larger than each of the other states analyzed except 
Wisconsin.   
 The results of these regional analyses seem to support two popular perceptions.  
First, while the United States has been criticized as leading the way in resource depletion 
and environmental destruction, it has also been seen as a leader in environmental 
protection.  This is a sweeping statement, but Table 5.9 supports the claim.  Values 
Americans impart on improvements to the environment are, on average, greater than 
those of the other countries in this data set.  Second, within the United States there is a 
popular perception of California as a more politically liberal, “left coast” state with 
stronger support for environmentalism.  Again, this statement sweeps over the widely 
varied political terrain within the state, and all the confounding variables that might 
influence this finding, but the results shown in Table 5.11 certainly support the 
perception.  They also suggest, contrary to another study (Boyle, Bergstrom, & Poe, 
2001), that benefit transfers across state lines can be reliable except when one of the 




























Combined* 369864 252 1.11 39.59 0.00 0.01% 3166006 0.08 
2.14 
CA 9401 45 5.81 51.22 0.10 0.20% 22867 2.79 
8.82 
CO 8966 35 0.78 29.05 0.02 0.06% 60015 -1.72 
3.29 
DC 6100 20 0.53 30.18 0.01 0.05% 44171 -2.98 
4.04 
IL 11521 28 1.09 29.99 0.01 0.04% 74853 -1.78 
3.96 
ME 3436 21 1.77 18.25 0.03 0.19% 11133 -0.88 
4.42 
MA 4658 16 1.80 17.29 0.02 0.11% 14249 -1.27 
4.86 
OR 306102 21 0.95 41.60 0.00 0.00% 2859793 -3.05 
4.96 
PA 10738 23 1.07 23.52 0.01 0.04% 54929 -1.78 
3.92 
WI 3558 11 3.57 27.50 0.03 0.12% 9384 -1.48 
8.61 
WY 5384 32 0.79 26.59 0.03 0.10% 32826 -1.72 
3.29 











Table 5.11: t-Statistics from Fisher’s LSD Test  
of the Differences Between the Mean Effect Sizes of Pairs of States 
 
 CA CO DC IL MA ME OR PA WI WY
CA ---   
CO 6.18* ---  
DC 5.44* 0.25 ---  
IL 5.43* -0.34 -0.53 ---  
MA 3.82* -0.93 -1.05 -0.63 ---  
ME 4.24* -0.99 -1.10 -0.65 0.02 ---  
OR 5.09* -0.17 -0.37 0.13 0.71 0.73 ---  
PA 5.12* -0.30 -0.49 0.02 0.62 0.64 -0.11 --- 
WI 1.85 -2.23 -2.24 -1.93 -1.25 -1.34 -1.95 -1.88 ---
WY 6.02* -0.01 -0.25 0.33 0.91 0.97 0.16 0.29 2.21 ---
* Significantly different at α = 0.01 
 
 
Combined Effects of Moderators: Meta-Regressions 
 With several moderating variables identified, the analysis continued with 
evaluations of their relative effects on environmental valuation.  Specifically, regression 
analysis was used to evaluate the variance in effect sizes due to the moderating variables 
together21.  Table 5.12 summarizes three models that cover all the moderating variables 
in this study.  In all of these models, observed effect sizes were weighted by their 
respective sample sizes, as has been throughout this chapter. 
 The independent variables in the models include four of the six analyzed 
environmental goods: air, animal, land, and water.  There were too few observations of 
plant, toxic, and other goods for statistical analysis.  (See Table 5.1.)  The four remaining 
                                                 
21 Regression analyses result in linear, relational equations of the general form  
 Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + … + bkXk + e,  
where Y is the dependent variable, Xi are the independent (explanatory) variables, bi are 
the coefficients of Xi (i.e., the slope of the line between Xi and Y), b0 is the y-intercept 
(the value of Y when all Xi = 0), and e is an error term.  In this case, Y is effect size, and 
Xi are the moderating variables.  Any bj that is found to be statistically significant 
describes the change in effect size for a unit change in Xj, while holding all other Xi 
constant.  Thus, the relative effects of the moderating variables were assessed. 
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environmental goods were coded as three dichotomous variables.  Specifically, “Air,” 
“Animal,” and “Land” were coded as “yes” or “no,” and water was the reference good 
signified by negative codes for all of the other three goods. 
Furthermore, the method of valuation was collapsed into one dichotomous 
variable for contingent valuation (“CV”).  In effect, this combines the hedonic pricing 
and travel cost methods into one reference group.  This is justified for several reasons.  
On a theoretical level, both methods are based upon real market behavior surrounding 
weak complements of the environmental goods.  Also, many of the travel cost analyses in 
this data set measured environmental values by having environmental measures as 
independent variables in the trip generation functions22.  That is, they were hedonic 
pricing models of trip generation.  Finally, on a practical level, there are too few travel 
cost valuations to make it a statistically significant category by itself.  Thus, method of 
valuation was coded as a dichotomous variable for contingent valuation, with weak 
complementarity methods as the reference method. 
Similarly, the location of study was converted to two dichotomous variables.  
Country was coded as United States or other (“U.S.”), and state was coded as California 
or other (“CA”).  These categories were already shown to moderate effect size.  (See 
Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11.)  The magnitude of change (“Holistic change”), type of 
description of change (“Quantitative description”), and era of contingent valuation 
development (“CV>1993”) were already operationalized as dichotomous variables, and 
they were included in the regression analyses as such.  Finally, the midpoint years of data 
collection (“Data year”) are ratio data and were included in the regression in that form. 
                                                 
22 This might also explain why the travel cost and hedonic pricing methods were not 
differentiated as moderating variables.  (See Tables 5.5 and 5.6.)   
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total sample size, T 708916 31235 637738
# effect sizes, K 325 121 283
adjusted R2 0.56 0.12 0.57





























































Dependent variable = effect size 





 Model 1 includes all valuations of the four environmental goods.  The reference 
group23 is valuations of incremental, qualitative changes in water, conducted with a weak 
complementarity method in a foreign country.  The F statistic indicates that the model is 
significant24, and the adjusted R2 indicates that 56% of the variance in effect size is 
explained by the model25.  Indeed all of the independent variables are statistically  
significant26.  Most of the b coefficients in the model have signs (positive or negative) 
that are consistent with previous findings in this chapter.  For example, improvements to 
air produces greater effect sizes than those of water, all other things being constant.  
Similarly, animal and land goods produce smaller effect sizes than water.  Also, holistic 
changes produce smaller effect sizes than incremental changes.  Most importantly for this 
research, the model confirms the previous finding that contingent valuations produce 
smaller effect sizes than the travel cost and hedonic pricing methods.  Two independent 
variables have the opposite signs of what was expected.  In Model 1, quantitative 
                                                 
23 In a regression equation that includes dichotomous independent variables, the reference 
group characterizes observations when all the dichotomous variables are “no.”  
24 Analysis of variance of a regression equation tests the overall significance of the 
model, and results in a F statistic.  Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses are 
 H0: b1 = b2 = … = bk = 0 (the model is insignificant) 
 H1: not all bk = 0 (the model is significant). 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic is greater than the critical value (defined 
by two separate degrees of freedom and a selected level of significance, α), otherwise the 
null cannot be rejected.  Rejecting the null indicates that the model is significant. 
25 While the adjusted R2 quantifies the explained variance in this model, it overestimates 
the explained variance in the represented relationship, because the variance in the original 
studies’ observations are not accounted in this model. 
26 The significance of each independent variable was determined with a t-test of the value 
of the coefficient, b.  Formally, the null and the alternative hypotheses are 
 H0: b = 0 (the independent variable is not related to the dependent variable) 
 H1: b ≠ 0 (the independent variable is related to the dependent variable). 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic lies outside the critical values (defined 
by the degrees of freedom in the sample and the selected level of significance, α), 
otherwise the null cannot be rejected.  Rejecting the null indicates the independent 
variable is related to the dependent variable, and the value of b measures the relationship. 
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descriptions of change produced smaller effect sizes than qualitative ones, contrary to 
earlier findings.  And valuations conducted in the U.S. produce smaller effect sizes than 
those done abroad.  These will be discussed when comparing them with their effects in 
Models 2 and 3. 
 Model 2 includes only the subset of valuations using contingent valuation, and its 
purpose was to confirm and measure the relative effect of the refinement of contingent 
valuation (“CV>1993”).  Its reference group is valuations of incremental, qualitative 
changes in water, conducted through 1993 in a foreign country.  Its F statistic indicates 
the model is significant, and all but one independent variable (“Land”) were found to be 
significant.  The model does confirm the moderating effect of the development of the 
contingent valuation method up through 1993.  The coefficient indicates that, holding all 
other variables constant, contingent valuations published after 1993 produced effect sizes 
that average 5.83 standard deviations greater than those published up through 1993.  The 
difference is larger than that reported in Table 5.8. 
Model 3 includes only the subset of valuations conducted in the United States, 
and its purpose was to test the effect of California (“CA”) on effect sizes.  Its reference 
group is valuations of incremental, qualitative changes in water, conducted with a weak 
complementarity method outside of California.  Like Model 1, all of the variables in 
Model 3 are statistically significant.  The model does confirm the moderating effect of 
studies done in California, but the sign of the coefficient contradicts the previous finding.  
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show California producing larger effect sizes, while Model 3 shows 
it producing smaller ones.  The contradiction was explored further by comparing the 
effect for different environmental goods.  These results are reported later in this chapter. 
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 Considering all three models together the primary variable of interest, method of 
valuation, confirmed earlier findings: contingent valuation produces smaller effect sizes 
than hedonic pricing and travel cost methods, but the gap – while still significant – has 
lessened in the last decade.  Also, not surprisingly, the type of good moderates value in 
all three models.  However, the magnitude of change – holistic versus incremental – 
produced varying results.  While holistic changes produced smaller effect sizes in Model 
1, it produced larger ones in Models 2 and 3.  This might reflect genuine differences in its 
effects in the different models (i.e., in contingent valuations and in the U.S. holistic 
changes produce larger effect sizes), and one could rationalize why this would be so.  But 
another explanation that cannot be overlooked is the validity of the measurement.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the two categories of magnitude are not completely mutually 
exclusive.  What is considered an incremental change in one study may be a holistic one 
in another, even though the actual change in each is the same.  Also, the two categories 
wash over the wide ranging degrees of changes in the studies.  While the operational 
categories were necessary for analytic purposes, their utility is questionable.  A better 
measure of magnitude of change is needed: one that can be validated so its influence on 
effect size can be more confidently assessed.  The type of description of change – 
quantitative versus qualitative – also produced varying results.  While the earlier analysis 
showed that quantitative descriptions result in larger effect sizes, Models 1 through 3 
reveal mixed conclusions.  This may be due to the variable’s association with magnitude 
of change.  As shown in Table 4.4, quantitative descriptions are strongly associated with 
incremental changes, and qualitative descriptions are associated with holistic changes.  
Thus, the mixed results in Models 1 through 3 may reflect the multicollinearity between 
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these two variables27.  “U.S.” also produced mixed results.  In Model 1, the resulting 
relationship is opposite that revealed in Table 5.9.  One possible explanation may be the 
relatively few cases done outside the United States, making its effects more volatile to 
changes in the subsets.  Finally, the years of data collection also produced mild, mixed 
results.  This reflects the weak relationship described earlier in its correlation coefficient.  
Indeed, a scatter plot of effect sizes by year of data collection, Figure 5.1, shows 


















Figure 5.1: Effect Size by Year of Data Collection 
 
 
Subsets by Environmental Goods 
 To further explore the effects of the method of valuation, and the contexts in 
which the effects change, the data set was divided into the four primary environmental 
goods and regression equations were recalculated with the remaining primary 
                                                 
27 However, when Models 1 through 3 were recalculated without “Holistic change” in the 
models, “Quantitative descriptions” still produced mixed results. 
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independent variables28.  Table 5.13 summarizes the results and shows the varying effects 
of method of valuation among the environmental goods.  While contingent valuation was 
shown to produce lower effect sizes overall, as confirmed in Model 1, it produces larger 
effect sizes for enhancements air and land.  For air, contingent valuation produces effect 
sizes 0.68 standard deviations larger than those from the hedonic pricing and travel cost 
methods, while holding the other variables constant.  For land, the increase is 2.44 
standard deviations.  For animal and water goods, contingent valuation produces lower 
effect sizes, consistent with previous findings.  Surprisingly, the effects do not appear to 
be associated with experience of using a specific method with each good (see Table 4.6).  
Contingent valuation has been disproportionately used to value animals, 
disproportionately underused to value air, and roughly proportionally used to value land 
and water.  The effects of contingent valuation do not match its use. 
 The effects of contingent valuation’s refinements were also explored by 
recalculating Models 4 through 7 with a data set limited to only contingent valuations, 
and substituting year of publication (“CV>1993”) for method of valuation.  Table 5.14 
summarizes the results.  For air and land, measures of effect size by contingent valuation 
are significantly larger after 1993, consistent with findings in Tables 5.8 and 5.12.  For 
animal and water goods, effect sizes from contingent valuation have changed slightly or 
insignificantly over the years. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Years of data collection (“Data year”) was excluded from these models because of its 
weak relationship with effect size, and country (“U.S.”) was excluded because of its low 
variance. 
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total sample size, T 217189 16028 417166 87612
# effect sizes, K 135 67 110 102
adjusted R2 0.06 0.77 0.04 0.03









































Dependent variable = effect size 
* Significant at α = 0.01 and T-1 degrees of freedom 
** Significant at α = 0.05 and T-1 degrees of freedom 
 
 










total sample size, T 6993 13533 16170 19567
# effect sizes, K 47 62 49 43
adjusted R2 0.77 0.01 0.14 0.01







































Dependent variable = effect size 
NA = not applicable; there is no variance in this variable  
* Significant at α = 0.01 and T-1 degrees of freedom 
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 Finally, the effect of California was reexamined, in light of the apparent 
contradictions between Tables 5.11 and 5.12.  The data set was limited to studies 
conducted in the United States, and the four regression equations were recalculated with a 
dichotomous variable for California (“CA”).  Table 5.15 summarizes the results.  For 
three of the four environmental goods – air, animal, and land – California is a significant 
variable.  Valuations of air conducted in California result in substantially smaller effect 
sizes than elsewhere, holding the other variables constant.  On the other hand, valuations 
of land conducted in California result in substantially larger effect sizes.  Valuations of 
animals result in slight differences between California and other states, and valuations of 
water result in no significant difference.  These findings appear to explain the 
 










total sample size, T 212314 15108 347657 77711
# effect sizes, K 126 61 72 81
adjusted R2 0.09 0.78 0.04 0.02

















































Dependent variable = effect size 
* Significant at α = 0.01 and T-1 degrees of freedom 




contradiction between the previous findings.  Valuations in California do indeed result in 
different effect sizes, but the differences are dependent upon the environmental good. 
 
Limitations of the Results 
 Before the implications of these results are discussed in Chapter 6, it is important 
to recognize their limitations.  The most apparent is the unexplained variance in the 
regression models.  While each model is statistically significant, most of them leave a 
vast majority of the variance in effect sizes unexplained.  One obvious reason for this is 
the bluntness of the operational measures of the independent variables.  The 
environmental good categories (except air), magnitudes of change, and even methods of 
valuation are much more varied than the few categories used to measure them: Table 4.1 
presents dozens of environmental goods reduced to seven categories; the magnitudes of 
change span a continuum, yet were reduced to two categories; and the variants of each 
method of valuation are hidden in the three categories used to capture them29.  However, 
given that the purpose of this research is to assess the broad (meta-level) effects of these 
variables on environmental valuation, the broad categories are justified, and the large, 
unexplained variance is expected and accepted as a consequence of the approach.  Future 
research could focus on the effects of each variable and use more sensitive measures.  
Also, the unexplained variance might be caused by other moderators not included in this 
research.  All of the meta-analyses conducted in this research suggest the presence of 
other moderators. 
                                                 
29 The methods were further reduced to two categories (contingent valuation and weak 
complement methods)! 
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 Another limitation of the results is the differing subsets of studies used for 
different analyses.  Different cases had to be eliminated from different analyses because 
of the differences in missing data in the observations.  The differing subsets present a 
possible spurious effect in the analyses.  That is, the results presented may be due to the 
differing subsets of data rather than the variables observed.  While the magnitude of such 
a spurious effect is unknown, it is minimized by the large sample size in this meta-
analysis.  One clear conclusion learned from this, however, is that information reported in 
environmental valuation studies is far from standard.  Improved and standardized 
reporting in original valuation studies is necessary to increase the validity of meta-
analyses such as this, and to make benefit transfer more viable (Boyle & Bergstrom, 
1992). 
 A common limitation of any meta-analysis is the possibility of publication bias 
(Begg, 1994).  This is a bias in the meta-analysis data set resulting from the presumed 
biases of journals to publish significant results.  If journals tend to publish significant 
results, and not publish insignificant results, then a meta-analysis of articles would result 
in an overstated effect size.  This problem is not of great concern to this meta-analysis for 
two reasons.  First, the problem is most relevant to meta-analyses focused on 
synthesizing and measuring the absolute magnitudes of effects.  The purpose of this 
meta-analysis, however, is to measure the relative magnitudes of effects from different 
valuation methods.  That is, the primary question in this research is one of convergence 
or divergence, not magnitude.  Thus, even if a publication bias was significant, it would 
have to be different for the different valuation methods to have an effect on these results.  
For example, consider the difference in means tests reported in Table 5.6, in which the 
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average effect sizes from contingent valuations and hedonic pricing studies were shown 
to be statistically different.  A “file drawer analysis”30 (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990, pp. 512-
513) estimated the number of unpublished hedonic pricing studies with an average effect 
size of zero that would have to exist in order to eliminate the difference between the 
average effect sizes of contingent valuation and hedonic pricing studies:   
 
XHP = k[(dk-average/dc-average) – 1] = 204[(2.25/1.62) – 1)] = 80.14, 
 
where k is the number of hedonic pricing studies, dk-average is the unweighted average 
effect size of hedonic pricing valuations, and dc-average is the unweighted average effect 
size of contingent valuations.  The results estimate that 80 unpublished, insignificant 
hedonic pricing studies would have to exist to change the conclusion of Table 5.6.   
Given the large sample of studies used in this evaluation – larger than any other meta-
analysis reviewed in this research – a comparably large number of other studies would be 
needed to negate the findings31.  The second reason why publication bias is not of great 
concern to this research is that many of the studies in the data set did indeed report 
insignificant results of environmental valuations. 
 A final limitation of these results is perhaps the most important: its 
generalizability.  The sample of studies in this research is not representative.  Rather, they 
were deliberately selected from the most prolific journals in environmental valuation to 
                                                 
30 The name of the analytic procedure refers to the studies with insignificant findings that 
occupy the file drawers of researchers’ cabinets instead of the pages of journals, because 
of a publication bias. 
31 For comprehensiveness, the “file drawer analysis” was repeated for the absolute 
magnitude of environmental valuations.  Considering the overall average effect size of 
the entire data set, 251 unpublished valuations averaging zero-effect would have to exist 
to make the overall average effect size insignificantly different from zero (at a α = 0.01 
level of significance). 
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presumably capture high quality studies.  This strategy was used to qualitatively 
minimize the chances of a type 1 error: rejecting the convergence of the valuation 
methods when they are actually equal.  The assumption was that the most prolific 
valuation journals publish higher quality valuation studies, and such studies would best 
represent the practices of environmental valuation in a meta-analysis.  Thus, the 
likelihood of erroneously rejecting convergence would be less than that for a data set that 
included lower quality studies.  The consequence of this strategy is that the magnitude of 
the divergence is not representative.  The advantage, however, is that the conclusion of 
divergence is better substantiated.  
 
Summary 
 In summary, the average effect size of all the environmental valuations in this 
data set is 6.90 standard deviations.  However, the variance in this average strongly 
suggests the presence of moderating variables.  Several variables were tested individually 
and collectively for their moderating effects.  The conclusions of the analyses are as 
follows: 
 
 Type of good is a significant moderator.  Air and water have significantly larger 
average effect sizes than land and animal, and air has a significantly larger average 
effect size than water. 
 
 Magnitude of change and type of description of change are significant moderators, 
but their effects are mixed.  These conflicting results may be due to validity problems 
in the measures themselves. 
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 The method of valuation, the primary variable in this research, is a significant 
moderator.  Effect sizes from contingent valuations are, on average, significantly 
smaller than those from the travel cost and hedonic pricing methods.  There is no 
significant difference between the effect sizes of the travel cost and hedonic pricing 
methods.  On average, contingent valuation produces effect sizes that average 40% to 
55% less than those of the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods.  The difference 
varies with the environmental goods valued.  While contingent valuations of animals 
and water result in lower effect sizes, those of air and land result in larger effect sizes.  
There is evidence, however, that contingent valuations have become more reliable 
over time.  Those published after the 1993 National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration report (Arrow et al., 1993) are less variant than those published before 
it;  the difference is accentuated for valuations of air and land.  Even so, the 
difference between the results of contingent valuations and  travel cost or hedonic 
pricing methods remain significant. 
 
 Few studies report statistics on the incomes of the subjects, preventing an analysis of 
the moderating effect of income on valuations. 
 
 The year of data collection is not a significant modifier.  There is not significant 




 Location of study is a significant moderator.  Effect sizes in the United States average 
twice the magnitude of all other countries in the data set, but the relatively small 
number of foreign studies in the data set casts doubt on this finding.  Within the 
United States effect sizes in California are, on average, significantly different than 
those from other states in the data set.  Specifically, effect sizes for air tend to be 




 This research set out to evaluate three popular methods of environmental 
valuation, because their substantial impact on public policy warrants a critical analysis, 
and because they have been clouded by controversy.  The evidence presented sheds light 
on the methods so policy practitioners can better understand their results and judge their 
proper use.  This chapter folds the results of this research back into the broader debate 
over environmental valuation to interpret the results and their implications in 
environmental policy.  It begins by describing what the results of environmental 
valuations tell us.  This includes a discussion of the convergent validity of the methods 
and their defensible uses.  It then examines the literature to describe what environmental 
valuations do not tell us, but should. 
 
What Environmental Valuations Tell Us 
 Following the analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the most fundamental 
question that must now be asked is, “What do environmental valuations tell us?”  The 
evidence in this research does not completely support one side of the debate described in 
Chapter 2, but it certainly leans with the critics.  Interestingly, the evidence brings 
attention to a second question that appears equally important: “Whose values do they 
represent?” 
 Addressing the first question, proponents and opponents agree that environmental 
valuations are intended to measure economic values of environmental goods.  This 
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dimension of value has several components of its own, which are illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
Total economic value of environmental goods is composed of use values and nonuse 
values, and these two categories are composed of five subcategories of value: direct use, 
indirect use, option, existence, and bequest values1 (Barbier, 1994).  But the three 
methods of valuation do not all claim to measure total economic value, only portions of 
it.  The hedonic pricing and travel cost methods, each being based upon observed market 
behavior, can only measure direct use values.  Contingent valuation, in contrast, is 
claimed to be able to measure all types of economic value, but these distinctions are often 
absent in its applications and left to the judgments of its readers.  Thus, the first  
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Figure 6.1: Economic Values of Environmental Goods  
(adapted from Barbier, 1994) 
 
                                                          
1 Direct use values are those derived from direct consumption or interaction with the 
good.  Indirect use values reflect benefits provided by environmental goods to support 
economic life, such as ecological services.  Option values do not represent a separate 
category of values, but reflect future use values: the value of holding the option for future 
use.  Existence values are intrinsic to the good and unrelated to the use of the good by the 
valuer or anyone.  Bequest values reflect desires to conserve the environment for use by 
future generations. 
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conclusion that can be made is that environmental valuations speak of direct use 
economic values, and in some cases (contingent valuation) it may also speak of other 
dimensions of economic value. 
 How authoritatively do they speak of these values?  The evidence from this study 
is mixed.  It clearly says that environmental values are positive.  In all the subsets of 
cases observed, the average effect size is always positive.  In only a few cases do the 
confidence intervals for the average effect size include zero, and each of those cases have 
a relatively small number of observations2.  The consistency with which positive 
measures of values were attributed to environmental improvements lends some credibility 
to the methods.  That is, the methods measure the direction of value well3.  But what can 
be said about the magnitudes?  Do they accurately express the same economic values of 
environmental goods?  The divergence of effect sizes among the methods say no.  
Contingent valuations and the two weak complementarity methods produce significantly 
different average effect sizes, while controlling for environmental good, holistic versus 
incremental changes, and quantitative versus qualitative measures of change.  The 
divergence suggests that one of the methods has problems with validity, or is measuring 
different aspects of value, as further discussed below.  In lieu of true economic value, 
others have offered alternative interpretations of the magnitudes of results.  Nunes and 
van den Bergh (2001) note that the range of environmental benefits stemming from an 
environmental good often extends far beyond that which is described or inferred in a 
valuation study.  As a result, the estimate of value can at best be taken as an incomplete, 
                                                          
2 Smaller numbers of observations increase the widths of confidence intervals. 
3 This claim is based on the assumption that values for environmental improvements are 
indeed positive, which is substantiated by opinion surveys on environmental values (e.g. 
Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1999). 
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lower bound of economic value.  Gregory, Lichtenstein, Brown, Peterson, and Slovic 
(1995) found that respondents' stated values are only vaguely represented in monetary 
terms.  Any dollar amount within a broad range is considered an acceptable expression of 
value, but the magnitudes are imprecise and not appropriate for economic analyses:   
 
“The more fundamental question raised by our results is whether holistic 
monetary estimates, as required by [contingent valuation] elicitations, 
provide appropriate measures of value for many nonmarket environmental 
goods.  Our conclusion . . . is that often they do not.  The imprecision in 
monetary estimates reported here arises because statements of monetary 
value for these goods are constructed by participants in the course of the 
elicitation process.” (p. 471) 
 
 At first glance, the answer to the second question seems simple: the values 
expressed or revealed are those of the subjects, be they respondents in a contingent 
valuation study, home buyers in a hedonic pricing study, or visitors in a travel cost study.  
But this interpretation belies the contextual problem of the valuation methods.  In Chapter 
5 this problem was identified as information bias: how the results of contingent 
valuations are significantly influenced by the information provided by the researchers.  A 
similar problem exists for the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods.  The selections of 
goods to include in the travel cost and hedonic pricing models are, in essence, 
researchers’ judgments of the weak complementary bundles of goods consumers are 
purchasing with their properties and travels.  The reality of what consumers are 
consciously purchasing may range from none of the environmental goods identified by 
the researchers to entire spectra of economic values of the goods.  For all three methods, 
researchers frame the environmental goods being valued by identifying the goods, 
specifying their scopes, and selecting the measures of them.  None of these tasks is an 
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objective decision, and all of them influence or define the results of valuation studies.  
Thus, when assessing the meanings of the outputs of environmental valuations, it is 
important to recognize that the values expressed are not only those of the subjects, but 
also those of the researchers (Nunes & van den Bergh, 2001).   
 One value of researchers that is consistently expressed in the applications of these 
methods is in the scope of value itself.  Just as researchers frame the environmental good 
being valued, so too do they frame how value is measured.  For each of these three 
methods, value is limited to the economic view and it is measured in monetary terms 
(Kassiola, 2003a).  This framework is defended by proponents of environmental 
valuation.  The economic view is justified, as described in Chapter 2, because it has 
become the dominant perspective in public policy analysis (Rees, 1994).  Therefore the 
economic value of environmental goods must be quantified so they are not excluded from 
cost-benefit analyses (Goodland & Ledec, 1994).  The use of monetary metrics to 
measure economic value is strictly a pragmatic decision.  It is not so much justified by 
proponents as it is irrelevant to them:  
 
“Opponents of economic evaluation frequently misrepresent economics as 
being about money: it is not, money is only the yardstick with which to 
compare the relative values of different goods. . . What the economist 
seeks to do is derive a rigorous method of measuring the values different 
individuals place upon different goods in order that these values can be 
compared.” (Green & Tunstall, 1991, p. 125) 
 
To practitioners of the methods, money is just a numeric measure that is convenient 
because of its well understood, common meaning.  Any other scaled measure would be 
welcome, but none is as commensurate among different people.   
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However, the selection of money as the measure is relevant because the common 
meaning it holds is limited in scope.  Money is the currency of markets, expressing 
economic values.  But there is significant evidence that people object to expressing their 
values for environmental goods in solely economic terms, and find it difficult to do so.  
Sagoff (1998) argues that individuals’ policy judgments expressed in contingent 
valuations are not actually their preferences as utility maximizers but normative 
expressions of what society ought to do as a collective.  Empirical evidence appears to 
support this claim.  Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) tested the construct validity of 
contingent valuations and found that results actually represent the respondents’ 
willingness to pay for the moral satisfaction of contributing to the public goods, not their 
economic values for the good.  Two other studies go further by identifying the ethics 
behind this moral satisfaction.  Stevens, Echeverria, Glass, Hager, and More (1991) asked 
respondents to interpret the meanings behind their willingness to pay for wildlife 
survival.  They found that most respondents were expressing beliefs that wildlife have a 
right to exist independent of any benefit or harm to people.  Baron and Spranca (1997) 
similarly tested the method and described environmental values as “protected values” 
arising from deontological ethics, not utilitarianism.  Their interpretation also explained 
why the results of contingent valuation are sometimes not reliable: 
 
“Protected values are those that resist trade-offs with other values, 
particularly economic values.  We propose that such values arise from 
deontological rules concerning action.  People are concerned about their 
participation in transactions rather than just with the consequences that 
result.  This proposal implies that protected values, defined as those that 
display trade-off resistance, will also tend to display quantity insensitivity, 
agent relativity, and moral obligation.  People will also tend to experience 
anger at the thought of making trade-offs, and to engage in denial of the 
need for trade-offs through wishful thinking.” (p. 1) 
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In light of these interpretations, it seems clear that the values of environmental valuation 
researchers are in conflict with those of the people they study. 
 
Convergent Validity 
 While the construct validity of environmental valuations have been tested by 
others, this analysis focused on the convergent validity among the three methods.  This 
refers to the degree to which different methods of valuation result in similar measures.  It 
is, in essence, a measure of reliability among the different methods.  The convergence of 
results is a necessary condition of validity, but not a sufficient one.  That is, when 
convergence is found between methods, we still cannot claim the validity of the methods.  
We can only say that they are reliable.  The meaning of the convergent results (i.e., the 
construct validity) is still open to debate.  When, on the other hand, divergence is found 
between methods, then validity is jeopardized.  The test does not say which methods are 
invalid, only that among the methods exhibiting divergence there is a validity problem.   
 Again, the results presented in Chapter 5 are mixed.  Table 5.5 shows no 
significant difference between the average effect sizes from the travel cost and hedonic 
pricing methods.  Their results converge4, establishing a level of reliability among them.  
However, the results from contingent valuations are significantly different than each of 
the other two methods.  Put together, these two results strongly suggest validity problems 
with contingent valuations5, or at least confirm that contingent valuation measures a 
                                                          
4 The small number of cases using the travel cost method makes this conclusion tenuous. 
5 However, the results do not prove that contingent valuation results are invalid.  To 
answer which methods’ results are invalid would require comparisons with actual market 
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different type of demand than the other two methods.  Literature that evaluates the 
construct validity of contingent valuation are generally critical.  Kealy, Dovidio, and 
Rockel (1988) compared contingent valuation results for familiar, market goods against 
actual market behavior for the goods and found low accuracy for the method.  They 
concluded that the accuracy of results for less well defined, less familiar, environmental 
goods can be expected to be even lower.  Johnston and Swallow (1999) found that the 
preferences expressed in their contingent valuation study conflict with the economic 
theory from which environmental valuation grew, casting doubt on the validity of the 
method.  Others have sought to explain the causes of such divergence.  Gregory, 
Lichtenstein, and Slovic (1993) evaluated contingent valuation from the perspective of 
behavioral decision research on human preferences and concluded that that the method 
imposes unrealistic cognitive demands on respondents, jeopardizing the validity of the 
method.  Still, there is the possibility that the divergence between the methods’ average 
effect sizes confirm Smith and Pattanayak’s (2002) explanation for why there should be a 
divergence.  Either way, at least one policy implication of this research is clear: these 
methods cannot be used interchangeably.  Policies prescribing environmental valuation in 




 Given these mixed results, what uses of these valuation methods remain 
defensible?  Others have described guidelines for the proper application of environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                             
values, or some other measure of construct validity, which were beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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valuation tools, and the results from this study provide greater detail to these guidelines.  
Navrud and Pruckner (1997) developed a hierarchy of need for accuracy6 in 
environmental valuation.  As illustrated in Figure 6.2, accuracy of results is not needed 
when the purpose is simply to stimulate awareness and promote public discussion of the 
environmental changes.  For example, Costanza et al. (1997) boldly estimated the 
economic value of the entire earth’s ecosystem services, based upon benefit transfers of 
over 100 valuation studies, many of them contingent valuations.  While the authors 
explicitly conceded the limitations of their estimate – including the biases in the valuation 
methods used in the original studies – they nonetheless presented their results to create 
awareness of the economic and environmental trade-offs humanity is making, 
consciously or not.  Critics of their effort focus on the accuracy of the results, but admit 
that the effort brings attention to benefits provided by environmental services (Norgaard, 
Bode, & Values Reading Group, 1998).  It showed, by order of magnitude, not precision, 
that the environment is worth far more than all the earth’s combined gross domestic 
product.  More accuracy is needed when evaluating projects and regulations, and when 
conducting environmental accounting, such as for cost-benefit analyses of proposed 
actions.  The most accuracy is demanded in natural resource damage assessments, such as 
the case of valuing the environmental losses due to the Exxon Valdez oil spill for 
purposes of litigation and cost recovery. 
 The problem with these guidelines is that the accuracy of environmental 
valuations can rarely be directly confirmed because environmental goods are usually not 
traded in the market.  Instead, prescriptions of valuation methods to these categories of 
                                                          
6 In their study, the authors made no distinction between accuracy and validity and used 
both terms to refer to the degree to which valuation results match actual values of 
environmental goods.  The same is done here. 
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Figure 6.2: Demand for Accuracy  
in Environmental Valuation 
(adapted from Navrud & Pruckner, 1997) 
 
 
uses can only be based upon indirect assessments of the methods’ validity, such as the 
assessment of convergent validity in this research.  Indeed, results of this study suggest 
that contingent valuation is best left for purposes of stimulating awareness and public 
discussion.  The divergence of its average effect sizes from those of the other methods, 
combined with others’ evidence of its construct validity problems, limit its defensible use 
to cases demanding only order of magnitude estimates of economic value.  Its use in cost-
benefit analyses, and other contexts demanding greater accuracy, is misleading at best 
(Diamond & Housman, 1994).  Does this leave the hedonic pricing and travel cost 
methods to fulfill the other uses of environmental valuation?  The evidence in this 
research does not invalidate these methods’ results, but it also does not validate them 
because their results were only compared against each other, not against some objective 
benchmarks of values.  Research is needed to test the construct validity of measuring 
economic values of bundled goods through these methods.  If such research confirms the 
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validity of the methods, then it is a much safer leap to assume that their use to value 
nonmarket environmental goods is also valid.  Even so, they would still only measure 
direct use values, just one component of total economic value. 
 Norton (1995) also developed guidelines for economic valuation of environmental 
impacts.  His environmental risk decision square conceptually maps environmental 
impacts against scales of space and time, and describes conditions under which economic 
decision rules are appropriate and inappropriate.  In the square, an action with spatially 
wide and irreversible impacts affects the entire ecosystem beyond the length of a human 
life span.  This is shown in Figure 6.3 as the “red zone,” and such actions should not be 
valued by methods of individual preferences because they commit future generations to 
broad environmental impacts.  At the other extreme, actions with local and short term 
impacts can be taken without affecting future generations or wide areas, so economic 
valuation methods can be appropriate. 
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Figure 6.3: Environmental Risk Decision Square 
(adapted from Norton, 1995) 
red zone 
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The conclusions of this research accentuate Norton’s prescriptions: the possible 
validity problems of the valuation methods further relegate their uses to low risk 
situations.  Considering Navrud and Pruckner’s and Norton’s guidelines together, along 
with evidence from this research, the defensible uses of the environmental valuation 
methods are quite narrow.  They can be appropriate in cases of local reversible impacts, 
and in such cases, hedonic pricing and travel cost methods are more reliable choices 
when accuracy is demanded.  But, again, these two methods only capture direct use 
values and ignore all nonuse values.  When accuracy is not needed, then estimates of total 
economic value from contingent valuation may stimulate discussions for local, reversible 
impacts.  But when both accuracy and total economic value are needed, none of these 
three methods will suffice. 
The results of this research also speak to the defensible uses of existing valuation 
studies in benefit transfers.  The literature already identifies key study qualities to 
consider when transferring results from one context to another.  They include the 
environmental good, the change in the good, the time in which the values were measured, 
the location of the study, the quality of the study, the demographics of the beneficiaries 
and the population studied, and the hypothetical markets in contingent valuations 
(Atkinson, Crocker, & Shogren, 1992; Brouwer, 2000; Smith, 1993; Whitehead & 
Hoban, 1999).  All of these factors are presumed to moderate value, and the analyses 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 help to qualify and quantify the effects of some of them. 
The analysis confirms that different environmental goods do indeed moderate 
values.  Air is the most transferable good, because of its homogeneity and the large 
number of studies valuing it.  Homogeneity of the good reduces variance among the 
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valuations, while the large number of studies increases the likelihood of finding existing 
studies that are comparable to the target situation in multiple ways.  Animals and land, on 
the other hand, are the least transferable goods, because of the heterogeneity of these 
goods and the relatively few numbers of studies valuing each category of these goods.   
This research is less conclusive about the importance of considering location and 
time in benefit transfers.  While the average effect size in the United States is over twice 
that of other countries, the relatively few numbers of studies conducted outside the 
United States, and the diversity of countries represented, casts doubt on generalizability 
of this result.  Within the United States, effect sizes were shown to be relatively stable 
across the states analyzed, except for California.  Californians appear to place greater 
value on land improvements than the rest of the country, and less value on air 
improvements.  Regarding the influence of the time of study, the evidence in this study 
shows it has relatively little effect on the measured values.  While the preferences can 
reasonably be expected to change over time, the data in this study shows remarkably 
stable measures over the last three decades. 
Most importantly, this research adds the method of valuation to the list of factors 
to consider when transferring benefits.  Overall, contingent valuations produced effect 
sizes that averaged 40% to 55% less than those of the hedonic pricing and travel cost 
methods.  However, the effect varies substantially by environmental good.  
The evidence in this research also adds to the existing demands for better 
reporting in original valuation studies, so their results can be better judged in benefit 
transfers and meta-analyses (Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996; Smith, 1993).  In 
this research, 614 valuations of environmental changes were counted, but 30% of them 
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were not usable in the analyses because they did not report sufficient information in their 
results.  Commonly missing, fundamental information includes samples sizes and 
measures of variance.  Other information that was often missing but could be quite 
helpful for secondary analyses include demographic characteristics of the samples such 
as income and age statistics, and study artifacts such as sampling methods and response 
rates. 
Ultimately, benefit transfers are vulnerable to the same validity issues as the 
original studies, but to a greater degree because of the additional issue of the 
comparability of the circumstances in the original studies and the target situation.  Thus 
benefit transfers should be limited to situations demanding low accuracy and relative 
economic values (Navrud & Pruckner, 1997). 
 
Future Research with this Data 
 Further refinement of the defensible uses of these methods of environmental 
valuation is possible with additional analysis of this data set.  Three broad issues appear 
particularly relevant, promising, and possible.  One issue for deeper analysis is the 
moderating effects of valuation method.  The current research confirmed and measured 
the influence of method, but it hides all the variance found within each method.  
Contingent valuation studies vary by the methods of elicitation, payment vehicles, 
amounts of information provided, components of value explicitly measured, response 
rates, etc., and many of these factors have been hypothesized or shown to affect results, 
as discussed in Chapter 5.  A meta-analysis of the these variables could quantify these 
moderating effects, and explain more of the variance in contingent valuation results.  
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Similarly, hedonic pricing studies vary by functional form of the variables, the numbers 
and types of explanatory variables, the goods purchased, the source of dependent 
variable, etc., and the data set could test the effects of these factors on hedonic pricing 
results.  Also, with more sensitive coding of the magnitudes of environmental change, 
including temporal and spatial boundaries, a “meta-scope test” could be performed to test 
the methods’ sensitivity to the scope of goods (Gregory, Mendelsohn, & Moore, 1989). 
 Another issue for refinement is the moderating effects of environmental goods.  
Further meta-analysis of it could reveal preferences people hold for variants of goods.  
For example, while others have attempted to measure the values of surface water in 
different forms (Mahan, Polasky, & Adams, 2000), a meta-analysis of this data set could 
measure the relative preferences people hold for ground water versus surface water.  Such 
information could be important to water resources planning and development.  Similarly, 
the relative preferences of different forms of land could be assessed with this data set to 
inform land use planning and development.   
 This data set could also be analyzed to compare use values and nonuse values 
measured by contingent valuation.  The adaptability of the method to the different 
components of economic value is its strength to proponents, but may also explain its 
problems with reliability (Diamond & Housman, 1994; More, Averill, & Stevens, 1996; 
Rosenthal, Nelson, & Kopp, 1992).  Because it can measure different components of 
economic value, its results can be expected to exhibit greater variance, thereby reducing 
its average effect size.  On the other hand, average effect sizes from contingent valuations 
can also be expected to be larger, because they are presumed to measure more 
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components of value.  A meta-analysis of the components of economic value might sort 
use values from nonuse values and explain much of the variance in results.   
 
What They Don’t Tell Us, But Should 
 What environmental valuations aim to tell us is a limited, economic view of 
value.  There are two major problems with this.  First, as described above, the methods do 
not do a great job of doing so.  Contingent valuation is fraught with validity problems, 
while the hedonic pricing and travel cost methods measure just a slice of economic value.  
More importantly, economic values are not as relevant to the environment as the 
popularity of environmental valuations suggests.  Subjects in environmental valuation 
studies make decisions based upon the advancement of their personal well being, but the 
environment is not a commodity to be traded for the purpose of raising personal welfare 
(Jakobsson & Dragun, 2001; Kassiola, 2003b; Rees, 1998).  Instead, the environment 
elicits many other dimensions of value that have been vying for a substantial voice in 
public policy.  Some of them have had notable success in being codified7, but none has 
displaced economic value in popularity, or approached the well defined, quantitative 
methods of measurement enjoyed by economic values.  
 Even proponents of these methods are quick to note that other dimensions of 
value are relevant to environmental goods and ought to be considered in policy decisions 
(Hanley, 1992).  But oftentimes, the inclusion of economic measures of value actually 
causes the loss of other measures because it reduces and limits the discussion by 
presenting what is presumed to be compact, commensurate information (Vatn & 
                                                          
7 For example, environmental justice is codified in Executive Order 12989, and public 
opinions on environmental impacts in 40CFR1502. 
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Bromley, 1994).  To the extent that environmental valuations limit the discussions to only 
economic considerations, they are detrimental to environmental decision making.  
Instead, valuations of the environment ought to facilitate expressions of many dimensions 
of value (Norgaard, 1985; Paehlke, 2003).  The literature again provides guidance on 
other values relevant to environmental decision making.  Interestingly, it lists values that 
are in tension with foundations of economic theory: 
 
 Communal, public values (not just individuals’ private values).  Stone (1997) strongly 
argues that public policy decisions, such as those affecting the environment, are 
inherently communal and are misdirected when a purely economic perspective is 
taken.  In such a framework, the individual is sovereign, and each person narrowly 
seeks to advance personal interests.  Bozeman (2002) claims that such an approach 
leads to “public value failure,” failures of efficient markets to produce outcomes 
reflecting public values.  “What most economic approaches to public value have in 
common is that they are less a reflection of public value than the private value of 
things public” (p. 146).  Instead, Stone argues that public policy decisions are best 
understood and directed when the community – or the “polis” as she calls it – is 
sovereign and individuals make decisions together with a focus on public interest.  
Several others agree (e.g., Gowdy, 1997; Norton, Costanza, & Bishop, 1998; Sagoff, 
1997). 
 
 Cooperative values (not just competitive values).  Closely related to communal values 
are cooperative values.  While the former identifies a unit of analysis (community), 
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the latter identifies a process.  Markets tend to generate competitive behavior and 
discourage cooperative behavior, but this is an outcome of market processes, not a 
reflection of human nature (McLaughlin, 2003).  Thus, Shabman and Stephenson 
(1996) claim that any valuation method’s validity and usefulness should be judged by 
its ability to facilitate cooperative decision making.  They argue that values for 
environmental goods are constructed in dialogue and interactions, not held  
individually in some a priori preference logic.   
 
 Deontological values (not just utilitarian values).  Milbrath (2003) argues that 
economic valuation abdicates moral choices on the environment to markets, when 
justice is a more appropriate value to measure.  Sagoff (1981) agrees.  He states that 
judgments on environmental choices ought to reflect deontological values, not just 
utilitarian ones.  Kempton, Boster, and Hartley (1995) provide empirical evidence 
supporting this.  In their public opinion survey on environmental values, they found 
that only a small minority of Americans take a purely utilitarian view of 
environmental goods, even among people in the timber industry who directly benefit 
from the commodity value of trees.  Environmental justice is an example of 
deontological values considered in environmental decision making, but its lack of a 
clear operational measure – as well as the controversial politics surrounding it –  has 
kept it from a position of prominence in environmental decision making. 
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 Environmental quality (not just personal wealth).  When personal gain is the measure 
of value for common-pool8 environmental goods, the resources’ degradation is 
eminent (Hardin 1968).  To counter this tendency, environmental quality must be 
included in the measures of value.  For example, the value of trees may be monetarily 
quantified by their potential market value as paper or lumber.  Such analysis, 
however, would neglect their values in preventing soil-erosion, using carbon dioxide 
and generating oxygen, and providing habitat for wildlife (Brower, 1995).  Measuring 
these latter values identify an environmental objective of decision making that 
complements the welfare objective of the economic view.  Gordon Brady, then a 
member of the Council on Environmental Quality under President Ronald Reagan, 
understood these things when his boss called for cost-benefit decision rules for 
government actions, in Executive Order 12291.  To balance the purely economic 
view, Brady (1983) prescribed direct measures of environmental quality to be 
included in calculations of environmental values.   
 
 Taken together, the relevant measures of environmental values include economic 
terms, non-economic social terms, and environmental terms.  They represent a pluralistic 
approach to replace one that has been dominated by, if not limited to, economic 




                                                          




 These prescriptions for what environmental valuations ought to tell us begs the 
question, “How can these components of value be measured?”  Finding a single measure 
to capture all aspects of relevant values is unlikely and perhaps undesirable, but options 
are available to capture the relevant values with a combination of measures.  Alternative 
methods of value measurement can be grouped by two variables: component of value and 
unit of analysis.  Several methods are summarized in Table 6.1 and select ones are 
introduced below. 
 Many methods have been developed to measure the economic component of 
value.  Besides those evaluated in this study, others observe groups and environmental 
qualities.  Multi-attribute value elicitation is a modification of contingent valuation that is 
explicit in capturing several aspects of total economic value (McDaniels & Roessler, 
1998).  Doing so makes the interpretation of the results less problematic, but the method 
is vulnerable to many of the same problems as contingent valuation.  Deliberative 
contingent valuation acknowledges the problems of applying utilitarian ethics to 
environmental decision making, but does not abandon economic valuation.  Instead, it 
assumes that contingent valuation can facilitate collective judgments of value by making 
the process discursive (Sagoff, 1998).  The jury-like approach is still aimed at economic 
valuation of environmental goods, but the task is couched as a social preference, not 
individual.  Two other methods are creative in their analysis of environmental measures 
in economic terms.  The environmental annuities method (Unsworth & Bishop, 1994) and 
the net environmental benefit analysis (NEBA) (J. Fittipaldi, personal communication, 
2001) essentially apply methods of discounted cash flow analysis and cost-benefit  
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Table 6.1: Methods of Valuation by Component of Value and Unit of Analysis 
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analysis to environmental changes, but they do so in ecological units of measure.  Thus, 
they avoid all the controversy over monetary conversion of environmental changes.  
NEBA was developed by the U.S. Army to prioritize remediation efforts and has been 
endorsed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of the 
Interior (“Army…,” 2001).  Multiple attribute decision making is a framework for 
evaluating environmental alternatives based on operations research (Prato, 1999).  Like 
monetary environmental valuation, its criterion of evaluation is efficiency, but unlike 
monetary valuation, it considers multiple dimensions of value.     
 Government bodies and social sciences have developed popular methods of 
measuring social values and facilitating social decision making, such as hearings, social 
surveys, focus groups, and debates.  Added to this list are several methods of social value 
measurement developed specifically for environmental decision making.  Decision 
pathways is a surveying technique that not only measures preferences, but also facilitates 
the construction of expressed values through series of linked questions (Gregory et al., 
1997).  Participants in the method are asked a sequence of questions that is determined by 
their answers to previous questions.  Several different question-and-answer pathways are 
possible, each one representing different values underlying their stated preferences.  
Narrative valuation is a method designed to help respondents consider different values in 
their development of environmental judgments (Satterfield, Slovic, & Gregory, 2000).  
As its name suggests, it does so through qualitative narratives of the problem.  Discursive 
ethics, a conceptual framework stemming from the theoretical roots of the Frankfurt 
School of critical theory, deconstructs environmental value claims from multiple 
disciplines to identify and compare underlying value distinctions (O’Hara, 1996).  It 
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manifests itself as open discourse among stakeholders which can take the forms of 
conflict resolution, mediation, etc.  A few methods of social value measurement are 
noteworthy for their creativity or unique perspective.  Citizens' jury provides an 
interesting environmental decision making method loosely based on the idea of a court 
jury (Aldred & Jacobs, 2000).  Representative jurors are selected from the public to hear 
arguments for environmental alternatives.  Evidence is presented by experts on the 
alternatives, the jury deliberates, and their decision is expected to carry some authority.  
Content analysis is based on an established claim that news media coverage of issues are 
correlated with public values.  Applied to environmental valuation, the method examines 
topics and prevalence of environmental issues in the news media to assess values for 
them (Bengston, Fan, & Celarier, 1999).  Finally, historiography recognizes that the 
history of an environmental good is a component of its value (Goodin, 2003).  Recording 
of its history preserves that value. 
 The environmental sciences are responsible for developing the direct measures of 
environmental quality, such as environmental indicators and indices.  Environmental 
indicators are physical measures of select environmental goods or conditions that are 
meant to represent broader environmental quality (Nyborg, 2000).  For example, the 
prevalence of a key species may be an indicator of the health of its ecosystem.  A more 
direct approach recognizes biologic integrity as a measure of ecosystem health (Karr, 
2002), and indices of biologic integrity have been developed for different ecosystems 
(e.g., Karr & Rossano, 2001; Lyons, Navarro-Perez, Cochran, Santana, & Guzman-
Arroyo, 1995).  Components of a specific riparian index, for example, might include 
counts of kinds of organisms at a site (biodiversity), relative abundance of predators, fish 
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assemblages, etc.  Such indices provide a continuum of values beyond the dichotomous 
categories of "impaired" and "unimpaired" that are often used to inform decisions. 
 Maguire (2002) claims that good methods of measuring environmental values are 
those that facilitate public decision making by 1) articulating those values, 2) making 
tradeoffs among conflicting goals, 3) understanding sources of conflict, 4) solving 
distributional problems, 5) integrating values with technical analysis, and 6) anticipating 
future consequences.  By themselves, the three methods of economic valuation in this 
research do ostensibly well in facilitating tradeoffs, but they fail miserably on all other 
counts.  However, a pluralistic approach to environmental valuation that incorporates 
some of the alternative methods introduced here can meet all of these criteria, and thus 
improve environmental policy decision making processes. 
 
The Lesson from the Exxon Valdez 
 The conclusions of this research have been anticipated by policy practitioners in 
the last decade.  Let us return to the case of the Exxon Valdez to observe the rise and 
decline of the practice.  The ship spilled its oil cargo in Prince William Sound in 1989, 
and in the ensuing battle over cost recovery, private and government organizations 
conducted environmental valuation studies to estimate the economic value of the 
environmental damages.  The case brought much attention to the practice of 
environmental valuation, and eventually a government endorsement of contingent 
valuation in 1993.  But it also increased the existing controversies surrounding the 
methods, partly because the estimated values of the environmental damages varied by 
billions of dollars (House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine Fisheries, 
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1991), and partly because some observers were perplexed by the measurement of 
environmental damages in monetary terms (Keeble, 1999).  Instead of clarifying the 
magnitude of the damages, many observers felt environmental valuation had made it 
more obscure.  Under such controversy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration ceased its practice of environmental valuation in 1995, just two years 
after it had endorsed it (Rogers, 1995).  NOAA announced it would no longer monetize 
the values of dead animals or damaged ecosystems following oil spills.  Instead, it would 
measure environmental impacts in ecological terms and engage the public to determine 
how to restore the ecosystem.  This restoration-based approach acknowledges the 
vulnerabilities and limitations of monetary valuation methods (especially for natural 
resource damage assessment), and replaces it with methods that are more community 
oriented, cooperative, and focused on environmental quality.  The results of this research 
provides econometric evidence to this experiential lesson of the Exxon Valdez case.  They 
confirm that methods of monetizing environmental values should have a much smaller 
role in environmental decision making than once thought and prescribed by policy 
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